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PREFACE 
This Concise Theory of Military Combat was prepared by members of The 
Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) as part of a broader program to publish a 
series of papers to develop public understanding of the nature of military 
conflict. TMCI is a nonprofit organization dedicated to the advancement of 
knowledge of military conflict, war, and military combat to reduce the 
likelihood and dangers of warfare. Its members pursue the goals of TMCI with 
no compensation other than professional and personal satisfaction. 
TMCI was formed in 1979 by a group of military operations research analysts 
and historians who concluded that then-current models and simulations of war 
and combat were inadequate and did not reflect a robust understanding of 
military conflict in its complex dimensions. Since then, TMCI members have 
prepared and presented research papers dealing with many aspects of military 
conflict. Over the past five years, emphasis has focused on understanding and 
summarizing a theory of military combat, and this paper is a result of that focus. 
The overall structure adopted by TMCI to organize and present its findings 
considers military conflict in the context of war and combat. These domains form 
a general hierarchy and are interrelated, yet separate. As with any taxonomy of 
human endeavors, the TMCI definition of domains into constituent parts is 
somewhat arbitrary, and there are exceptions and "fuzzy" boundaries in the 
structure. There is a question whether war or military conflict should be 
paramount in the ordering of domains or whether they are relatively equal in 
importance. War includes many activities other than military conflict, and 
military conflict exists outside of war. Additionally, there are broad, cross- 
cutting functions (e.g., command, personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, 
civil-military affairs, communications and information, and technology) that 
apply to each of the major domains in varying degrees with differences in 
application. 
The theories, philosophies, axioms, and principles developed by TMCI and its 
members are systematic, intellectual structures that explain fundamentals and 
the way that things work within specified boundaries of the phenomena. They 
are descriptive and explanatory, but are not necessarily predictive or 
prescriptive. These theories incorporate quantitative measures and use some 
mathematical notation to portray complex qualitative relationships, but are not 
entirely mathematical in nature. 
TMCI invites interested readers to send their comments to the authors of this 
paper. Readers interested in advancing knowledge of military conflict who are 
willing to work on TMCI products are invited to inquire via: 
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President of TMCI Secretary of TMCI 
12 Fairfield Street or 4827 Yorktown Blvd. 
Salem, MA 01970-4808 Arlington, VA 22207 
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INTRODUCTION 
What to Expect From This Theory 
A Concise Theory of Military Combat propounds a structure intended to relate 
comprehensively and consistently all elements and activities of every form of 
organized combat. Our goal is a unified description that is rigorous as to 
definitions, components, and the dynamics of all combat phenomena. 
This theory is explanatory, not prescriptive. Its aim is to describe "what 
everyone knows is true" about combat. Military professionals and others 
knowledgeable about military affairs will find no parts of the theory that are 
new. Our objective is to integrate all parts into a unified whole. Our intention is 
to be scientific in the sense that art and practice must precede the codification of 
practice into an organized body of knowledge. The reader will find no attempt 
to say how to fight better and no recipes for victory. This (or any other) theory is 
practical only to the extent that knowledge of any subject has practical value. 
After all, one does not fight or even train with a book in hand. 
About Terminology and Definitions 
What follows is grounded in the proposition that a theory of combat must be an 
extension of physical and biological science. When the human factor is excised, 
the components must behave like physical systems. Our approach is to describe 
what is added by the presence of human combatants. Definitions and descriptors 
should link the familiar terms of physical theory to combat theory and vice 
versa. Here is an example. Combat force, meaning a compulsion imposed on an 
enemy, has been said by some writers to be an analogy to physical force. The 
theory presented here asserts that combat force is not an analogy but a real 
phenomenon. We know it is real because, like physical force, its effects can be 
observed. But its effects are richer than physical force because they act on 
humans as well as machines. The force imposed by one side upon the other in a 
battle has not only physical but also mental and spiritual consequences. We 
know this because we observe not only casualties but fear and demoralization in 
soldiers subject to intense fire. 
To label the compulsion "force," however, would perpetuate a longstanding 
problem of the terminology of warfare. This theory reserves the term force to 
mean an organized body capable of fighting an enemy. Compulsion, says this 
theory, derives from combat energy. The energy is converted into combat power 
which in turn produces observable results. The results are the measure of combat 
power achieved. 
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The term combat poxoer has itself been used ambiguously to mean both the latent 
combat energy embodied in a military force and the rate at which the energy is 
exerted on the battlefield. To make the distinction clear, the theory refers to the 
latent energy as combat potential and says that combat power occurs only during 
combat. Thus, in a campaign a commander deals with the development, 
deployment, and sustainment of his force's combat potential. Only when the 
force engages in combat does he transform potential into combat power that is 
felt by the enemy. 
Development of the Theory 
The authors wish to credit the work of The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) as 
the basis of this Concise Theory of Combat. For more than a decade TMCI's 
objective has been to advance an understanding of organized warfare in all its 
aspects. TMCI was founded in 1979 by Dr. Donald S. Marshall, General George 
Blanchard, and the late Trevor Dupuy. From the outset TMCI has guarded its 
independence from the armed forces and private institutions alike. TMCI is 
incorporated as a nonprofit organization, international in scope and open to all 
points of view. 
But the roots of this document lie deeper than TMCI. On 27 September 1977, the 
Office of Naval Research of the Department of Defense sponsored a conference 
at Leesburg, Virginia, which expressed the need for a theory of combat to guide 
and undergird models, simulations, and analyses of warfare. Subsequently, a 
small group of operations analysts held several meetings in 1979 and 1980 at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, at the behest of Professor 
Michael Sovereign who was then Chairman of the Department of Operations 
Research. The hope of these gatherings was for a more solid foundation of 
theory to guide operations analysts in the development of models of combat, 
including computer simulations and war games. Attendees were operations 
analysts experienced in quantitative historical study and military operations 
research, including Herbert Weiss, Lawrence Low, Robert Helmbold, Paul 
Moose, John Wozencraft, Wayne Hughes, James Taylor and several others from 
on and off campus. 
After the first Working Meeting of TMCI at the Army War College in June 1982, 
these efforts fused, combining those who emphasized quantitative methods with 
those who emphasized descriptive methodology. The result is this document, a 
coalescence of both points of view that can serve as a basis and reference point 
for combat modeling and as a description of combat for officers who believe that 
art and practice will be stronger when based on a foundation of theory. 
The early meetings of TMCI comprised a diverse set of attendees and 
presentations. Nineteen working meetings have been recorded and archived by 
Doctor Marshall, who maintains TMCI's files and library at his home in Salem, 
Massachusetts. At the meetings many points of view were represented, 
discussions were spirited, and cohesion sometimes resulted, but was always 
ephemeral. A large number of people looked in on TMCI's meetings. Many who 
did so made valuable contributions but most were impatient to get to their own 
favorite issues and fell away after a few sessions, especially since TMCI was 
unfunded and most attendees bore their own expenses. The corporate Army lost 
interest when it became apparent that TMCI's aims would not solve immediate 
problems confronting decision makers. To the extent that the other Services were 
aware of the effort at all, they were similarly indifferent toward work that 
offered no immediate payoff. Nevertheless, the Army War College and Naval 
Postgraduate School continued generously to provide space for meetings, as did 
several other organizations, notably SAIC, Institute for Defense Analysis, SRI 
International, and Center for Naval Analyses. 
By the mid-1980s, it was clear that biannual sessions of a few days could not be 
sufficiently focused, and so two six-week retreats were arranged, at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and the University of California at Berkeley. Those sessions 
were attended by a hard core of TMCI working members. By 1990, the essential 
material was more or less in hand for this theory, but other sections planned to 
cover practical applications and modeling were far from complete. The larger 
work seemed still some years off, so the present authors undertook to assemble 
the document you are reading. Progress was slow because all of the work was 
volunteer and in large part unfunded. 
Meanwhile, the Naval Postgraduate School had established an Institute for Joint 
Warfare Analysis to foster independent, scholarly, but utilitarian basic military 
research and defense analysis. A Concise Theory of Combat is one of its first 
publications. 
Withstanding the Test of Time 
It is just as well that some twenty years have transpired since the Leesburg 
Conference. The manifold changes that have occurred since then have provided 
a breadth of perspective against which to test the robustness of the theory. We 
have seen: 
• A reorientation of tactics and operational plans in the "U.S. Armed 
Forces from combat against the Soviet Union to regional conflict and 
operations other than war. 
• Radical changes in technology, which have led to a new vocabulary of 
terms such as dominant battlefield awareness, operational maneuver 
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from the sea, information warfare, command and control warfare, and 
precision strike. 
• Profound organizational realignments that flowed from the Goldwater- 
Nichols Act. The fallout is manifest in extensive changes to doctrine 
with added emphasis on joint operations. 
Over the same 20 years, changes in military operations research have been 
nearly as extensive. Analysts now lean more heavily on computer simulations 
that aim to enhance battlefield realism. War games span the possibilities from 
simple seminar games to computer-assisted games and distributed interactive 
simulations. Field exercises using instrumented ranges have expanded in 
territory covered, and number of forces in play. Computer-based virtual reality 
reaches far beyond the realism of early aircraft simulators. The mathematics of 
chaos, complexity, fractals, self-organizing systems, and other new explanations 
of phenomena may open other doors to understanding warfare. 
Yet the changes in military affairs, in science, and in computer technology have 
required no substantive changes to the theory. In fact, this theory has anticipated 
many of them: 
• Object-oriented programming is consistent with our combat theory's 
fundamental notion that combat is fought by elements that exist in 
states and perform functions. 
• Computer simulations that attempt to relate several echelons of 
battlefield activity depend for viability on the proposition of our theory 
that combat elements and their actions can be aggregated and 
decomposed within a hierarchy that exhibits congruency throughout 
every echelon. 
• We see recent emphasis on "information warfare," and yet the 
importance of information gathering, transfer, and processing have 
long been important features of the theory. 
• Emphasis on maneuver versus firepower has re-emerged in contentious 
contemporary debate. The theory has recognized from the outset that 
fire and maneuver both make essential contributions to combat power, 
along with other factors, such as deception, shock, posture, and 
surprise. 
• Suppression and demoralization by firepower, the effect of which was 
so evident in the Gulf War, were given prominence in the theory a 
decade ago. 
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In addition, the theory frames other concepts recognized in a general way but 
seldom incorporated in specific terms by the operating and analytical worlds: 
• There is a difference between battlefield reality and perceptions of 
reality by all combatants. 
• Chance, probability, risk, and other aspects of uncertainty in combat 
have specific places and weight in combat theory. 
• Functions performed by each side (such as command, fire, and 
maneuver) must be distinguished from processes, in which the results 
of combat (such as destruction, suppression, demoralization, and 
motivation) are formed by interaction of the two sides. 
• The actions of nature and effects of the environment are given the 
status of a third party in combat. 
• The theory is careful to distinguish combat potential as latent combat 
energy embodied in a force not in combat, from combat power, which 
is the rate of delivery and effectiveness of a force's energy directed 
against the enemy. 
• The mission has a top-down vectoring influence on all combatants, and 
external influences also have an important impact. 
The theory parallels current thought, which treats command as both a function 
and a process, and carries the notion further by specifying command-control to 
be the process that transforms combat potential into combat power vectored 
toward the objective, whether that be enemy forces or another focus specified in 
the mission statement. 
About Clarity, Brevity, and Further Study 
There will be readers who say the theory is neither clear nor concise. Can't it be 
reduced to something more easily grasped? Something brief? For the individual 
who wants an extreme distillation, the six axioms and associated definitions 
found in Chapter 1 are a minimal expression of the necessary basis for a general 
theory. How well the axioms will serve by themselves is another question. 
Newton's three laws of motion may have been sufficient for several centuries of 
progress, but scientists and engineers spent lifetimes understanding their 
implications and applying them usefully. Living-systems theory says that the 
whole hierarchy of plant and animal life can be described as matter, energy, and 
information and the transformation of one into another. To apply that theory to 
living systems in a useful way is something else again. 
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As for brevity, are you really surprised that a description of combat cannot fit on 
a one-page executive briefing? War is a highly complicated human endeavor, 
and combat is its pinnacle. It should be no surprise that a description of combat 
takes more than a few pages, and that understanding it entails close study. 
Finally, the reader should bear three things in mind: first, comprehension comes 
from grasping the theory all of a piece. If it doesn't all hang together, then it has 
failed. Second, if this work has merit, then testing, rework, and extension are to 
be expected. Third, an understanding of the theory will allow the reader to 
know combat only in the way a spectator in the stands knows football. To play 
in a position on the team requires more than understanding the theory. 
Lawrence J. Low Edmund L. Dubois Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Listed below are definitions of terms as they are used in this document. 
Action - an act performed by a single or aggregated element to change the state 
of one or more other elements, its own state, or both. 
Activity - see combat activity. 
Agent element - see element. 
Attribute - a qualitative or quantitative modifier of a combat element. Attributes 
are of three kinds: 
Spatial conditions: the time-space characteristics of elements, including 
location, spatial orientation, and motion. 
Physical properties: descriptors of elements that can be stated and 
measured in physical terms, such as dimensions, weight, shape, and 
configuration. 
Qualities: nonphysical, subjective descriptors of elements, such as those 
relating to motivation, reliability, and durability. Qualities are the only 
attributes of cognitive elements. 
Available combat potential - the latent capacity of a force to achieve useful 
results in combat with its existing organization, training, equipment, support, 
motivation, and leadership. 
Chance event - an event that occurs without discernible human intention or 
cause. 
Cognitive element - see element. 
Cognitive entropy - the ratio of what is not known about the combat situation to 
complete knowledge of the combat situation; the measure of unknown relative to 
knowable, hence a measure of confusion, disorder, and uncertainty in the 
combat arena. 
Combat activity - one or more combat elements each taking an action that 
impacts one or more other combat elements, themselves, or both, thereby 
producing a result that changes the attributes of the impacted elements. The 
term "combat activity" is synonymous with the term "combat process" except 
that in the process, results are expressed in terms of the primary combat 
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processes rather than in general terms. See also combat process, primary combat 
process, and element. 
Combat arena - the three-dimensional location where combat takes place, 
including locations remote from the main combat action from which actions are 
carried out that directly affect combat. 
Combat environment - the geophysical space and features of the combat arena. 
Combat friction - unproductive energy expended on any wasteful result that 
occurs in a force when an agent element of the force carries out an action 
impacting an object element. In the aggregate, combat friction at any time is the 
summation of wasteful results occurring at that time from many elemental 
actions at the lowest level of combat. 
Combat function - an action taken by one or more elements of either side in 
combat to achieve an intended result. See primary combat function. 
Combat mission - an objective to be achieved or a task to be performed in 
combat, together with the purpose of achieving the objective or performing the 
task. The objective or task is stated explicitly, but the purpose is sometimes 
implied. 
Combat outcome - the actual end results that accrue as the final states of all 
elements of all parties in combat when combat has been concluded. 
Combat output - the cumulative results (measured as the new states of elements 
of both sides and the combat environment) of combat power acting over time on 
the combat situation. Combat output is the time integral of combat power. At the 
end of combat, combat output equates to combat outcome. 
Combat power - the realized capability of a force at any instant of time to 
achieve results in combat in furtherance of a particular mission against a specific 
enemy force in a specific combat environment. 
Combat process - one or more combat elements each taking an action that 
impacts one or more other combat elements, themselves, or both, thereby 
producing a result that changes the attributes of the impacted elements. Each 
element taking its action is an "agent element" and each element being impacted 
is an "object element," including the agent element if it impacts itself. Both the 
agent elements and the object elements may be from either or both sides in 
combat and/or from the combat environment. The only difference between the 
terms "combat process" and "combat activity" is that the results from activity are 
expressed in general terms, whereas the results of process are expressed in terms 
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of the primary combat processes. See also combat activity, primary combat 
process, and element. 
Combat result - the changed state that occurs in a single or aggregated element 
from an elemental or aggregated combat activity. 
Combat situation - the totality of the states of both sides and of the combat 
environment at any point of time during combat. 
Designed combat potential - the precombat, latent designed capacity of a force 
to achieve useful results in combat when organized, trained, equipped, 
supported, and led according to the force design against a design threat. See also 
available combat potential. 
Element - a material or intangible thing of any kind, whether animate or 
inanimate, that exists in combat and can change the state of another element or 
itself. The following are subordinate categories of elements: 
• Agent element - an element that performs an action impacting an 
object element, itself, or both. 
• Object element - an element that is impacted by the action of an agent 
element, thereby having its attributes changed. 
• Cognitive element - (a) an element with cognitive capability; (b) the 
product of cognition. 
• Physical element - an element that has weight and physical dimensions. 
External context of combat - everything outside the combat arena that has any 
influence whatsoever, no matter how indirectly, on what is done by either side 
during combat; this includes all manner of persons, material things, documents, 
communication sources, political activity, strategic directives, military forces, 
and the like. 
Internal context of combat - the military forces of the two adversarial parties in 
combat, together with their mental and physical states, and the combat 
environment. 
Military combat - purposeful, controlled violence carried out by direct means of 
deadly force between opponents, each attempting to carry out a mission, the 
achievement of which has value to that side and the achievement of which is 
opposed in some way by the other side. 
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Military conflict - an antagonistic state between two or more parties in which 
military forces and weaponry of each of the parties are used or are available for 
use and use is intended if needed. 
Military force - any body of persons that combines for the purpose of waging or 
threatening to wage aggressive or defensive military conflict with respect to any 
other body of persons. 
Object element - see element. 
Physical element - see element. 
Primary combat function - a generic category of like actions taken by elements 
of either adversary in combat to achieve an intended result. The complete set of 
primary combat functions is defined to encompass all functions occurring in 
combat, so that any single combat function will fall under one or another of the 
primary combat functions. 
Primary combat process - combat activity of any kind that produces a common 
composite result. The complete set of primary combat processes is defined to 
encompass all combat activity, and thus all combat results, so that any single 
combat activity will produce results that fit under one or more of the primary 
combat processes. 
Result - see combat result. 
State - the condition of existence at a point in time of a single or aggregated 
element, as determined by its cognitive and physical attributes, including its 
spatial condition. 
Uncertainty - a state of doubt about the combat situation, including the outcome 
of combat. 
Vector - used as a verb: to direct the actions of a force toward a specified 
mission or goal: 
- used as a noun: directed actions that are in accord with a specified 
mission or goal. 
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Chapter 1 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY 
Military combat is a subset of the broader category of military conflict, which in 
turn is a subset of human conflict in general. As we use the term, military 
combat is defined as purposeful, controlled violence carried out by means of 
deadly force between opponents, each attempting to carry out a mission, the 
achievement of which has value to that side and denial of which has value to the 
other side. Wars of course involve deadly force, as do campaigns within wars, 
but it is only in combat that deadly force is directly and actively applied against 
the enemy. Combat is the active agent of warfare, the crucible in which war aims 
are decided. 
We include within combaf s boundaries the preparatory steps taken by each side 
immediately before active use of deadly force and the disengagement actions 
before interaction between the two sides ceases. The phrase "use of deadly 
force" encompasses the threat of deadly force when it has an effect on combat. 
We do not bound the scope of combat by the kinds of weapons employed nor by 
the size of forces or geographical area. Intercontinental delivery of cruise 
missiles and ICBMs is a combat action on a grand scale. Contiguity of mission is 
the best determinant of what constitutes combat. 
Military combat cannot be treated apart from the campaign and war of which it 
is a part, and so we include within our purview the external context that forms 
the boundary conditions for combat and affects its course. Before combat 
commences and while it proceeds, combat activity is influenced by the direction, 
impetus, and constraints imposed by the external context, and combat results 
feed back their influence upon the external context. 
As foundation for the theory, we have narrowed a larger list of possible axioms 
of combat to the following six: 
Axiom 1     Military combat involves deadly interaction between 
military forces. 
Axiom 2    In combat each side seeks to achieve a goal, called its 
mission, which has perceived value. 
Axiom 3     Combat potential is embodied in military forces. 
Axiom 4    The commander of each side activates combat 
potential to create combat power in furtherance of the 
mission. 
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Axiom 5     Domination of the opposing military force is the 
ultimate means of accomplishing a mission. 
Axiom 6    Uncertainty is inherent in combat. 
Mission is the governing factor that vectors activities in warfare, translating 
purpose into intended action throughout the hierarchical command structure. At 
every echelon, the mission is meant to be responsive to the echelon above, and to 
the extent this is so and the missions are properly understood, there is powerful 
vectoring from top to bottom of the entire force toward its war aims. To the 
extent the hierarchy of missions is unclear, inconsistent, ambiguous, or 
misunderstood, vectoring is weakened. 
Values underlie the purposes of war, and the purposes of campaigns and 
combat. At every echelon a value is attached to the outcome of each mission. At 
the termination of any mission, the value achieved is weighed against the 
broader picture—never a simple "win-or-lose" analysis. Associated with these 
values are the costs in attempting to achieve the mission. The value after mission 
termination is rarely the same as the value before the mission commenced; the 
very pursuit of the mission has itself caused a dynamic change in the situation, 
and the cost may have been excessive—or lower than anticipated. This purpose- 
value-mission-outcome-cost relationship extends through every echelon of 
warfare and, as with congruity of mission, congruity of purposes and values 
facilitates commonality of war effort. Every soldier and sailor will have some 
sense of purpose and value to himself or herself that corresponds—although 
obviously differing in particulars—to the sense of purpose and value of the 
theater commander and the civil authorities. 
Viewed from the bottom up, combat comprises myriads of things that have 
attributes and carry out a variety of actions. All activity in combat can be 
described in terms of these three basic, independent components: 
elements 
attributes of elements, and 
actions taken by elements. 
These three components exist in minute detail, and they exist also as 
combinations of elements with combinations of attributes carrying out 
combinations of actions in ever larger agglomerations up to the highest levels of 
combat. Working in reverse, one can disaggregate the combinations of combat 
activity into smaller combinations of elements, with their attributes, performing 
lesser actions, and so on down to the most elemental level. Viewing combat from 
the top down, we see aggregated elements formed into the traditional units of 
military forces carrying out aggregate actions in the form of fires, maneuvers, 
searches, screens, deceptions, maintenance, and so forth. But in all cases, these 
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traditional units and actions exist as combinations built up from elements, 
attributes and actions at the lowest level. 
The component element is any material or intangible thing, animate or inanimate, 
that exists in combat which can act to change the state of another element or 
itself. This includes obvious physical entities such as guns, persons, ships, and 
aircraft, but also less obvious objects such as trees, hills, seastate, wind, rain, and 
sunlight. Elements exist singly and as aggregated elements of related single 
elements. A rifle and a truck are single elements. A squad armed with rifles is an 
aggregated element. A truck with driver carrying a load of ammunition is an 
aggregated element. 
The component action is an act performed by a single or aggregated element 
with the intent of changing the state of one or more other elements, its own state, 
or both. Elements and actions are of two kinds: physical and cognitive. The only 
elements that are cognitive are humans, who have thoughts and emotions; but 
humans are also physical elements, since they have weight and size. The only 
actions that are cognitive are ones taken by humans that derive from mental 
capacity. A tank firing a round performs a physical action. The decision by the 
tank gunner to fire the round is a cognitive action. Cognitive elements and 
actions, however, do not exhibit the property of aggregation that applies to 
physical elements and actions. This is because the thoughts of a group of 
humans cannot be combined into a single aggregated element that functions as if 
it had a single mind. This is not to say a well-functioning unit or staff does not 
generate thoughts that are so closely coordinated that they have the appearance 
of coming from a single mind. 
The component attribute is a quantitative or qualitative descriptor of an element. 
Attributes include spatial conditions (location, orientation, and motion), physical 
properties (characteristics that can be physically measured, such as size, weight, 
and capacity), and qualities (nonphysical descriptors, such as reliability, 
manpower intensiveness, and clarity of orders). 
At every moment of time, the combination of a single or aggregated element and 
its attributes is the state of that element. Every person, rifle, hill, river, ship, 
squadron, and force has a present state, but that will change during combat 
because of the actions taken by itself, by friendly elements, by enemy elements, 
and by environmental elements. 
At the lowest level, an element performing an action will impact one or more 
other elements and usually also itself. The element taking the action is the "agent 
element" and the one being acted on is the "object element." An agent element's 
action alters the object element's attributes in some way, and thus changes the 
state of the object element. We designate the element-action-element triad, 
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together with its results, a combat activity. Combat is made up of countless 
numbers of such elemental activities, some involving single elements impacting 
single elements but more often single elements impacting multiple elements, 
including the agent element itself. 
As with elements and actions, combat activities have the property of 
aggregation-disaggregation. Thus we see aggregated elements (a ship and crew, 
for instance) taking an aggregated action (firing a salvo) against an enemy 
aggregated element (a fortified position or an ammunition dump). Those who 
wage combat see and experience the aggregated level, but in all cases it is at the 
elemental micro level that every action and every result in combat begins. The 
overall structure of combat derives from the primary structure of elements, 
attributes, and actions. 
Considering all categories of aggregated forces and activities, we can construct a 
generalized functional cross section of combat at any fixed moment. The cross 
section includes the states of the two opposing forces and the shared geophysical 
combat environment, as well as the external contexts that impinge on each side. 
This fixed-time snapshot of combat is universal: it pertains to every form of 
combat at every echelon, high or low, and pertains to forces operating on land, 
in the air, at sea, or in any combination. For any one echelon of combat—say 
combat involving battalion-size forces on both sides—the fixed-time snapshot is 
subsumed within combat involving larger (say brigade-size) forces and in turn 
the battalion-size fixed-time cross section subsumes combat involving 
subordinate (company-level) forces at that moment. Each fixed-time cross 
section is structurally like all others at higher and lower echelons. Moreover, the 
types of forces and types of activities of the two opposing sides are structurally 
identical with each other, and both sides share the combat environment in 
common. The structure applies even though one side is attacking and the other 
defending, for example, this mirror imaging of type forces and type activities 
between the two sides does not mean equality between the two sides as to 
number and capability of forces and activities. There is never equality. The 
congruent nesting of type forces and activities from the lowest to the highest 
echelon and across all forms of combat illustrates a universal characteristic: 
military combat is structured as a nested hierarchy of forces and activity with 
functional repetition of the pattern throughout the hierarchy. 
Each side prosecutes its effort through its own combat functions. A combat 
function is a category of like actions taken by force elements; the complete set of 
combat functions is each commander's bag of tricks, and each side in general has 
the same kinds of functions (though not with the same capabilities) and employs 
them to achieve results intended to support its mission. As both sides carry out 
their functions, the combat activity causes three-sided interactions that create 
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combat processes. It is through these combat processes that actual results are 
determined in the form of altered states of force elements. 
We define a combat process as combat activity of any kind that produces a 
common generic result. The distinction between combat functions and combat 
processes is that functions are actions oriented to results intended to be achieved 
by each side, whereas processes are oriented to results actually achieved in the 
give and take of combat. Each side unilaterally applies combat energy to 
perform its functions to fulfill its mission, but the opponent has a say in the 
matter and tries, by performing other functions, to thwart the other side's efforts 
and achieve its own mission. In addition, the combat environment can affect 
each side. From this three-way interaction comes a set of processes that are 
reflected in the actual results achieved by each side. The results, seen as the new 
states of each side's force elements, are the new combat truth that pertains to 
both sides, although neither side ever fully knows what that combat truth is. 
Granting there could be an extremely large number of combat processes, each 
differing in some small degree from the next, we have settled on a small list of 
primary combat processes that, by definition, encompass the totality of combat 
activity. Every single element-action-element activity at the lowest level and 
every aggregated element-action-element activity will contribute to, and thereby 
fit into, one or more of these primary combat processes, as determined by the 
results actually achieved. In the normal case, any one activity will involve 
several processes, including those that affect the acting element itself. The 
processes fall into two categories: those that impact only enemy force elements, 
which we designate externally directed processes and those that impact only own 
force elements, designated internally directed processes. The primary combat 
processes are: 
Externally Directed Internally Directed 
Demoralization Motivation 
Destruction (and damage) Command-control 





Combat processes, like the elements and actions that are part of those processes, 
exhibit the property of aggregation-disaggregation. For example, elemental 
processes of destruction, suppression, and protection at the lowest level are 
blended into aggregated processes of destruction, suppression, and protection at 
the higher levels. Since combat processes relate to results obtained, the labels 
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used for them are descriptive of combat results rather than combat actions such 
as fire and maneuver. 
Within the fixed-time cross section of combat—which itself remains time 
invariant—all forces and actions of both sides, along with the external contexts 
and geophysical environment, are in continuous flux. In the time continuum, 
there is a sequence of these cross sections, differing as to particulars of the 
situation from one instant to the next and ending in the final outcome of combat. 
The differing particulars are the new states and it is the processes that bring 
these about. 
The dynamic aspects of the theory of combat rest on the concept of combat 
power. Combat power, like gravity, cannot be seen, but combat commanders 
and everyone else subject to it senses what it is. As we use the term, it is the 
agent by which all results are obtained in combat. We define combat power as 
the realized capability of a force at any instant of time to achieve results in furtherance of 
a particular mission against a specific enemy force in a specific combat environment. 
Combat power is the action agent by which forces seek to translate the purpose 
of conducting combat into a desired outcome. Energy in the form of combat 
functions is applied by each side to its own forces to fulfill its mission and 
simultaneously to the enemy force to eliminate his opposition. The realized 
capability that each side is able to achieve in the two-sided clash of actions is the 
combat power that side has managed to produce. Combat power is an 
instantaneous function (that is, a rate) which, acting over time leads to 
cumulative results (cumulative changes of state). We use the term combat output 
to refer to the accumulations. 
Combat power is derived from the basic element-action-element activities 
described earlier, and therefore inherits and expands upon characteristics from 
that structure. Thus combat power: 
Is, most fundamentally, determined by the combination of the actions of a 
force and the interactions with the opposing force and the combat 
environment, rather than by the unilateral actions of the force. Because of 
this, the results of combat power are not necessarily the favorable results 
planned by each side, but instead are the actual results that occur in the 
light of actions by both sides exerting combat power, each seeking to 
further its own ends. 
Is granular in nature. Combat power exists as minute grains or "quanta" 
derived from the countless individual element-action-element activities at 
the lowest level of combat. Participants in combat, however, do not see 
these grains as such; instead, they observe the effects in aggregated form 
that appears as a continuous flow of power. 
An Overview of the Theory 
Directly impacts elements, not actions. Combat power affects the states of 
own force and enemy force elements, both physical and cognitive, and 
elements of the combat environment. Actions are impacted only indirectly 
through changes of state of elements carrying out actions. 
Has a vector-like nature. Combat power is directed to achieve the 
mission, and thus operates as if vectored by the mission. 
Acts as a flow. Combat power is the capacity to achieve results at an 
instant of time, and therefore operates as the time rate of change of states 
of elements. 
Exhibits the property of aggregation-disaggregation. The elemental bits of 
combat power can be aggregated into clusters of combat power. 
Exists only while combat is in progress. Before combat commences and 
after it terminates, the capacity to achieve results exists as combat 
potential. 
A commander in combat is an individual who causes his forces to take actions that 
are vectored by the commander in furtherance of the mission. There is a 
hierarchy of commanders in every force, from the officer in tactical command 
down to a pilot who flies his aircraft, an individual soldier who commands only 
himself and his rifle, an operator of a radar who scans it and reports contacts, or 
a sailor who steers a ship, each doing so in conformance with an explicit or 
implicit task assigned. The vectoring (the order or command) is temporal (when 
to act), spatial (where to act), and functional (what action to perform), done to 
achieve a purpose that may be explicit or implicit. We say a commander 
activates his forces to create combat power from available combat potential. 
Insofar as the theory is concerned, the key to recognizing the commander at 
every echelon is not based on lawful, organizational, or even doctrinal authority 
and responsibility, but identification of the individual at that echelon who 
receives and acts on a mission or task and causes forces to take actions (perform 
functions) to fulfill it. 
Combat potential is the latent capacity to achieve results in combat. The 
development of combat potential begins when raw manpower is recruited and 
weapons are acquired, and development continues, for the particular force 
involved, until combat begins. At this point, combat potential is converted into 
combat power; then, after combat ends, unexpended capacity reverts to combat 
potential. The combat potential available to a commander when he engages in 
combat is often less than he would wish because of shortages in manning and 
equipping and deficiencies in morale and training, but the situation at the time 
circumscribes what he has to draw on. 
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A commander, through the command function, begins to convert the latent 
energy of combat potential to the active energy of combat power by the many 
steps he takes preparatory to the active phase of combat, such as acquiring 
intelligence, issuing orders, positioning forces, and exhorting his troops. Once 
active fighting commences, combat power is determined by the combination of 
the commander's actions and the interactions with the enemy and the 
environment. In addition, there are other factors that a commander can only 
partly control in exerting combat power. On the negative side, the actions of his 
force will be degraded by wasted energy arising as combat friction in the 
countless interactions among own-force elements. On the favorable side, to the 
extent the units are suitably organized and operated as a balanced combined 
arms force, he can benefit from synergism from mutual support and 
reinforcement. The commander also may benefit from strong force integrity and 
cohesion, or, under adverse circumstances, his force could be subject to 
catastrophic loss of cohesion. Over and above such particular factors, there is a 
powerful positive influence toward self-regeneration embodied in military units 
in combat. Under extreme life-threatening stresses and in the face of adversity 
and disorder, some military units exhibit strong adaptability for survival and 
reconstituting combat capability. 
The set of primary combat processes is inclusive of every kind of result 
occurring in combat. Through the property of aggregation, we can in principle 
lump together all the destruction results and all the suppression results and so 
on for all the other processes, from whatever cause and in whatever sector and 
over whatever period of time. Our current state of knowledge, however, does 
not permit us to do this quantitatively beyond crude estimations. 
The external processes directly alter the states of enemy elements and thus act to 
remove enemy resistance to the mission. The internal processes are equally 
essential to advance the mission and to support the external processes. Some 
processes operate only on cognitive elements. The internal process of motivation 
and the counterpart external process of demoralization clearly do so. The 
command-control process encompasses not only the cognitive decision-making 
that stems from each person in the chain of command, but also the lesser 
decisions that every individual in combat makes. The command-control process 
is so ubiquitous that essentially all action in combat originates by it, except for 
acts of nature. The command-control process is, in turn, fully dependent on the 
information acquisition process to take sensible actions. 
A brief example may serve to clarify how processes work. A scouting patrol 
observes (the information acquisition process) an enemy force assembling. 
Through several steps of the communication process, the information reaches the 
combat commander. He weighs the information and his options and decides on 
a course of action (all of this the command-control process). Through the 
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communication process, his order reaches an artillery battalion commander, who 
directs a salvo to be fired. On a hand signal from a sergeant (further 
communication process), soldiers make the decision to yank the lanyards of their 
howitzers (command-control process in response to the sergeant's signal), firing 
the guns. When the artillery rounds land in the target area, enemy soldiers are 
killed and wounded and trucks destroyed and damaged (the destruction 
process); other enemy personnel cease their actions and take cover (suppression); 
still others are frightened and run away (demoralization); and the enemy unif s 
assembly preparations are delayed (disruption). The illustration is a 
simplification; many additional processes would be occurring at every stage. 
The sixth axiom states that uncertainty is inherent in combat. Uncertainty imbues 
every participant with doubt about the present situation, about what will 
happen next, and even about what has already happened. Combat is not 
deterministic, yet experienced commanders and others tested in battle learn to 
read the partial patterns and forecast future events with enough accuracy to 
determine the likely direction combat will take. Some succeed at this far better 
than others, but in all cases it is experience that fills the gaps of uncertainty, and 
when experience is lacking, training, doctrine, and good sense compensate. 
Good commanders sense how much they need to know about the situation, and 
because time is precious they act as soon as enough pieces of a pattern are in 
place. They proceed not on the certainties but on the probabilities, fully aware 
that unforeseen events may occur and ramify unpredictably; and they convey 
their orders with conviction despite the uncertainties. 
Within this gray world of incomplete, ambiguous, often biased, partially 
erroneous information and disinformation, the principal task of every combat 
commander is to direct the actions to apply energy through combat functions 
(fire, maneuver, force protection, and so forth) that will manifest themselves as 
propitious distribution of combat power, vectored in time and space to fulfill the 
mission. 
Combat power exists in the form of minute quanta-like contributions created by 
countless element-action-element activities at the lowest level. Each of these 
leads to a change in the attributes of one or more object elements, and thus a new 
state of those elements. It is at that moment and at the location of the object 
element that an elemental contribution to combat power is created by the side 
initiating the activity. The object elements may be physical or cognitive or both, 
and may be an enemy element or a friendly one (or may be the element 
performing the action). In the usual case, there will be more than one object 
element and more than one kind of state change, and therefore more than one 
process contributing to the elemental bit of combat power. 
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At any instant of time, these micro-level contributions of each side's combat 
power can be aggregated spatially over a small area of the combat arena. Over 
time, the aggregated combat power in that area will wax and wane as combat 
activities amplify or die down in intensity. If both sides' elements are creating 
combat power in the area, there will be a separate aggregation for each side's 
combat power contributions. The combat power aggregations in such small areas 
can, in principle, be extended to map the combat power for each side over the 
entire combat arena at any moment, and such a mapping could, in principle, be 
made for successive time intervals, manifesting itself as a shifting flow of 
spatially distributed combat power for each side over the duration of combat. 
Although the results of combat power are real, when seen in their full 
complexity there is no known way of representing combat power's full effects 
quantitatively, and this theory does not advance one. Assuredly the aggregation 
of combat power cannot be done by any linear summing. Attempts to depict the 
capabilities of forces have been limited for the most part to firepower's effects, 
and even simulations have failed to combine such disparate factors as 
movement, suppression, protection, and deception, or the even more difficult 
factors such as motivation and demoralization. Complicating this picture further 
is the relationship of combat power to mission. Combat results that do not go 
fully in the direction of the commander's vector (that is, fully support the 
mission) should not be added in the same degree as those that do. 
Yet, despite the imprecision, good commanders in combat cope with the 
uncertainties and accomplish the equivalent of effectively aggregating combat 
power and distributing and vectoring it to achieve their mission, or give a good 
account in the attempt. The empirical methods they use have been tried and 
tested in battle and the lessons set down in doctrinal and tactical manuals, and in 
broader language in the principles of war. Much of the process is an art, but 
more than just art and intuition underlies successful command in combat. 
Combat is normally episodic. The constantly shifting distribution of combat 
power for the two sides creates a flow that includes Crescendos and lulls. 
Information is the commodity that controls the peaks and valleys. The flow of 
information, both as to rapidity and quality, is a crucial aspect in the task of 
distributing combat power. The side that has the shorter cycle time to acquire, 
communicate, weigh, act on, and reacquire information has a significant 
advantage. Similarly, the side that brings the greater accuracy and completeness 
to the information it acquires has a clear advantage, and likewise, the side that 
has the faster reaction time in translating decisions into responses has an 
advantage. These precepts are general; the reality that information and reaction 
cycle times are continually blended rather than discrete does not minimize their 
importance. 
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Throughout combat every participant observes and interprets events as trends, 
and makes decisions based on his projection of the future. The high value of 
combat outcome compels such continuing assessment of where the action is 
leading. It is, however, the perceptions of trends that individuals act on, not the 
reality. At all times every individual, from commanders down to privates, 
seamen, and airmen, seeks to improve his future situation by reinforcing 
favorable trends and altering those he sees as unfavorable. Determining an 
opportune time for action based on perceived trend projection is an art learned 
from experience and training. 
Commanders must be sensitive to culmination points where the course of battle 
has shifted for the better or worse, taking into account the time lag between 
when events were observed and when corrective action can be effected. To miss 
a critical shift or react too late can have a magnified adverse effect. As noted in 
the U.S. Army 1986 manual on operations, "commanders must understand that 
in battle, men and units are more likely to fail catastrophically than gradually." 
Combat is perhaps the most complex of all human endeavors. The nature of 
combat, with its peaks and lulls, its constantly shifting combat power, its 
uncertainties, and with all its participants subject to great hazard and stress, 
follows no repeatable pattern that allows for predictability in detail. Despite this, 
experienced commanders and trained forces find ways to successfully apply 
combat power and achieve missions. Where many throw up their hands at the 
complexity and chaos of combat, the ones called on to wage battles make a 
creditable showing. In the same vein, where some disparage as hopeless an 
attempt to explain the intricacies of combat, we have at least tried. If nothing 
else, this is a beginning. 
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AXIOMS OF COMBAT 
2.1     THE AXIOMS 
A foundation of any theory rests on a set of axioms. Axioms are self-evident 
statements asserted as indisputable facts. We have sought to keep the set of 
axioms underlying this theory of combat to the absolute minimum, and we 
believe the important tenets of our theory should and can be traceable to these 
few axioms. 
Axiom 1 Military combat involves deadly interaction between military 
forces. 
A military force is defined as a set of elements that are activated for the purpose 
of engaging in combat. Deadly interaction includes the direct use of deadly 
means and the threat of using deadly means. Insofar as nonlethal weapons may 
be used, they are always backed up by deadly means should the latter be 
needed. 
Axiom 2 In combat each side seeks to achieve a goal, called its 
mission, which has perceived value. 
The mission of a force is the specific task assigned it by higher authority or 
presumed by the commander of the force based on guidance from higher 
authority. Combat is not undertaken for its own sake in isolation from other 
activities; it is conducted as a purposeful activity within the broader goals of 
entities external to combat. 
Axiom 3    Combat potential is embodied in military forces. 
Combat potential is the latent capacity of a military force to achieve results in 
combat. 
Axiom 4 The commander on each side in combat activates combat 
potential to create combat power in furtherance of the 
mission. 
Combat power is the realized capability of a military force at any instant of time 
to achieve results in combat. 
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Axiom 5    Domination of the opposing military force is the ultimate 
means of accomplishing a mission. 
Domination is the result of imposing the will of one force on the opposing force 
through all the interactions of combat, especially those affecting the will and 
spirit. 
Axiom 6    Uncertainty is inherent in combat. 
Uncertainty is a state of doubt about the combat situation, including its outcome. 
Uncertainty is distinguished from chance, which concerns unpredictable events 
that happen without discernible human or other cause. 
2.2     PRINCIPLES OF WAR 
The principles of war are empirical precepts formulated as guides to the conduct 
of war and combat. Versions of principles have been set forth by many writers 
and by official military organizations. The versions differ in detail as to the 
number of principles and wording, yet there is remarkable similarity. In effect 
the principles represent wisdom developed over many years by those who have 
engaged in battles—the distilled lessons learned from successes and failures. 
The principles by themselves do not constitute a theory of combat, but they do 
represent broad, prescriptive counsel to commanders, and as such the theory 
ought to be consistent with them. 
The following is one version of the principles of war, taken from the 1993 issue 
of the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. (The manual includes 
additional discussion of each principle, which we have omitted here.) 
Principle of the Objective - Direct every military operation toward a 
clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. 
Principle of the Offensive - Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. 
Principle of Mass - Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at 
the decisive place and time. 
Principle of Economy of Force - Allocate minimum essential combat 
power to secondary efforts. 
Principle of Maneuver - Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage 
through the flexible application of combat power. 
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Principle of Unity of Command - For every objective, ensure unity of 
effort. 
Principle of Security - Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected 
advantage. 
Principle of Surprise - Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a 
manner, for which he is unprepared. 
Principle of Simplicity - Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, 
concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. 
The Army manual on operations adds discussion of three concepts critical to 
campaigns and major operations. Since these also apply in some degree to 
combat, we include them here in greatly abbreviated form. 
Concept of the Center of Gravity - Operations should concentrate 
against those enemy components that are particularly vital, thereby 
unbalancing the entire enemy structure and producing a cascading 
deterioration in cohesion and effectiveness that may result in complete 
failure or will leave the enemy vulnerable to further damage. 
Concept of Lines of Operation - A line of operation is the directional 
orientation of a force in relation to the enemy; it is the linkage between a 
force's objective and its bases of operation. A single line of operation is 
preferable to multiple lines of operation when available resources are 
limited, but when resources are adequate, multiple lines of operation can 
disperse the enemy's efforts. Operating on interior lines (operations that 
diverge from a central point) benefits a weaker force, whereas operating 
on exterior lines (operations that converge on the enemy from more than 
one direction) can benefit a stronger force by offering the opportunity to 
encircle and annihilate a weaker opponent. 
Concept of Culminating Points - Unless an offensive operation is 
decisively successful, a culminating point will be reached sooner or later 
where the strength of the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of 
the defender. The art of attack is to achieve decisive objectives before a 
culminating point is reached; the art of defense is to hasten the 
culmination point, recognize its advent, and be prepared to go over to the 
offense when it arrives. 
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MILITARY COMBAT IN THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT 
Human conflicts of many kinds occur throughout the world. Within the broad 
spectrum of these conflicts, our concern in this document is narrowed to those 
that involve military conflict, and within this still vast category, the subject is 
narrowed to warfare, and then further narrowed to the subset of warfare called 
military combat. 
3.1     THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY CONFLICT 
3.1.1 Warfare in the Spectrum of Conflict 
Every animate species engages when necessary in conflict with others of its kind 
and with other species. Most of this arises from the primal need to survive and 
the urge for procreation to continue the species. The human species appears 
unique in its ability and willingness to carry conflict to a different order of 
purpose (whether a higher or lower order is left to others to ponder). Whereas 
animals fight other animals because of instinct driven by genes, humans plan 
and deliberately set out to achieve domination over other humans for many 
purposes using lethal weapons of ever greater efficiency. Warfare is where this 
characteristic is brought to its ultimate extension, and combat is the locus within 
war where the killing is carried out. 
Whether or not the waging of war and combat is an innate characteristic of 
humans is not addressed in this work. Warfare is accepted and legally 
sanctioned in human society, at least for defensive purposes. And since the 
history of the species has demonstrated that wars have arisen time and again 
despite attempts to end them, warfare, and combat as its cutting edge, are 
important subjects for study. 
3.1.2 Military Conflict 
By the term military conflict we mean an antagonistic situation between two or 
more parties in which military forces and weaponry of each of the parties are 
used or are available for use and use is implied if needed. The term military forces 
means not only formally constituted armed forces, but any body of persons that 
combines to wage or threaten aggressive or defensive action vis-ä-vis another 
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group. Thus paramilitary units that may be created without a formal tie to a 
recognized political entity are military forces that can engage in military conflict, 
often but not always localized and limited in scope and sometimes carried out 
under covert or overt sponsorship of a nation. Similarly, counterinsurgency and 
counterintelligence forces engaged in defense of a political entity are military 
forces within our meaning. In the more general case, military forces are 
responsive to nation states and are formally organized by those states into units 
with weapons and uniforms. And in the more general case, these forces may 
engage in military conflict in the form of wars, campaigns, battles, engagements, 
sieges, blockades, and also in forms of military conflict short of outright 
hostilities, such as shows of force, policing, and peacekeeping. 
3.1.3   The Spectrum of Military Conflict 
In illustrating the scope of military conflict we can say at the outset that the 
boundary of what is included cannot be defined by the line between peace and 
war, since many forms of military conflict occur during periods not considered 
times of war. 
Figure 1 portrays the spectrum of human conflict and, as a subset, the spectrum 
of military conflict. Two aspects are shown: the levels of violence and the 
geographical extent. The levels of violence blend and overlap without clear 
distinction of one from another. Terrorism and sabotage, for example, can range 
from civilian person-to-person and group-to-group conflicts to international and 
ethnic conflicts. The geographical extent of conflicts similarly can stretch from 
localized areas to near-global scope. The second World War was violent conflict 
waged over much of the globe for several years; the United States attack against 
Libya in 1986 was violent conflict confined to a small geographical area for a 
short time. 
3.1.4   Strategy and Tactics 
The magnitude and geographical extent of military conflict are sometimes 
distinguished by the terms strategic level and tactical level. These terms are 
relative and can be misleading when applied to levels of military conflict. In the 
common meaning, strategy and strategic level refer to the broad, overall 
concepts and planning for a military conflict, whereas tactics and tactical level 
refer to the more detailed implementation measures in response to the strategy. 
A strategy is a plan, with a specifically expressed goal, to execute national or 
other political policies. Strategic level is therefore usually associated with 
national authorities and theater-level commands. Most of what takes place in 
combat is generally considered the tactical level. Recently another term has been 
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added to distinguish military activity at the level between strategic and tactical. 
This is called the operational level. 
LEVEL OF CONFLICT VIOLENCE 
Massive destruction of civil populace and infrastructure, 
economy, and military forces and infrastructure 
Massive destruction of military forces and infrastructure 
with collateral civil damage 
Major miitary destruction with limited civil destruction 
Selective military destruction with collateral civil damage 
Civil war; large scale guerrilla and partisan conflict over an 
extended time period 
Military attacks limited in duration and objective with civil 
damage avoidance; punitive tit-for-tat attacks; border 
violations; short-duration guerrilla actions 
Blockade; imited terrorism; sabotage 
Military coup; mutiny 
Show of force; showing the flag 
Embargo 
International economic warfare 
Violent civil disturbance; riot 
Bloodless coup 
Violent organized criminal activity 
Nonviolent civil disobedience; strike; civil demonstration; 
civil unrest; boycott 
Antagonistic industrial "warfare:" unfriendly business 
takeovers; illegal civil action 
Political argument; civil disputes; debates;friendly 
business takeovers 




















Figure 1. Spectrum of Human Conflict 
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Yet in contrast to these common uses of the terms, there are frequent references 
to the strategy of a small part of a military conflict or the strategy used in 
conducting a single battle. And certainly at each echelon in warfare, a 
commander has the equivalent of his strategy for conducting operations at that 
echelon, even though he may not use that term. Because of this variability in 
meaning, we have not used the labels strategy and tactics as hard and fast 
distinctions for levels of military conflict. In regard to the operational level of 
warfare, we prefer the term campaign because of its wider usage over many 
years. Campaigns and operations (or operational art) both refer to the activities 
conducted to effect a strategy (in the common use of that term), their product 
being the positioning, maneuvering and sustaining of forces that occurs prior 
to—and also includes—active combat. 
3.1.5   Military Combat within the Totality of Conflict 
Figure 2 depicts the place of military combat within the totality of human 
conflict. War is the principal context within which combat occurs (but not the 
only context, as combat can occur in the absence of formal warfare). War means, 
in the broadest sense, all the adversarial activities of two (or more) hostile parties 
to a military conflict. This includes political, economic, and diplomatic actions 
conducted during the conflict together with actions carried out by military 
forces. Within wars there can be one or more campaigns, normally of shorter 
duration and involving a smaller set of forces than are engaged in the war. 
Campaign means the coordinated movement, positioning, and preparation of 
forces to attain a specified objective, which is responsive to a broader war 
objective. The campaign may involve a series of stages carried out sequentially 
or in parallel, and it ends when the objective is achieved or is deemed 
Figure 2. Combat in Relation to Other Forms of Conflict 
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unattainable. A campaign ordinarily leads to and includes one or more combat 
situations or threats of combat (the definition of combat is presented below). 
Within a particular combat there will be one or more engagements, which can 
take place simultaneously or be separated in time. An engagement is localized, 
heightened activity during combat that involves intense use of deadly force 
between the opposing sides. There is no clear-cut boundary that separates an 
engagement from other activity during combat; the only distinction is that of 
heightened action in a localized space over a relatively brief time span. Firefight 
is a synonym for engagement. Within engagements there will normally be many 
shorter spasms of fighting between two entities—individuals, small units, 
armored vehicles, aircraft, ships—which we call duels for lack of a more concise 
label. 
The combination of duels, engagements, combat, and campaigns comprises a 
continuum of war activity. Within this continuum, events are episodic rather 
than continuous. There is not an unbroken flow of duels one after the other, nor 
of engagements, combat, or campaigns. 
The term battle is commonly used in a context that equates to our term combat 
yet sometimes is broader in scope and sometimes approximates our engagement. 
Because of this spread of meanings, we have not used battle to designate a 
specific category of military conflict. 
3.2     MILITARY COMBAT 
3.2.1   Defining Military Combat 
We define military combat as purposeful, controlled violence carried out by direct 
means of deadly force between opponents, each attempting to carry out a mission, the 
achievement of which has value to that side and the achievement of which is opposed in 
some degree by the other side. Military combat is the active agent—the cutting 
edge—of warfare. It is the means for achieving war aims through domination of 
the enemy. There could be a war without casualties, but there cannot be a war 
without a test of wills, and combat or its threat is where the testing culminates. 
There also could be stand-alone combat in isolation from the broader scope of 
war. These circumstances—stand-alone combat and a war without casualties— 
are aberrant cases. Although our focus has been on the more usual cases where 
opposing forces use force as necessary to achieve missions within the context of 
campaigns and war, our findings will apply to aberrant cases as well. 
We include within our definition the threat of deadly force in addition to its 
actual use. Admittedly this may add a degree of fuzziness. A situation in which 
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force is threatened but not used is an unusual case, though it has occurred in 
history. We include such a case within our definition only where the initial 
intent by both sides was to employ deadly force and preparations were made to 
those ends, even though the intent was later changed by one side before deadly 
force was brought to bear. We exclude the case where one side from the outset 
chooses not to oppose the enemy (and cannot be forced into the contest); and we 
exclude the case where one side absents itself from the scene, leaving the other 
party to carry out its mission unopposed. 
Throughout, the word combat by itself is used as a noun or adjective to mean the 
totality of activity that is included within our definition of the term. The words a 
combat and the combat are used as nouns to refer to a particular combat from 
beginning to end. 
3.2.2   When Combat Begins and Ends 
Our definition of combat includes a beginning, an active phase, and an ending. 
The active phase starts when violent means are employed by either side against 
the opponent. The beginning phase includes the preparatory actions 
immediately preceding the active phase after a decision has been made by either 
side to proceed with combat. These include such actions as developing plans and 
disseminating orders, positioning forces and supplies, setting up protective 
measures, scouting and other intelligence gathering, and mentally preparing 
troops. In some cases (an ambush, for instance, or a submarine stalking and 
executing a surprise attack against an enemy warship) one side has virtually no 
time to make preparations; under our definition combat has begun when the 
other side sets up the ambush or begins the stalking. In cases where neither side 
has time to prepare, combat begins with the active phase. The end of combat is 
marked by the cessation of interaction by both sides—especially the use of 
violent means—and the immediate repositioning and reconstitution of forces in 
accordance with the situation. One side may have gotten its dose of fighting and 
be on the run, but combat does not end until its opponent has ceased to pursue. 
It is clear from this discussion that establishing the boundary as to precisely 
when any particular combat starts and when it ends is to some extent a matter of 
choice. 
Military combat is normally episodic. From the beginning of the active phase 
until its end there will usually be periods of intense fighting separated by 
periods of lower activity during which forces regroup to engage in the next 
confrontation. Insofar as the reduced activity is merely a pause in the on-going 
action to achieve a mission, it does not constitute a termination of combat within 
our definition. 
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3.2.3   The Magnitude of Combat 
No firm boundary can be established as to the magnitude of forces, the 
geographical area, or the time duration that is encompassed within the definition 
of combat. On the smaller side we can consider combat involving only squad- 
and platoon-size forces, or two ships or aircraft in extended but isolated actions 
against each other. On the larger side we can include division- and corps-size 
air-land-amphibious forces, large naval fleets, and massive air assaults. 
Contiguity of mission is the governing factor more than size or duration. All the 
forces of each side that are engaged in fulfilling the mission of their side are the 
forces participating in the combat, whether or not they actually shoot or are in 
harm's way. Forces spatially remote from the main combat arena, such as stand- 
off surveillance aircraft or space-based communications satellites are included 
when they directly support the mission. The three-day Battle of Gettysburg 
includes a number of separate instances of combat, as does the Battle of the 
Somme in 1916 and the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. The Battle of Marathon 
between Greeks and Persians in 490 BC and the naval Battle of Savo Island in 
1942 are single instances of combat. 
We likewise establish no bound as to kind of weapon. Any weapon that is 
potentially lethal or incapacitating is a candidate. Weapons can range from fists, 
knives and clubs to thermonuclear and biological weapons. The geographical 
extent and the nature of combat environment are similarly not limited. Combat 
can occur on land, in the air, at and under the sea, in space, and in any 
combination of these environments, and it can be confined to a small area or 
range over a broad expanse in three dimensions. 
3.3     THE CONTEXT OF COMBAT 
3.3.1   The Internal Context 
The internal context of combat is simply all the personnel and materiel of the 
two opposing sides plus the geophysical environment in which combat is 
waged. Included with these are also their physical, psychological, cultural and 
mental characteristics. The quantity and quality of weaponry are included, and 
also the mission, the doctrinal and tactical training, and the esprit de corps of 
troops. Every combatant carries layers upon layers of influence with him into 
combat, from his genetic makeup and what his teachers taught him to the 
bonding with his foxhole buddy and the faith he places in his commanding 
officer. These are all part of the internal context. The geophysical environment 
includes weather conditions, man-made infrastructure, and natural 
topographical and oceanographic features. Noncombatants, commercial aircraft, 
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merchant shipping, fishing boats, and the like present within the combat area are 
part of the context, and some may be the object of attacks. In short, the internal 
context of combat encompasses all features, animate and inanimate, physical and 
cognitive, natural and man-made, that exist in the combat arena. 
3.3.2 The External Context 
In describing combat as the cutting edge of warfare with a discrete beginning 
and end (granting some looseness as to starting and ending points), we do not 
mean to isolate combat from the military conflict of which it is part. At all times, 
from beginning to end, combat and all combatants are affected by the broader 
context in which combat is set, and what happens in combat feeds back to affect 
that broader context. War is not suspended while awaiting the outcome of a 
combat action; other war actions proceed. 
Despite its role as the point where crucial actions are decided, combat is always 
subservient to the wider perspective of the campaign and the war, and beyond 
that to the higher political interests and to the populace at large. The external 
context can impose constraints on the conduct of combat as well as strong 
impetus. Societal culture and the attitude of the folks back home can be powerful 
influences on individuals, collectively and individually. This broader context 
affects the purpose, values, and mission that guide each combat, not only at its 
start but throughout its duration; and the results of combat are fed back as 
influences on the campaign and the war. 
3.3.3 Combat as the Crucible for Decisions 
Granting the obvious influences of the external context, it is nevertheless in the 
crucible of combat that campaigns can become successful and wars can be 
brought to a favorable end, militarily at least. And granting that in warfare, the 
time spent and number of persons engaging in combat are a small fraction of the 
total, it is in combat that critical events are made to happen. 
Of all human endeavors, combat is perhaps the most intense and trying for its 
participants. It forces each to put his life and that of his opponent in jeopardy 
and dictates that many on each side must give up their lives for a sometimes 
remote, abstract cause. For every combatant the sacrifices are of the highest, but 
each senses the stakes also are high and often critical. While not every single 
combat will have a decisive outcome, it appears that the high-risk, high-stakes 
nature of combat sets it apart as the crucible where decisions in war are settled. 
This establishes the importance of examining combat and attempting to explain 
it as carefully, comprehensively, and scientifically as possible. 
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MISSIONS AND OUTCOMES 
Axiom 2 states that each side in combat seeks to achieve a goal—its 
mission—which has perceived value. Mission is a pervasive factor that spurs and 
harnesses combat activity, both stimulating and constraining the action. It acts to 
bridge the purpose of combat to the outcome. As such it constitutes the primary 
means for guiding combat in accordance with the grander designs of wars and 
campaigns. 
4.1     TOP DOWN CONTROL 
Mission is a top-down controlling factor which acts through the hierarchical 
structure of command. The mission given to the highest theater-level echelon 
becomes the basis for missions assigned to the next echelon, and so on down to 
the lowest units, each echelon being more circumscribed as to the time and space 
covered. At the lowest echelons, missions become verbal directions to 
individuals. 
To the extent that the top-down hierarchy of missions is consistent and is 
comprehended as intended, there is powerful vectoring of an entire force toward 
the outcome sought by the top of the chain of command. Understanding of the 
broad purposes of the war effort at all levels serves to foster these conditions. To 
the extent that missions become muddled, misinterpreted, or evaded, or war 
purposes are not understood, the vectors' magnitude and direction lose their 
strength and sharpness. 
4.2     THE MISSION 
A combat mission consists of two parts: an objective to be achieved (or task to be 
performed) and the purpose of achieving the objective (or performing the task). 
The objective is always stated explicitly, although sometimes in broad terms 
(and sometimes, in the case of a poorly expressed objective, ambiguously). The 
purpose is often left to be inferred by subordinate commanders. 
In its broader sense, mission expresses the end state of affairs to be achieved 
during the course of combat—the outcome. In contrast, the statement of mission 
promulgated in a combat order is often phrased as the actions (usually expressed 
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as tasks) to be accomplished to achieve the outcome, not the outcome itself. In 
this case the directed actions or tasks serve to imply the outcome, provided they 
are sufficiently clear. A combat mission statement will normally be a single 
sentence, but implicit in that brevity will be a vast array of specific actions that 
the force understands must be taken. Doctrine, training and experience serve to 
fill in matters not stated, and beyond that, missions are further buttressed by 
implied national values, goals, and cultural aims. The simple mission of "taking 
the hill" is understood by all involved as implying many contributing actions for 
reasons that reach beyond the local situation and for values that, vague as they 
may be to some, justify the effort and danger. When commanders and 
individuals cease to see a mission in light of these underlying purposes and 
values, the mission no longer exerts its directing control over combat, and force 
effectiveness begins to disintegrate. 
Missions are usually received as orders from the next higher command echelon, 
but they can also be inferred by a commander from his understanding of the 
policies, goals and intentions of the higher commander and of the entire war 
effort. In any case the combat commander normally will translate the assigned or 
assumed mission into a more specific mission statement of the objectives to be 
attained by his force. The degree of latitude allowed a commander in assuming a 
mission not explicitly directed from above or in departing from the specifics of 
an assigned mission will be influenced by what is permissible in doctrine and 
the personalities of higher and lower commanders. Any combat mission that 
differs from what was intended by higher echelons risks perturbing the overall 
control of the war effort—a circumstance that is not necessarily bad if the combat 
commander has a better appreciation of the local situation and of the context of 
his combat action within the larger picture. 
If the dynamics of the combat situation are altered sufficiently from the initial 
conditions, the mission itself may be modified in the midst of combat, or if 
events outside the combat arena change substantially, higher command may 
direct a new mission. The revised mission, together with revised orders to 
subordinate units, then supersedes the original mission as the vector guiding 
combat. In extreme cases, if the cost of continuing becomes excessive, mission 
abandonment and disengagement or capitulation may be forced. 
4.3     RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PURPOSE, VALUE, 
MISSION, OUTCOME, AND COST 
Values underlie the purposes of war, and the derivative purposes of every 
combat will likewise have values associated with attaining those purposes. In the 
end, it is the values that will govern the human and material resource costs 
expended to achieve the purposes, and hence to fulfill the mission. The 
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relationships among purpose, value, mission, outcome, and cost extend through 
the hierarchy from top to bottom. The values associated with purposes and 
missions at the highest echelons are infused as values at lower echelons down to 
the individual. Compatibility and commonality in the value system throughout 
the force reinforce the common effort. Nevertheless, values and costs as seen by 
infantrymen and sailors with their lives at risk are different in particulars from 
values and costs seen by high level commanders. 
The hierarchical relationships among purpose, value, mission, outcome, and cost 
are illustrated in Figure 3. There can be other conflict levels in addition to the 
three shown. The purposes, with associated values, at the campaign level flow 
from those at the war level. At each level, missions derive from the purposes and 
values at that level and ultimately lead to outcomes that have values associated 
with them. The values associated with purposes are the a priori values of the 
outcomes intended, together with the expected costs, whereas the values 
associated with outcomes are the a posteriori values after resources have actually 
been expended—after the costs have been counted and weighed in light of what 
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Figure 3. The Hierarchy of Purpose, Value, Mission, Outcome, and Cost 
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The outcome of any single combat, the gains as well as the costs , contributes to 
the on-going campaign in which the combat is embedded. More remotely, the 
outcome adds to the war effort. At each level—combat, campaign, and war—the 
combat outcome is weighed against the post-combat value at that level. The 
outcome of combat is shared by both sides of the conflict, but the purposes, 
values, missions, and assessments are unique to each side. 
4.4     OUTCOME ASSESSMENT 
In assessing the outcome of a combat just concluded, a combat commander and 
his superiors will address how closely the outcome fitted his mission, but they 
will also weigh the value of the outcome in relation to the value of the combaf s 
purpose. They may consider the costs as worth the outcome, or the costs as 
questionable from the point of view of his own force yet acceptable because of 
the outcome's contribution to the war effort, or the costs as unacceptable from 
any point of view. At the campaign level, the outcome of this combat and of all 
other combat outcomes (as well as noncombat actions) are viewed collectively 
and the whole is periodically weighed against the purposes and values as seen at 
that level. The same pattern repeats through all higher levels. 
Moreover, the identical pattern of purpose, value, mission, outcome, and cost 
assessment is also repeated at every lower echelon within the combat force from 
subordinate commanders down to individuals. At the lowest echelons the 
assessments are informal or only in the minds of individuals. Thus the pattern of 
purpose, value, mission, and outcome assessment is constant from the highest to 
the lowest levels of war. 
In no sense can a valid combat assessment by either side be expressed in such 
simple terms as "win," "lose," or "draw." Combat assessment is never merely a 
body count or compilation of material destroyed, although these are among 
many factors to be weighed. It is a complex evaluation seen from different 
perspectives by many parties. The evaluation is affected by the perceived 
friendly force situation, the perceived enemy situation and also by the 
perception of the enemy's perception. The possible course of future events must 
be considered—the outcome of one battle becomes part of the initial conditions 
of the next. Uncertainty is an inevitable component of the assessment, and must 
be taken into account. 
Any assessment has only transitory standing—subsequent events in the 
campaign and war may convert what initially seemed a favorable combat 
outcome into, in retrospect, an unfavorable one. In addition, a favorable outcome 
to one side does not necessarily equate to an unfavorable outcome for the other 
side. For example, one force could successfully execute its mission of "taking the 
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hill by 1200 hours" while the opposing force was successfully fulfilling its 
mission of "delaying enemy occupation of the hill until 1100 hours." And even 
though both sides attained their mission in this example, either or both could 
have had an adverse outcome if the cost outweighed the value. Combat is not a 
zero-sum game where one side's fortune always equals the other's misfortune. 
To reiterate an earlier point, the outcome being assessed is shared by the 
opponent, and obviously the impact of the outcome upon the enemy is a major 
part of the assessment on both sides. As will be discussed in more detail later, it 
is outcome as perceived by the various parties on both sides that is being weighed, 
and obviously, faulty perceptions about the outcome will lead to faulty 
assessments. 
Assessment does not wait on the conclusion of combat. As combat action 
unfolds, combat commanders, their subordinates, and their superiors make 
periodic estimates of the situation and of progress toward mission attainment. 
Assessment of results during combat enables refinement and redirection of battle 
activity. Purpose and value continue to be critical determinants, and the 
balancing of value against cost as combat proceeds is one of the most difficult 
matters all combatants face—but especially those in command. 
4.5     SUMMARY 
The mission hierarchy in its broadest sense is the principal means to vector a 
force toward the desired goals of warfare. It provides control from the top down 
through every echelon of the military force to all individuals. At every echelon 
up and down the chain of command, the mission of that echelon derives from 
the mission of the next higher echelon. Linked with each mission is a purpose for 
achieving the mission and an associated value of mission accomplishment. In 
combat, the mission vectors all combat action, aligning it with the missions and 
purposes of the war effort. Upon the completion of combat, the outcome is 
assessed in the light of the post-combat values and costs as seen at (and within) 
that level and at all higher levels, and the assessments influence further action at 
all war echelons. 
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COMPONENTS OF MILITARY COMBAT 
A first step toward describing a theory of military combat is determining the 
basic components that constitute combat. By components we mean the set of all 
things, in the most fundamental sense, that can be said to make up the 
phenomenon of combat: the constituents that exist in all combat actions. The task 
is somewhat like that described by Herman Melville in his chapter on cetology 
in Moby Dick: 'The classification of the constituents of a chaos, nothing less is 
here essayed." 
At this point we will be describing only the components, and the relationships 
among them, but not how the components perform their functions. Those 
matters will be covered in later chapters. 
5.1     APPROACH 
Two approaches have been taken. One uses a top-down method based on the 
conventional functions of combat. The other, which we consider the more 
fundamental of the two, can be designated a decomposition-recomposition or 
bottom-up approach. 
5.1.1 Top-Down Functional Approach 
The top-down approach examines components from the point of view of any 
political entity setting out to provide the means to wage combat. This approach 
is useful to provide a conventional view of components and as a check against 
the bottom-up approach to ensure the latter does not somehow misrepresent 
combat as actually practiced. The micro-derived components from the bottom- 
up approach must mesh with the macro-derived components from the top-down 
functional approach. The two methods must yield compatible structures even 
though they entail quite different conceptual approaches. 
5.1.2 Bottom-Up Decomposition-Recomposition Approach 
The bottom-up decomposition-recomposition approach is the more fundamental 
because it relates more directly to the structure and dynamics of combat. In this 
method, a large number of factors (or more accurately topics) that relate to 
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combat were compiled from an extensive number of documentary sources and 
individuals. The topics, which cover every gamut of combat, were categorized 
and grouped, then analyzed. From this we have distilled constituents that 
appear at every level of combat. 
The top-down approach is discussed first. 
5.2     COMPONENTS AS DERIVED FROM 
THE TOP-DOWN FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
Throughout history there has been strong consistency in the components that 
civilizations have used to wage combat. To examine these from the top-down 
functional approach, we start with the political entities that, at the highest level, 
take actions to prepare for combat. Consistent in these actions are the following: 
defining the threat; developing strategy, doctrine, and tactics; orienting toward 
goals and control; engendering the will to fight; and organizing and arming 
forces. 
5.2.1 Defining the Threat 
Political entities start with an idea in mind as to what kind of an opponent 
combat may have to be waged against, and where and when it may have to take 
place. From this they distill a definition of threat. The definition may be specific 
as to who and where, but more often it is framed in broad, generic terms. An 
alternative approach is based on the capability to operate in a variety of 
circumstances against many opponents, in effect against a generalized enemy. 
Threat definition will also indicate the general intentions ascribed to the 
potential opponents, such as an emphasis on aggressive or defensive action. 
Strategic intelligence provides a principal input to defining the threat. 
5.2.2 Developing Strategy, Doctrine, and Tactics 
Governments and their military establishments develop military strategies 
aimed at fulfilling the military role within political strategy and goals. Doctrine 
and tactics in conformance with military strategy are developed to guide 
commanders and their forces in the conduct of combat. At a lower level, 
techniques are developed as combat aids for individuals, crews, teams, and 
small units. These guidelines and techniques are codified into doctrinal, tactical, 
and technical documents. In modern forces these documents comprise copious 
volumes of words. 
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5.2.3 Orienting toward Goals and Control 
In furtherance of Axiom 3 (achieving goals), another constituent of combat is its 
directed orientation toward the goals and objectives of the highest political 
levels—usually national or alliance levels. Achievement of these goals and 
objectives has particular value to the political entities. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the combat objectives align with war objectives, and the values ascribed to 
combat outcomes align with the values of achieving the broader goals and 
objectives. The hierarchical system of organization and command, using 
directives, mission assignments, and orders, conveys the wants of the 
government and upper military echelons. National objectives are imposed on 
forces in combat through the tradition of disciplined observance of orders 
throughout the chain of command. While the strength of this tradition varies 
widely from one force to another, its effect is always present. 
5.2.4 Engendering the Will to Fight 
A paramount constituent of combat is the will to fight and achieve objectives. 
The will of combat forces to do so flows from the will of the highest 
governmental authorities and the will of the populace called on to support 
combat. While this normally falls under the term national will, combat forces can 
also be those of an entity that is not a nation in the accepted sense. The risks of 
warfare magnify the criticality of will as a component of combat. Governments 
make concerted efforts to reinforce the notion of willingness to risk life and 
property for the good of the whole and to overcome the natural reluctance of 
individuals to place themselves in harm's way. The will to fight will rarely be 
symmetrical for two opponents and will vary widely for combat forces in 
different circumstances. 
5.2.5 Organizing and Arming Forces for Combat 
As stated in Axiom 3, combat potential is embodied in military forces. To create 
military forces with the potential to wage combat, governments draw on 
available manpower, material, technological, and geopolitical resources with a 
view of what the forces may be called upon to do in combat. The consistent 
patterns in organizing and arming for combat are these: 
Structuring forces into units. Forces are organized into units designed to 
perform particular combat functions. Manning, arming, and supplying 
are intended to match the functions planned for the unit. The variety of 
functions, and hence the variety of units, has proliferated as new 
technology has forced increased specialization of combat units. 
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Organizing units into a hierarchical-lateral structure. Small units are 
combined in a hierarchical-lateral structure to form larger units, which in 
turn are combined into even larger units, this pattern repeating as 
necessary to reach the size needed. At each echelon, the structure as a 
whole is designed to be an integrated system with unitary control of the 
force downward from that echelon. 
Establishing control through a command chain. Control of forces is 
accomplished through unit commanders and the missions assigned to 
them. The command structure is hierarchical in conformity with unit 
structure, and the chain of command is meant to exert unified control 
over the entire force from the highest level to the lowest. 
Incorporating deadly and nonlethal armament. Following from Axiom 1, 
the weapons and equipment used to arm combat forces entail deadly 
means for offense and defense. Whether weaponry and doctrine 
emphasize offense or defense, they consistently incorporate the capability 
to inflict harm. There has been recent interest in adding nonlethal 
weapons, but even these may harm and they remain backed by lethal 
weapons. No national-level military force has yet been structured with 
only nonlethal weaponry. 
Dividing resources among fighting, support, and acquiring information. 
Only a fraction of a military force engages in direct fighting with 
opposing forces. The remainder is involved in information acquisition 
and other forms of support to the fighting elements. Some of this comes 
from military forces outside the combat arena, but at all times a 
substantial effort within the combat area is devoted to support and 
information acquisition. As combat has grown more complex, the support 
and information functions have become increasingly important and have 
received a greater proportion of resources. In modern forces, only a small 
part of the total structure is designed for fighting. Despite this 
quantitative shift in resource allocation, fighting remains the critical 
function of combat. 
Emphasizing joint operations. Differences in the physical environments 
in which forces operate exert a major impact on force organization, 
arming, and employment. Forces intended to operate at sea have always 
been structured differently from those intended to operate on land. The 
result has been the establishment of separate naval and land forces (and 
separate marine forces at the land-sea interface), and more recently, 
separate air and space forces. While this force organization may appear to 
segregate combat by sea, land, air, and space environments, force 
organization for the conduct of combat operations more commonly 
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follows a joint system approach based on the combination of functional 
needs in each case. 
5.2.6   Summary of Top-Down Approach 
To summarize, from the top-down functional approach we can see the following 
components that consistently appear in combat: 
• A defined threat, providing a generalized or a more specific basis for 
designing forces for combat. 
• Strategy, doctrine, tactics, and techniques, codified as guides to the 
waging of combat in light of the threat. 
• The will to fight, stemming from the will of governmental authorities, the 
willingness of the populace to support fighting, and the level of profes- 
sionalism of the armed forces. 
• Control of combat oriented toward higher level objectives. 
• The organizing and arming of forces for combat in hierarchical patterns 
that are consistent historically and across all forms of government. 
Included in the patterns are units designed for fighting, support, acquiring 
information and exercising control. 
In the top-down approach, we have identified factors, such as defining a threat 
and arming forces for combat, that fall outside our definition of combat as active 
fighting embedded within campaigns and wars. These national level 
components are part of the external context of combat, which influences what 
goes on within combat. This will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6. 
5.3     COMPONENTS AS DERIVED FROM THE BOTTOM-UP APPROACH 
The decomposition-recomposition (bottom-up) approach derives the compo- 
nents of combat in an entirely different manner from the top-down approach 
and leads to a different view of basic components. The methodology used is 
similar to that called reductionism, but we do not attempt to push the method as 
far as is often done in works of science. 
The compilation of combat topics in the bottom-up approach covers a wide 
range of subjects, some broad in scope, some concerned with small details. The 
list is a mixed bag of terms relating to combat. The small sampling presented in 
Table 1 illustrates the variety and partial redundancy of the topics as they 
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appear in unsorted, unorganized form. Compiling the list, categorizing and 
grouping the topics, and analyzing them is the decomposition part of the 
approach. 
5.3.1   The Basic Components 
Analysis of the categorized topics showed they could be organized into three 
fundamental, independent constituents which have a consistent relation to each 
other: 
• Elements of combat 
• Attributes of elements 
• Actions of elements 
These are the basic components of combat as determined from the recomposition 
part of the bottom-up approach. 
Table 1. Sample List of Unsorted Topics Relating to Combat 
Leadership Training Surveillance 
Chain of command Estimate of the situation Ballistic missile 
Commanders Combat intelligence Meeting engagement 
Objectives Fear of death Field of fire 
Missions Combat fatigue Squad 
Vehicles Mobility Weather 
Combat vessels Courage Trafficability 
Classes of supply Unit integrity Collateral damage 
Civil affairs Aircraft shelters Determination 
Landing craft Attack Unity of command 
Rifles Defense Cover 
Field fortification Combat uniform Corps 
Accuracy of fire Fire for effect Interoperability 
Bombing accuracy Harassing fire Bomb loading time 
Maneuver Culminating point Enemy intentions 
Firepower Suppression Fuel depot 
Dispersal Resupply Recuperability 
Discipline Combat friction Replenishment at sea 
Sea sickness Platoon Sea state 
Reconnaissance Chance Cislunar space 
Fog of battle Uncertainty Initiative 
Doctrine Morale Synchronization 
Tactics Ammunition Air superiority 
The three components of combat are defined later in the chapter. In addition, we 
have determined two distinct categories into which each of the element and 
action components can be divided: 
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• Physical elements and actions 
• Cognitive elements and actions 
Each of the three components is distinct from the others; each is an independent 
part of a triple-leg foundation on which all combat rests. We can envision 
elements, attributes of the elements, and actions down to the most minute level 
of combat, and we can combine the minute-level elements and actions, together 
with associated attributes, into agglomerations of elements and actions up to the 
highest levels of combat. Or, we can decompose the full scope of combat into 
smaller and smaller categories of elements (with their attributes) and actions, 
down to the smallest level. We designate this characteristic as the property of 
aggregation-disaggregation. 
5.3.2 Cognitive and Physical Categories 
The basic element and action components are either cognitive or physical. Physical 
elements are those that have weight and physical dimensions. The only elements 
that are cognitive are humans and human thoughts, and the only actions that are 
cognitive are those by humans. Cognitive actions work as influences on 
cognitive elements. Individuals in combat are simultaneously both cognitive and 
physical elements. They are cognitive in that they can think, convey thoughts, 
and can be harmed mentally; and they are physical in that they have weight and 
size, need to be fed and transported, and can be harmed physically. Computers 
using artificial intelligence may approach cognition, but are not independently 
cognitive. The term physical includes elements and actions that involve 
electromagnetic radiation, which, though it cannot be physically weighed and 
seen, can produce observable physical effects. 
5.3.3 The Triad Relationship of the Components 
The basic components have a clear-cut relationship to one another. An agent 
element takes an action that impacts an object element, itself, or both. (If it impacts 
itself, then the acting element is both agent and object.) In any case, the result 
alters the attributes of the object element. We call this triad relationship a combat 
activity. Normally, more than one object element is impacted by a combat action, 
and therefore the result of the action involves changed attributes of more than 
one object element. Moreover, there often are virtually simultaneous actions by 
other agent elements that also impact the object elements. For example, an 
enemy object element may duck to avoid the firing action of his opponent, 
thereby altering his own attribute to a more protected posture. He is acting as an 
agent element taking an action (ducking) that affects himself. From this we can 
derive the more generalized definition of combat activity as one or more elements 
each taking an action that impacts one or more other elements, or themselves, or 
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both, thereby producing a result that changes the attributes of the impacted 
elements. 
The object elements are not limited to elements that have been discretely selected 
by the agent element. Unaimed fire, for example, can act on any elements in the 
area where fire is delivered. In the case of discretely acquired targets, the object 
elements can be in addition to, or other than, the ones targeted. In friendly fire 
accidents, the object elements are unintended elements of the friendly force. 
Where fire is intentionally brought to bear on a friendly unit that is about to be 
overrun by the enemy, the object elements are the enemy and any friendly force 
elements that unfortunately are also hit. Object elements can be any elements of 
the friendly force, the enemy force, or the combat environment, and they can be 
intentional objects or unintentional ones. 
5.3.4 Two-Sided Adversarial Nature of Combat 
It follows from the axioms that combat involves two forces in opposition. The 
degree of opposition may be total, in the sense that the attainment of an objective 
by one side equates to the denial of an opposite objective by the other side; or it 
may be partial, in that the objectives of the two sides are not complete opposites. 
In either case, the two sides are in some degree of deadly contention. In war, it is 
possible to have more than two parties in opposition, but combat involving more 
than two opponents is such an aberrant case that we have not included it. It is 
questionable that a situation has ever arisen where three (or more) opponents 
have simultaneously waged combat against each other. 
5.3.5 Environment: The Third Party to Combat 
While combat involves two opposing parties engaging in deadly interaction, we 
must also identify a third party: the combat environment. This is the shared 
three-dimensional geophysical space and features in which the two adversarial 
parties wage combat. The combat environment acts as a neutral third party that 
affects both of the opposed parties. It is neutral in the sense that it does not "take 
sides" in combat, but it is not neutral in the way it can affect each side differently 
and the way each side may be able to exploit it to advantage. 
As with the adversarial parties, the environment comprises elements with 
attributes, and the elements can cause actions. The nonadversarial character of 
the combat environment, however, gives a distinct difference to the manner in 
which its actions affect combat. The combat environment is not fixed during the 
course of combat; in addition to changes occurring naturally, it can be modified 
in some degree by the two sides, as for instance, when fire levels the vegetation 
and churns the ground. 
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5.3.6   Internal and External Contexts of Combat 
The internal context of combat includes the two opponents and the shared 
combat environment. But within this internal context, combat is continually 
influenced by an external context which is essentially unbounded in scope, since 
it stretches to the national entities supporting combat on both sides and extends 
to a broad geophysical space far beyond the battle arena. The external context 
establishes the boundary conditions for combat by both sides, not only at the 
start of action but in more or less degree continuously throughout combat. 
Within the internal context, each side will be influenced primarily by its own 
external conditions from the national or alliance level down to the campaign 
level, but there will also be an influence from trying to account for the 
opponent's external influences. Chapter 6 discusses the internal and external 
contexts in greater detail. 
5.4     DISCUSSION OF THE COMPONENTS 
5.4.1    Element 
The component element is defined as a material or intangible thing of any kind, 
whether animate or inanimate, that exists in combat and can change the state of another 
element or itself. This includes such things as individual soldiers, sailors, marines 
and airmen, combat orders, plans, weapons, equipment, supplies, and the 
geophysical combat environment. The environment includes topographic 
features such as the terrain as a whole, a tree growing on the terrain, hills, 
airfields, roads, and buildings; oceanographic features such as the seas, islands, 
and reefs; and atmospheric features such as air, rain, snow, clouds, radiation 
from the sun, and reflected radiation from the moon. Elements may be either 
cognitive or physical. As noted, the only cognitive elements are individual 
humans, together with their thoughts and the contents of their minds. (The case 
of animals trained for use in combat is a limited and usually inconsequential 
exception.) Elements may exist as single entities (such as an individual, a rifle, a 
tree, or a truck) and as aggregated entities of related single elements (such as a 
battalion, a forest, or a convoy of ammunition trucks). However, while a group 
of humans, such as a platoon or the staff of a headquarters, is an aggregated 
physical element, it is not an aggregated cognitive element, since it cannot think 
as if it were a unitary whole. Each person on the platoon or staff is a separate 
cognitive element that works cooperatively with the others. Thus, while in the 
rigorous sense there are no aggregated cognitive elements, the cooperative 
cognitive actions taken by individuals in a well-trained unit will appear much 
like collective cognition. 
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Any categorization of individual and aggregate elements is to an extent arbitrary 
and case-specific. Nevertheless, designations are implicit in long-standing usage. 
The ammunition stored in a munitions depot is an aggregated element of similar 
individual elements; the equipment and personnel in a combat unit is an 
aggregated element composed of many like and unlike elements, all of which 
are, however, functionally related. A useful categorization of combat elements 
can be made clearer through examples. Each of the following is an element of 
combat: 
An individual combatant is both a cognitive element and a physical 
element. 
A rifle carried by a combatant is a physical element. The parts of an 
assembled rifle are not elements, but spare rifle parts supplied separately 
are elements. 
A squad, with all of its equipment, weapons and supplies, is an 
aggregated physical element. The squad is not a cognitive element 
because it does not think as a single corporate body, but it is composed of 
cognitive elements (the members of the squad) who can take cognitive 
actions acting in concert. If the squad is diminished by loss of personnel 
and equipment, the reduced squad remains an aggregated element so 
long as it retains unit integrity. 
An aircraft is a single physical element. An aircraft with its crew is an 
aggregated physical and cognitive element, as is the aircraft with crew 
plus loaded ordnance. Each crew member is a single cognitive and 
physical element. As with the squad example above, the crew members 
can take individual cognitive actions but will normally concert their 
mental actions. 
A battle-control computer is a physical element. A separable software 
program that can be inserted into the computer is a separate element, and 
when inserted into the computer, the combined system becomes an 
aggregated element. Built-in nonseparable software, such as the 
computer's operating system, is not an element. 
A river in the combat area is an element. So are a road, a hill, a bridge, a 
forest, and a tree. 
An area of combat terrain is a highly aggregated element. Individual 
topographical elements combine into a single aggregated element of 
terrain in the same manner as persons and equipment aggregate into a 
combat unit. 
37 
Components of Military Combat 
A battalion, a division, a corps, and a joint task force are aggregated 
physical elements. 
The document that constitutes a written combat order is a physical 
element embodying cognitive meaning which may be read and 
understood as a cognitive action. 
Radiation from the sun is a physical element, although a highly diffused 
one. When the radiation shines on an object, heating it and making it 
more visible, the radiation is taking an action. Like radiation, the earth's 
magnetic field is an element. 
The mental indoctrination instilled over years in the mind of a 
commander or any individual combatant is a cognitive element, but it is 
subsumed in the individual as an inseparable part of his state. An 
individual and his mental faculties are the same cognitive element. But an 
individual's thought process (in formulating a course of action, for 
example) is a cognitive action, and when that individual conveys his 
thoughts to another (say by giving verbal instructions), he is taking a 
second cognitive action to influence and change the cognitive state of the 
other person. 
5.4.2   Action 
The component action is defined as an act performed by a single or aggregated 
element to change the state of one or more other elements, its own state, or both. (The 
term state is defined below.) Since actions require a small but finite time for 
completion, they, unlike elements and attributes, inject time flow into combat. 
Actions encompass every act that takes place in combat: acts by individual 
elements and acts by aggregated elements. A soldier (single element) using his 
rifle (single element) to fire a round (single element) has performed a single 
action, that of firing. A missile-carrying destroyer and crew (an aggregated 
element) firing a salvo of rockets (each rocket a single element) using all of its 
launchers (each a single element) has performed an aggregated action. 
Conversely, this aggregated action can be broken down into the many single 
actions involved. Thus actions, like elements, have the property of aggregation- 
disaggregation. 
Actions have no substantive existence; they cannot be shot at, destroyed, moved, 
or stored. One cannot attack an action. Only elements can be attacked, destroyed, 
moved, or otherwise subjected to the actions of combat. Likewise, only an 
element can perform an action. The relationship between elements and actions is 
the same as that between nouns and verbs. In the grammar of combat, elements 
(nouns) carry out actions (verbs) against other elements or themselves. Although 
38 
Components of Military Combat 
elements do not carry out actions against actions, elements have an indirect 
effect by acting against other elements that perform actions. 
All actions are carried out by one element affecting another element or elements 
(including itself)- This applies even to actions caused by environmental elements 
(such as the actions of raining, heating caused by the sun, and other weather- 
caused actions). Actions thus always have objects: action is directed upon one or 
more elements. In the grammar analogy, actions are transitive verbs. 
Actions are either physical or cognitive. Actions which derive from thinking are 
cognitive, and these originate only with cognitive elements (humans). Actions by 
all other elements are physical (humans also perform physical actions). Every 
action by an animate or inanimate element (except for events attributable to acts 
of nature) commences with a human cognitive thought to set the action in 
motion, and hence every action in combat must be preceded by a cognitive 
action. A gun does not fire by itself and a truck does not move by itself; someone 
decides to have the gun fired and the truck moved. An antipersonnel mine in a 
minefield does not go off until a soldier makes a decision to move across the 
minefield. In addition to natural events, a possible exception to this principle can 
be included for actions attributable solely to failures of equipment, such as a 
computer shut-down because of battery rundown. 
The following illustrate what is included within the component action: 
• Deciding a course of action (a cognitive action) 
• Stating a order verbally or composing it in writing (cognitive actions) 
• Exhorting a unit to perform well (a cognitive action) 
• Transmitting a written order; receiving a written order (both are 
physical actions) 
• Firing one round from a weapon; firing a salvo of rounds 
• Steering a boat; flying a reconnaissance mission 
• Transporting a combat unit from one location to another 
• Repairing a tank 
• Storing intelligence information in a computer 
• Capturing a terrain feature 
• Destroying part or all of a bridge 
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• Suppressing a force 
• Surrendering a force 
• Snowing within the combat area 
• Changing of the weather, as from clear to cloudy 
• Changing of the sea state, as from calm to heavy seas 
Most of these are aggregated actions. Although only the first three of the list are 
cognitive actions, all except the last three require cognitive actions before they 
can be initiated and most require additional cognitive actions to complete 
execution of the action. For example, the action of destroying a bridge is physical 
but requires the cognitive action of making a decision to have the bridge 
destroyed and a great many other cognitive decision actions to initiate the 
physical actions of transmitting orders, positioning forces, and firing weapons. 
The last three on the list are actions that man does not control and for which, 
therefore, there is no preceding cognitive input. 
5.4.3   Attribute 
The component attribute is defined as a qualitative or quantitative modifier of a 
combat element. Attributes provide the differentials that distinguish one element 
from another. Attributes are not in themselves either cognitive or physical, but 
they can modify either category of elements. When they modify elements, 
attributes correspond to adjectives, and when they modify actions, they 
correspond to adverbs. Although attributes cannot themselves be aggregated, 
they modify individual elements which become aggregated, and the effect is as 
if the aggregated element takes on the combined attributes of the many 
elements. To illustrate, a tank platoon (an aggregated element) comprising 
individual tanks each with a certain attribute of cross-country mobility becomes 
a platoon with essentially that same attribute of cross-country mobility. 
Similarly, where every member of a bomber or ship crew has the attribute of 
high morale, the aggregated crew displays that same attribute, but if some have 
high morale and others do not, the aggregated crew will display a mixed 
attribute. 
Attributes are of three kinds: 
• Spatial conditions: these are the time-space characteristics of elements, 
which include location in three-dimensional space at any moment of 
time, orientation in space (pointing this way or that, standing upright 
or lying down, and so on), and instantaneous motion (moving in a 
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circle or linearly, rotating, motionless). Spatial conditions apply only to 
physical elements. 
• Physical properties: these are descriptors of elements, both human 
and other, that can be stated and measured in physical terms, such as 
dimensions, weight, shape, configuration, composition, muzzle 
velocity, range, explosive force, and load-carrying capacity. Physical 
properties pertain only to physical elements. Properties of elements of 
the environment can include steepness of hills, density of foliage, 
heights of buildings, strength of fortifications, density of clouds, 
temperature, and so on. 
• Qualities: these are nonphysical, subjective descriptors of both physical 
and cognitive elements, such as motivation, durability, reliability, 
slowness, vulnerability, intelligence, tractability, brevity (e.g., of 
orders), and manpower intensiveness. Qualities differ from physical 
properties in that they cannot be as specifically quantified and 
described, and they apply to cognitive elements as well as physical 
ones. They also include a sense of "goodness" or "badness," depending 
on the situation in which the element is operating. For example, 
weapons of short range in a force are generally not as good as the 
longer range weapons of another force; but if the short-range weapons 
are more accurate, they may on balance be better. Clear 
comprehensibility of an order is always a quality of goodness. Lack of 
intelligence in a commander is a bad quality. Short message 
transmission time is good. The will of an individual to fight can be 
changed from strong (good) to weak (bad). These examples show that 
qualities are less concrete than physical properties and spatial 
conditions. For some qualities, what is good in one situation may be 
less so or bad in another circumstance. 
5.4.4   State 
At any instant of time the combination of an element and its attributes is 
designated the state of that element. State is defined as the condition of existence at 
a point in time of a single or aggregated element, as determined by its cognitive and 
physical attributes, including its spatial condition. Every element from individual 
persons and individual items of materiel up to complete multinational forces has 
a state at any moment of time. The states of elements, both single and 
aggregated, will be frequently changing during combat. As perceived by 
combatants, the changes appear to be continuous. The component "action" is not 
a part of state, but the actions of elements result in changes of state of all affected 
elements. 
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Like the three basic components, state has the property of aggregation- 
disaggregation. Thus, state can be aggregated by combining the states of the 
smallest elements into the states of larger elements, and the largest element can 
be decomposed into states of the smallest elements. The combination of 
individual element states into the state of an aggregated element is not, however, 
an arithmetic summation of the individual states, for, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
there are nonlinear effects at play. 
The states of elements are changed by the triad element-action-element activities 
that are constantly taking place in combat. These activities have results, and the 
results are the changed states of the elements acted upon. 
5.5     SUMMARY: BASIC COMPONENTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS 
This section sets forth the basic building blocks that universally constitute 
combat. All of combat, from the smallest granular level to the full scope of all 
forces engaged, can be composed from three basic components. Each of the three 
components is distinct from the others, but they are linked in relationships that 
hold consistently throughout combat. Figure 4 illustrates the relationships. 
The components are: 
• Elements, which are all the material and intangible things existing in 
combat. Elements may be cognitive (having mental capability) or 
physical. 
• Actions, which are acts carried out by elements upon other elements or 
upon themselves, thereby changing the states of the elements acted on. 
Actions may be cognitive (stemming directly from a mental process) or 
physical. 
• Attributes, which are descriptive modifiers of elements. Attributes are 
of three kinds: spatial conditions, physical properties, and qualities. 
The attributes of cognitive elements are limited to qualities. 
There are three separate parties to every combat: 
• Each of the two opposing forces, and 
• The geophysical combat environment, which acts as a non-adversarial third 
party. 
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Figure 4. Relationships of Components of Combat 
All of the physical and cognitive elements (as modified by their attributes) of the 
two opposing forces and the environment, together with all of the actions taken 
by elements over time to impact other elements and the results of those actions, 
constitute the totality of combat. This is the internal context of combat. The 
internal context is embedded within and continually influenced from the outset 
of combat until its conclusion by the external context, which extends to the highest 
political levels and broadest geographical areas on both sides of the conflict. 
There are consistent patterns in organizing and arming for combat. Combat 
forces are organized by aggregating elements into functional units that are 
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linked laterally and hierarchically into functionally oriented echelons that are 
controlled from the top down through a command chain responsive to the 
highest level. Combat forces are oriented and vectored toward the goals and 
strategy of the governing entity and are infused with the will of the populace 
and the political authorities to pursue their assigned missions at high personal 
risk. 
The decomposition-recomposition approach provides the fundamental building 
blocks necessary to understand combat structure and dynamics, while the top- 
down functional approach provides patterns of force structuring and connects 
combat to the larger war picture. The two approaches are complementary and 
not antithetical. 
The manner in which elements, actions, and attributes are structurally related, 
and the impact of the external context upon the internal context—sometimes 




STRUCTURE OF COMBAT 
This chapter brings together the components of combat and the internal and 
external contexts into a structure descriptive of the combat phenomenon. The 
structure unites external and internal contexts, functional relationships among 
the components, mission, and the outcome of combat with space and time 
dimensions. 
6.1      BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND THE EXTERNAL CONTEXT 
Combat does not occur as a closed or isolated system. Its conduct is affected by 
the initial conditions shaped by the external context at the commencement of 
combat. As combat proceeds the external context continues to exert an effect. The 
external context provides the initial impetus and constrains combat to conform 
with the campaign and war levels and with political factors. Thus, before and 
during combat it forms the boundary conditions that influence the course of 
events. 
The external bounding influences have become increasingly significant as 
combat has become more dependent on forms of multiservice support and 
weapons systems remote from the combat arena. Intercontinental transport of 
forces, satellite systems providing intelligence and positioning information, and 
long-range missile and aircraft systems are a few of the remote capabilities that 
now interface with local combat. Advances in communications enable near-real- 
time injection of controls from command levels far from the combat area and 
near-immediate feedback of combat progress to those levels, complicating 
command during combat. 
Table 2 lists some of the variables that contribute to the boundary conditions; 
many additional factors also come into play. Boundary conditions are formed by 
the purpose-value-mission framework of the war and the campaign, together 
with capabilities and constraints from the external geophysical environment and 
the general situation vis-ä-vis the enemy. The more immediate initial conditions 
are those existing just before the preparatory phase of combat—the forces about 
to be involved (with their combat potential at the time), the mission or task 
assignment, the enemy force expected to be in opposition, conditions created by 
the environment within the combat arena, and the information available about 
all of these factors. 
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Table 2. Variables Illustrative of the External Context 
War Context 
National (and alliance) war goals 
National (and alliance) will and support of the war effort 
War leadership 
War strategy and objectives 
War doctrine 
Available manpower resources—quantity, quality, morale, readiness, leadership, 
motivation 
Available material resources—quantity and quality of weapons, communications, 
support 
Future availability of manpower and material resources 
Intelligence systems and intelligence available 
Immediate war situation prior to the combat 
Intentions for war actions subsequent to the combat 
Campaign Context 
Campaign leadership 
Campaign mission and objectives 
Campaign doctrine 
Rules of combat engagement; other war constraints 
Forces and support available at the campaign level; availability for diversion to the 
combat 
Combat potential of forces planned for the combat 
Reinforcement and replacement forces and support to be expected 
Concept of how the combat fits with campaign plans 
Estimate of the costs of conducting the combat 
Intentions for campaign actions subsequent to the combat 
Geophysical Environment External to the Combat Area 
Geographic, oceanographic, aerographic, and outer space environments 
Climatological conditions 
Recent and forecast weather conditions affecting the external environment 
Man-made infrastructure, such as roads, seaports, airports, urban centers 
The Opponent's External Context 
At the war level: intelligence information about the same war categories listed above 
At the campaign level: intelligence information about the opponent's campaigns 
At the geophysical environment level: intelligence about the opponent's environment 
6.2    Primitives of Combat Structure 
Development of combat structure starts with single elements acting on single 
elements, or small units of only a few elements acting on other small units, all 
subject to influences of the boundary conditions. The smallest animate element is 
a single soldier. Examples of the smallest inanimate elements are a vehicle and a 
howitzer. Aggregation of single entities into small units and of small units into 
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larger units is governed by commonalities of the attributes and functions of 
elements. A squad and an aircraft crew are examples of small unit aggregations. 
Working with individual elements and small unit aggregations, we will describe 
a micro-structure of combat—structure as it occurs at the lowest level of combat. 
6.2.1   Combat Micro-Structure 
Figure 5 illustrates the basic ingredients of combat structure at the micro level. 
The external context acts on and influences the form and flow of combat activity 
over time, represented in stylized fashion by the rest of the figure. Mission 
provides specific internal direction to combat activity and vectors it through 
command and control. 
The figure illustrates a microcosm of combat in which an element engages in an 
action that affects itself, affects one or more other friendly force elements, one or 
more enemy elements, or environmental elements. The effects of the actions are 
labeled RESULT. As stated in Chapter 5 the attributes of an element determine 
its state. The result of an action is a change in the attributes of the object elements 
(those being acted on), and thus their states. To the extent the agent element (the 
one performing the action) changes its own attributes (therefore its state), it 
becomes both object and agent element. In some cases, an action results in 
destruction of an element, and the change of state then becomes that of physical 
elimination. 
The actions and the changes of state occur over a small but finite period of time 
(shown in Figure 5 as At). Changes of state are indicated in the figure by dotted 
arrows directed from the "result" symbol to the "element" symbol. 
As indicated in the figure, element-action-element sets with associated results 
constitute the combat activities defined in Chapter 5. These fall into a few basic 
categories: 
• Single-action activity - Blue force tank (Element 1) fires on Red force 
tank (Element 2). The results are Red force tank damaged (change of 
state of Element 2) and Blue force tank ammunition expended (change 
of state of Element 1). 
• Multiple-action activity - Red force tank (Element 2) moves to take 
cover while simultaneously firing on Blue force tank (Element 1). The 
results are Red force tank at a new spatial position and ammunition 
expended (two-fold change of state of Element 2), and Blue force tank 
crippled (change of state of Element 1). 
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Figure 5. Microstructure of Combat Activity 
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• Action-counter-action activity - Blue force tank (Element 1) fires on 
Red force tank (Element 2) and Red force tank returns fire. The results 
are Blue force tank ammunition expended but tank destroyed (two-fold 
change of state) and Red force tank ammunition expended and tank 
damaged (two-fold change of state). 
• Multiple object-element activity - Blue force tank (Element 1) fires on 
two Red force armored personnel carriers (Elements 2 and 3). The 
results are one Red force personnel carrier destroyed (change of state of 
Element 2) and one personnel carrier damaged (change of state of 
Element 3), and Blue force tank ammunition expended (change of state 
of Element 1). 
At this fine-grained level, combat structure is the assemblage of many such 
element-action-element activities in various combinations. In Figure 5, the 
explicit independent variable is time, progressing from top to bottom. The 
actions and the changes of state of each activity take place over a small but finite 
time interval. Spatial changes of the elements (in three dimensions) are implicitly 
tied to events in the figure as time progresses. 
6.2.2   A Micro-Structure Scenario 
In principle, any combat can be decomposed into elemental activity chains, 
creating figures of great complexity. Using a simple hypothetical firefight 
scenario, such a construct has been made in Figure 6. Force element sizes have 
not been specified in the scenario, nor have the constraints of geophysical 
environment and external contexts. However, elements and their actions in the 
scenario can be thought of as aggregations of single units within limits of 
element homogeneity and commonality of individual actions. In aggregating to 
any degree there is a loss of precision and detail in defining battle activity. 
We can take a time cut across Figure 6 (at, for example, t = tj) and then examine 
the resulting fixed-time cross section of the combat. The time cut reveals every 
force element on both sides, the state of each element at that moment, and the 
action, if any, the element is taking. If Figure 6 had included the combat 
environment and the external context, the time cut would also reveal the states 
of their respective elements at that instant of time. Additional time cuts across 
the figure would produce similar patterns of information. The question remains 
as to whether a generalized fixed-time cross section of combat could be derived 
from such information. 
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6.3     A SLICE OF COMBAT IN FIXED-TIME 
Two procedures are needed to produce a generalized fixed-time cross section of 
combat. One calls for examination of combat structure from the bottom up and 
the other from the top down. The two procedures parallel the bottom-up and 
top-down approaches to determining the components of combat. 
6.3.1 Bottom Up: from Micro to Macro 
This procedure starts with the smallest combat elements and their activities. It 
then groups elements and activities through a process of aggregation into larger 
entities more in keeping with a commander's view of traditional organization 
and operations. Drawing on the firefight of Figure 6 as an example, we 
undertake at some fixed time (such as tj in the figure), an aggregation into 
groupings for the two opposing sides: 
Elements of like kind 
Actions of like kind 
Activity results of like kind 
Influences from the external context of like kind. 
In addition, elements and actions of the geophysical environment affecting each 
adversary are similarly aggregated into like groups. 
To guide arrangement of the groupings into a meaningful pattern of forces, 
actions, results, environment, and context, we must draw on knowledge of 
combat and the traditional organization of resources used in combat. The latter 
is provided by a top-down view. 
6.3.2 Top-Down: from Macro to Micro 
Governments have, since early times, organized and armed combat forces in 
consistent task-oriented patterns of four general functional areas: fighting, 
support, information acquisition, and command-control. Of these, it is the 
fighting function that primarily impacts the enemy. In a modern force, a major 
part is applied to support, information acquisition, and command-control 
functions, and a minor part to fighting. 
By decomposing, we can identify in the top-down approach layers of 
hierarchical structure from the level of national command authority down to the 
individual combatant. 
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This process of decomposing, in conjunction with the process of aggregating 
from the bottom up, leads to a useful construct of combat structure. The top- 
down view connects the detailed individual view of structure to the larger 
geopolitical picture and the war. The bottom-up view provides the underpin- 
ning necessary to understand combat structure and dynamics. The two views are 
complementary and non-contradictory. 
6.3.3   Generalized Fixed-Time Cross Section of Combat 
Using concepts outlined above, a diagram can be constructed that represents a 
generalized fixed-time cross section of combat structure—a slice in time, so to 
speak. This is shown in Figure 7 which consolidates categories of forces, 
activities, and results of the two opposing sides and the shared combat 
environment. The result is a time-instantaneous diagram of structural relation- 
ships that is universal for any form of combat and for any level of combat, in 
effect, a snapshot of combat. All the forces, activities, and relationships shown 
are present at every instant of time in combat, but in varying degrees as 
conditions change with time. The quantitative and qualitative specifics of forces, 
activities, and results will vary widely from one combat to another. Information 
acquisition is carried out not only by those force elements specifically charged 
with this task, but also by support forces and fighting forces. Every individual in 
combat will engage in information acquisition at one time or another. 
Force and functional relationships. The generalized forces and functional 
relationships shown in Figure 7 are composed of myriads of the elemental forces 
and activities illustrated in the firefight of Figure 6. All the actions of the two 
sides and the combat environment interact in the "Combat Interaction" block of 
Figure 7 to form the interactive combat processes (discussed later). Actions of the 
fighting forces and the intelligence gathering elements of one side interact with 
those of the other side in a direct, confrontational manner. Forces carrying out 
other actions interact primarily with own-force elements and only indirectly 
with enemy forces. 
From the interactive processes, the actual results of combat are formed, indicated 
in Figure 7 as changes of state in the Blue and Red forces and the combat 
environment and the degree of mission accomplishment by each side. 
Information about the results is acquired and perceptions based on the 
information are fed back to the command element. The figure, taken as a whole, 
represents the three-sided combat situation at a moment in time. 
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Structural symmetry and hierarchical congruency. There is complete symmetry 
of structure between the two opposing sides. Obviously this does not translate 
into symmetry of capabilities of the two sides. In addition, the two sides share 
the results of combat, the combat situation, and the geophysical combat 
environment. And obviously, the effects on the two sides of the environment, 
results, and situation are never symmetrical. The environment, for example, may 
favor or handicap one side, and one side may be more susceptible than the other 
to certain environmental impediments. Although both sides share the combat 
situation, each side has incomplete and only partly correct information of the 
emerging results and the actual states of both sides. Each side therefore works 
with perceptions of reality, rather than with absolute reality. This is a universal 
feature of combat structure. 
The relationships of forces and activities shown in Figure 7 are hierarchically 
congruent through all levels and kinds of combat: they are independent of the 
combat force echelon (the figure applies equally to squad-size and to larger 
forces) and independent of the combat domain (land, sea, air, space, or any 
combination). The Blue and Red commanders and staffs shown are situated 
within organizational hierarchies that include superior, lateral and subordinate 
commands, and each has a mission or task that likewise is part of the mission 
hierarchy. At every echelon, each side has manpower and material resources at 
its disposal to perform command-control, fighting, support and information 
gathering functions, which may or may not be adequate for the mission 
imposed. Each side is bounded and influenced by its own external context. 
Perception versus reality. The actual combat results at any instant are measures 
of the degree of mission accomplishment by each side—in effect, incremental 
measures of effectiveness for each of the opposing forces. The cumulative results 
over time of these instantaneous snapshots will be cumulative measures of 
combat accomplishment and mission achievement for each side. But actual 
results will differ from results as perceived by the two sides. Perceptions of 
physical and cognitive results are derived from friendly situation reports and 
from scouting, reconnaissance, surveillance, and other intelligence activities, all 
of which are subject to analysis and interpretation and thus all are less than 
perfect. Perceptions of combat—not the reality—are used by both commanders 
and all other combatants in planning, decision-making, controlling, and all other 
cognitive actions. 
The command-control, support and information acquisition actions are generally 
similar for all military forces but differ in the details of implementation. There 
are, of course, major differences in the fighting actions. Part of combat support 
and information acquisition may come from external pools of manpower and 
materiel, but most is embedded within the combat force structure itself. 
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A simplified cross section of combat. Figure 8 presents a simplified version of 
Figure 7. Here again, the structural symmetry in elements and functions of the 
two sides is evident. But, as stated earlier, structural symmetry should not be 
taken to mean symmetry in carrying out functions in a given combat situation. 
Asymmetries arise from all sorts of differences ranging from the external context 






























Figure 8. Simplified Fixed-Time Cross Section of Combat 
6.4     FUNCTIONS AND PROCESSES 
6.4.1   Distinction between Combat Functions and Combat Processes 
Earlier, we grouped related elements, actions and activities across a slice of time 
into aggregations. We now group related combat elements and actions into 
primary combat functions, and related combat activities into primary combat 
processes. 
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For each grouping—functions and processes—we select the minimum set of 
categories that will cover all actions and all processes of combat. In both cases, 
the selection of the minimum set is arbitrary, but in both the set is defined as 
encompassing, respectively, all functions and all processes that occur in combat. 
It is possible to argue for more or fewer categories in each set, or to subdivide 
functions and processes almost indefinitely, winding up with a vast number that 
differ only slightly. Nevertheless, these two sets, chosen arbitrarily but 
judiciously, seem well suited for the purpose of describing a theory of combat. 
The difference between combat functions and combat processes is that the 
processes are oriented to results actually achieved against object elements in the 
three-sided amalgam of combat, whereas functions are oriented to results that 
agent elements intend to achieve by their actions. Functions are the means—the 
actions taken by elements—unilaterally employed by each side to obtain desired 
results. Processes, in contrast, are the activities of all three parties in combat that 
create actual results—the new states of object elements. Thus, combat functions 
are the input-oriented actions directed by commanders, while processes are the 
output-oriented accomplishments of the actions, taking into account what the 
enemy and the environment may do to attenuate the effect. 
Figure 9 illustrates the difference between function and process, using a combat 
activity in which the actions of both sides and the combat environment play their 
parts in determining the result. The process is formed by the interaction among 
the three parties. 
6.4.2    Primary Combat Functions 
A primary combat function is defined as a generic category of like actions taken by 
elements of either adversary in combat to achieve an intended result. Primary 
combat functions at the lowest level (individual elements taking individual 
actions of like kind) are aggregated into primary combat functions being carried 
out by aggregated elements taking actions of like kind at that moment in combat. 
Some functions are performed internally to support own-force activities, while 
others are directed against the enemy, in both instances the functions being 
directed toward mission fulfillment. The enemy, in turn, performs appropriate 
functions to further his own mission and to counter his opponent's actions. 
Action is the enabling mechanism for combat functions. It is undertaken by an 
agent element impacting an object element with some particular result intended 
by the agent that may or may not be realized. The reasons for disparity between 
intent and outcome include imperfect execution of agent action, environmental 
interference, counteraction by the object element, unrecognized conditions of 
object state, and so on. Combat process, relating as it does to what is actually 
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obtained as results, is not affected by uncertainties and unknowns afflicting 
forces, and thus is the reality of combat. Nevertheless, the cause of all combat 
activity is the performance of functions—the actions initiated by commanders 
and carried out by forces. 
COMBAT 
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Figure 9. Distinction Between Combat Function and Combat Process 
The Primary Combat Functions. Any list of combat functions will vary from 
source to source, depending on terminology, specificity, the kind of forces they 
pertain to, and the sort of combat involved, but all lists reflecting modern joint 
warfare will resemble one another. Two lists of combat functions are shown in 
Table 3, one based on the Universal Joint Task List (Tactical) and the other 
adapted from the 1986 edition of the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. 
From the two lists, we have developed a generalized set of four primary combat 
functions (Table 4) that are broad enough to include every function of combat. 
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The same primary combat functions are available to both sides, and each side 
uses them to further its mission and to counter actions by the opponent. 
Table 3. Lists of Combat Functions 
Combat Functions Combat Functions 
From Universal Joint Task List From Army Manual of Operations 
Exercise command and control Command and control 







Tactical air operations 










Special forces operations 
Civil-military operations 
Sustainment, including arming, 
fueling, maintaining, repairing, 
transporting, protecting 





The command part of the command-control primary function is performed by all 
in the command chain (including anyone assuming command) and their staffs. 
This involves the weighing of information, the formulation of decisions, and the 
dissemination of decisions and directives. The control part of the function is 
performed by all other persons who carry out command decisions. The function 
also includes signals that control weapon systems, such as guidance commands 
to a missile, and those that interface with humans, such as electronic warning to 
an air crew of an approaching enemy missile. Communicating is part of the 
command-control function. The fighting function includes all the actions directly 
carried out against enemy forces: delivery of firepower, maneuvers, deception 
actions, offensive electronic war actions, and many other offense and defense 
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actions. The support function encompasses not only longer-term forms of 
sustainment, but also provides for the immediate needs of fighting forces. It 
includes sustainment of both manpower and materiel resources, encompassing 
health and medical support, maintenance and repair of equipment, providing 
munitions and fuel, transporting, engineering support, and the like. The primary 
combat function of information acquisition includes the gathering of information 
about the enemy, about the friendly force, and about the combat 
environment—in short, the gathering of all information about the combat 
situation. The processing of both own force and intelligence information to 
formulate combat decisions falls under the command-control function. 
Interdependence of Functions. The symmetry of forces and functions between 
the two sides is clearly shown in Figure 7. Less apparent is the interdependence 
of the four primary functions for each side: active fighting, support, information 
acquisition, and command-control. This is better illustrated in Figure 10, where 
for the sake of simplicity, the fixed-time cross section of combat is shown in 
abbreviated form for only one side. The command-control function, working 
through the chain of command, vectors fighting forces to move toward mission 
accomplishment to remove enemy opposition. At the same time, the command- 
control function directs the acquisition of information needed and directs 
support forces to enable fighting forces to proceed in their tasks. All four 
functions must be carried out successfully to achieve the mission. Each depends 
on the other three, as symbolized by the linked rectangles in Figure 10. The 
command-control function is essential to initiate purposeful actions by the other 
three, and depends on information being acquired; the fighting function must be 
sustained by the support function to continue its tasks. What results from the 
combat functions of one side is affected by the combat functions of the other 
side, and from this interactive mix come the combat processes and the actual 
results of combat. 
In addition to these four interdependent functions, we must introduce the notion 
of counter-functions that can be engaged in by the other side. The counter- 
function to command-control includes all measures taken by one side to disrupt, 
confuse or destroy the other side's capability to make sound decisions, 
disseminate information and control forces. The counter to information 
acquisition is keeping own-force information secure. These are aspects of 
information warfare. Counter-support takes the form of interdiction and 
destruction of the enemy's capability to sustain his forces with weapons and 
other materiel, including sustainment from outside the combat arena. Similarly, 
there are counters to all of the activities involved in the fighting function. 
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Figure 10. Relationship of Command-Control, Support, Information 
Acquisition, and Fighting Functions 
6.4.3   Primary Combat Processes 
A primary combat process is defined as combat activity of any kind that produces a 
common generic result. Since combat processes include every component of 
combat—elements, attributes, and actions, together with actual results and new 
states of elements—the primary combat processes, taken together, represent the 
totality of what happens in combat. Every combat function initiated with some 
intended result will generate one or more combat processes that will, in the 
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three-sided interaction of combat, lead to the actual results of combat. Every 
single combat activity by an element at the lowest level will contribute to one or 
more of these primary combat processes. Every aggregated combat activity will 
likewise fit into one or more primary processes. 
The primary combat processes, listed in Table 5, are either externally or 
internally directed. External processes (and only these) change the states of 
enemy elements; internal processes change the states of own-force elements, and 
do not affect enemy elements. Both types of processes occur over time during 
combat, each waxing and waning in intensity as the circumstances of combat 
change. At a fixed instant of time, most or all of the processes will be ongoing for 
each side across the structural panorama shown in Figure 7. Combat processes 
apply to both sides, although the effectiveness of their application can differ 
markedly for the two sides. 
Table 5. Primary Combat Processes 









As with the command-control function, the command-control process includes 
not only planning and decision-making by the command chain, but controlling 
actions by all other combatants. The information acquisition process entails 
acquiring information on both the friendly and the enemy force, as well as on 
the combat environment. Although acquisition of information about the enemy 
(intelligence gathering) has an externally directed aspect, the process is classified 
as internally directed because its purpose is to provide information to 
commanders for use in the command-control process. The communication 
process differs from information acquisition in that the latter involves reception 
of information while the former involves transmission of information. Protection 
is an internally directed process because its purpose is to preserve the friendly 
force from enemy action, rather than to harm enemy elements. Movement is a 
process that involves all actions changing the spatial location of own-force 
elements. Sustainment includes both materiel support and support to personnel. 
Motivation involves the mind and spirit of friendly force combatants. It is the 
opposite of the externally directed demoralization process, which acts against 
the mind and spirit of enemy personnel. The destruction process includes 
damage to materiel and the wounding of combatants, in addition to outright 
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destruction and killing. Suppression involves the reduced efficiency of 
combatants by raising fear of harm. Neutralization means that part or all of the 
enemy force is placed in a position where they are completely unable to support 
their mission. Disruption involves delaying or denying enemy execution of 
actions, including support activities. Deception works through the enemy's 
information acquisition process to his command-control process to misperceive 
the combat situation. The processes are explained in more detail in Chapter 7. 
The relationships among actions, functions, and processes are shown in Figure 
11, in which we use the notational convention of Figure 6. Five Blue force units 
are firing at five Red force units with the intended result of destroying all of 
them. Simultaneously, one Blue unit feints a maneuver intended to deceive a 
Red unit The actual results of the firing are two Red units destroyed and three 
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Figure 11. Relationships Among Actions, Functions, and Processes 
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deceived to the point that it moves to a position that isolates itself from the 
battle, and thus is neutralized. Firing and maneuvering are actions. A Blue force 
element firing against an enemy element with an associated intended result, is a 
combat function. The combination of (1) a Blue force element firing against a 
particular enemy element; (2) the enemy's simultaneous response affecting that 
particular Red Force element; and (3) the combat environment's impact on both 
Blue and Red force elements leads to the actual results that come out of all these 
interactions. This is a combat process. For simplicity, the Red force and combat 
environment impacts are omitted from Figure 11. The figure is further simplified 
by not showing all the results (and thus not all the processes) of a real 
engagement. 
The firing and maneuvering functions shown in Figure 11 aggregate into 
separate collections of destruction, suppression, neutralization, and deception 
processes. The firing actions of Blue force Bj and B3 lead to the destruction 
process; those of B2, B4, and B5 lead to the suppression process. In addition, B5 
contributes to the neutralization and deception processes through its decoy 
maneuver. 
6.4.4   Some Observations on the Property of Aggregation-Disaggregation 
In aggregating elements (with their attributes), actions, functions, and processes 
from the lowest level up to the highest level within the full combat environment, 
we gain a perspective of combat from the vantage point of those who participate 
in it. In doing so, however, we sacrifice detailed information about the states of 
individual elements, the actions they take, and the effects on the elements acted 
upon. At the lowest level, a clear input-output accountability conceptually exists 
for everything that happens in the combat arena. In moving from the lowest 
level to the higher levels of aggregation, we shift from discrete single activities to 
substantial interlinkage of aggregated activities. The interlinkage is not only 
within each force but also arises through interaction with the opposing force. 
The complexity is of such magnitude that precise tracing of accountability (while 
remaining possible in principle) becomes inordinately difficult. Although we 
have defined each process to be distinct from all others, aggregated processes as 
seen by combatants as an amorphous blend. The impact of one or two processes 
cannot be examined without considering all the rest. Combat processes, while 
providing us with a more orderly picture of what happens in combat, are 
dynamically related in degrees that vary with time and circumstances, as 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
There is a further point to be made. The property of aggregation-disaggregation 
that we ascribe to combat elements, actions, functions, and processes is used in 
this document only in a static sense. We conceptually combine elements at a 
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moment in combat into units of larger and larger size, and combine actions such 
as firing and processes such as suppression into larger and larger 
agglomerations of firings and suppressions by larger and larger units. And 
conversely, we conceptually break down (disaggregate) elements, actions, 
processes, and so forth into smaller and smaller pieces at a point in time. But 
what we do not—and cannot—say is that anyone can predict how a group of 
single elements or ongoing elemental processes at any time during combat will 
be formed into any particular set of aggregated elements or aggregated 
processes at any later time. Nor can we say that an aggregated element or an 
aggregated process can be traced back in the past or forward into the future to 
any particular states of individual elements or to any particular processes 
affecting the individual elements. The aggregation-disaggregation properties we 
ascribe have no cause-and-effect accountability over time, and they are without 
predictive power. 
In speaking of aggregations of "like" elements and "like" actions, we do not 
mean "precisely alike" elements and actions. We mean the aggregations that 
normally occur in military units and the aggregated actions those units normally 
take. Thus the aggregation of human elements into a platoon would include 
personnel trained with many different military specialties, and the aggregation 
of materiel elements would encompass a variety of equipment suited to the 
mission of the platoon. Included among the military specialties and equipment 
would be those for both offensive and defensive actions, for sustaining the unit, 
for communicating, for moving the unit, and so on. The 'likeness" of aggregated 
elements and actions is related to what the unit is intended to do in combat; it is 
a functional likeness, rather than a literal one. 
6.5     FROM ELEMENTAL RESULTS TO FINAL OUTCOMES 
The problems encountered in the transition from the lowest to higher levels 
apply also in the transition from elemental results to aggregate results of 
aggregated processes, and to the cumulative aggregated results that are the final 
outcome of combat. At the bottom level, the results of element-action-element 
activities are distinct. At the level of aggregated activities, the aggregated results 
become so intermingled that identifying particular effects with particular causes 
is difficult or impossible. Each of the aggregated processes is composed of many 
micro activities that create micro results contributing to that process. The 
aggregated results from the complete set of primary combat processes are then 
blended into the full range of results across the combat spectrum at any point in 
time. Figure 12 (an extension of Figure 11) portrays this blending. As combat 
proceeds, the cumulative results lead to new combat situations, and at the end of 
combat, lead to combat outcome. At any moment in combat, the changes of state 
are going on not sequentially but simultaneously. The time intervals between 
64 
Structure of Combat 
changes, At, are small (approaching zero), so that the combat situation from the 
overall view appears to be changing continuously. 
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Figure 12. Blended Aggregation of Process Results 
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6.5.1    Combat Structure from a Fighting Perspective 
Military combat involves primarily the psycho-physical act of fighting in order 
to achieve a mission. All other acts associated with combat support the act of 
fighting. Command and control gives purpose and direction to fighting, while 
support sustains it with substance, and information acquisition provides the 
means for good decisions. By analogy, at the elemental level, command and 
control is the brain and the nervous system, support is the nutrition and 
circulatory systems, and information acquisition is the five senses, all fostering 
the bone and muscle used in fighting to strike the blow and thrust the sword. 
To further clarify the role of processes in combat structure, Figure 13 presents an 
enlarged view of the combat arena of Figure 7. The heavy line identifies the 
region of combat interaction. Within the region of interaction, the internally 
directed processes of each side directly affect the forces of that side, and the 
externally directed processes directly affect the forces of the opposing side. The 
internally directed processes affect the opposing forces indirectly by supporting 
the force elements that carry out the external processes. Both internally and 
externally directed processes are of equal importance; without the internal 
processes, the external processes cannot be executed. The internal command- 
control process, for example, is needed to set all other processes in purposeful 
action. Portions of the forces blocks are shown outside the combat interaction 
region because at any point in time, certain forces in combat may be performing 
functions that are not affected by interaction with the enemy. 
All of the processes of each side are susceptible to being countered in some 
degree by processes of the other side. No process is free from the possibility of 
being countered. 
6.6     COMBAT STRUCTURE IN THE TIME DOMAIN 
Having examined the fixed-time structure of combat, it is now necessary to 
consider how these time-instantaneous slices are integrated over the time 
domain from combat initiation to combat termination. 
6.6.1    Structural Invariance Over Time 
Figure 14 illustrates how the introduction of time affects the overall structure of 
combat. The figure indicates that the external context variables for each side 
influence combat from beginning to end. The initial conditions set by the 
external context provide the starting boundary for combat, and throughout 
combat  there  can  be  continuing  constraints  and  impulsions,  as  well   as 
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Figure 13. The Role of Processes in Combat Interaction 
reinforcements into the combat arena and changes of mission directed from 
outside. 
The fixed-time cross section of combat is a static, instantaneous picture; it is 
invariant with time. At every point in time (as, for example, t = t3), the same 
symmetrical pattern of force and activity relationships pertains for the two 
antagonists, as do the hierarchical and lateral linkages with other forces. The 
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interdependent combat functions and the combat processes (neither are shown 
in Figure 14) do not vary in kind over time, but constantly vary in degree for 
each of the two sides. Thus combat functions and processes would not appear as 
pipes of constant diameter as time progresses, but as cylinders of expanding and 
contracting diameters. The processes are initiated by each side's actions but are 





COMBAT TERMINATION -> FINAL OUTCOME 
Figure 14. Combat Structure in the Time Continuum 
All functions and all processes are potentially operable over any fixed-time cross 
section and their intensity and the degree of interaction among them will change 
over time with the dynamic interplay of opposing forces. Each of the snapshots 
of combat (shown in Figure 14 at times tj, t2, t3, t4, and t5) represents the combat 
situation at that moment. At each time point, the combat processes are altering 
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the combat situation, leading to a new situation at the next time point, and so on 
to the termination of combat. Combat termination occurs after the active fighting 
by both sides ceases and the two sides disengage. The situation at this time is the 
outcome of combat. 
6.6.2   Asymmetries Between Opposing Forces 
The structural symmetry between the two adversaries—the same pattern of force 
and activity relationships, the same categories of combat functions and combat 
processes—is time invariant. However, functional symmetry in patterns and 
categories says nothing about symmetry of capability between the two sides. 
Beginning with the external contexts and the starting boundary conditions of the 
two sides, together with their missions, and continuing through all aspects of 
combat, every specific element, action, and state on one side will differ from 
every element, action, and state on the other side. Quantitative and qualitative 
differences will abound in forces and their attributes, and the differences will 
change as combat progresses. While both sides have the same categories of 
combat functions, each will use those functions in its own ways and with its own 
effectiveness, and the processes that derive from those functions will yield 
different results for the two sides. 
How each side will fare in combat will depend on these differences and the 
dynamics of how effectively each side can convert its combat potential into 
realized capability for accomplishing the mission. The means for doing this is 
combat power, addressed in the next chapter. 
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DYNAMICS: THE CONCEPT OF COMBAT POWER 
7.1     GENERAL 
7.1.1 The Transition from Structure to Dynamics 
The transition from structure to dynamics marks a shift from the relatively 
straightforward to matters of complexity. Here we must pattern our approach 
more after the social and biological sciences than the firmer approaches of 
physical sciences. 
Nevertheless, we have sought to be as scientifically objective as the state of 
knowledge permits. While military practice will undoubtedly remain much in 
the realm of art, our description of combat dynamics is not so much art as a 
holistic explanation of the workings of combat. We believe that, in principle, the 
dynamics could in the main be substantiated—quantitatively in many parts and 
qualitatively elsewhere—if the data of combat were somehow vastly expanded. 
For the present, we must be content to provide a descriptive explanation. The 
subject is presented more as a source of insight than as an explanation with 
predictive power. Poincare, addressing the difficulty of expressing solutions to 
problems, stated, "What we can always do, or rather what we should always try 
to do, is to solve the qualitative problem so to speak, that is to try to find the 
general form of the curve representing the unknown function." 
7.1.2 Combat Power, Processes, Distribution, and Output 
The concept of combat power is central to understanding the theory of combat. 
Axiom 4 states that commanders create combat power from combat potential in 
furtherance of a mission. It is combat power that produces results in combat. 
We begin the discussion of dynamics by explaining the meaning of the term 
combat power as used here. Each side brings energy to bear in the form of 
combat functions with the aim of creating combat power, but it is only through 
the fundamental processes of combat that combat power is actually produced 
and results achieved. As stated in the previous chapter, the results of combat 
processes are not determined by each side unilaterally; they are formed by the 
interactions of the two sides, as further modified by the combat environment. 
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Commanders and their forces are judged by how well they distribute the combat 
power developed and how successfully they vector that power toward mission 
fulfillment. The cumulative effect of combat power over time is called combat 
output. This corresponds to the work done in trying to accomplish the mission in 
the face of enemy opposition. It is the combat output of one side relative to the 
combat output of the other side that determines which side has done better at the 
conclusion of combat. 
7.2     THE NATURE OF COMBAT POWER 
Combat power has different meanings to different audiences. An explanation of 
the term as used here is presented below. 
7.2.1    Characteristics of Combat Power 
Combat power, the agent by which results are achieved in combat, is the means 
of translating the purpose of combat into the desired outcome. The combat 
functions of each side are unilaterally applied to remove the enemy's opposition 
and to achieve mission fulfillment. In the resulting interactions between the two 
sides and the combat environment, combat processes, reflecting actual results, 
form the combat power achieved by each side. Since combat power derives from 
the basic components and structure of combat, it inherits their characteristics and 
translates them into the dynamics of combat. Thus, such properties as vectored 
control and aggregation-disaggregation, described earlier in the static sense, 
carry over to the dynamic nature of combat power. 
Although combat power cannot be seen any more than can gravity its results can 
be observed, and in some degree measured. It is very real to commanders in 
combat and to every combatant. Like a force field, combat power does not exist 
as a single entity such that each side has a lump sum of combat power that is 
applied against the other side's lump sum. It is a distributed quantity that is 
continuously being formed and aggregated (from finite bits) throughout the 
combat area, waxing and waning here and there as the battle progresses. Each 
side forms and distributes its own combat power, but it cannot do so 
unilaterally, for its combat power is affected by the opponent's actions and by 
the combat environment. 
Definition of combat power. Combat power is the realized capability of a force at 
any instant of time to achieve results in combat in furtherance of a particular mission 
against a specific enemy force in a specific combat environment. Combat power is the 
actual instantaneous capability brought to bear in any manner that influences the 
combat situation. It exists as elemental combat power contributions that can be 
aggregated and distributed in time and space by command and control actions. 
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Combat power encompasses capabilities that are both internally-directed 
(affecting the friendly force) and externally-directed (affecting the opposing 
force). It does not depend unilaterally on the actions of a force, but rather on the 
combination of those actions and interactions with the opposing force and the 
environment. Because of this, the results of combat power are not necessarily the 
useful results expected by one side taking an action, but instead are the actual 
results that occur in the amalgam of both sides taking action, each for its own 
purposes. 
Combat power directly impacts elements, not actions. As with the element- 
action-element activities described in Chapter 5, combat power is brought to 
bear both on physical elements (tanks, trucks, aircraft, fortifications, ships) and 
cognitive elements (commanders, other personnel, the fighting spirit of 
individuals). It does not directly affect actions (shooting, moving, firing, feeding, 
and so on), but actions are impacted indirectly through the combat power effects 
on elements. 
Vector characteristic. Since combat power is the means of realizing intentions, it 
has the nature of a directed agent. The combat power of each side is directed 
toward the accomplishment of that side's mission, and thereby operates as if 
vectored to achieve the mission. But since each side's combat power is affected 
by the opposing side and the environment, the vectoring does not guarantee that 
results will align with the vector. In addition, vectoring can be weakened by 
ineffectual internal activities of the friendly force, and friendly and enemy 
activities external to the combat arena can impinge on the vectoring by each side. 
Trilateral dependence. Combat power is generated from available combat 
potential. But whereas the combat potential available to each side is unilaterally 
dependent on the actions of that side, the resulting combat power is dependent 
on the actions of the enemy, as well as those of the friendly side, and in addition 
is affected by the combat environment. The trilateral dependence of combat 
power is fundamental. 
Granular characteristic. The ebb and flow of combat power on each side may 
appear to be a continuous function, smoothly changing over time. Actually, 
combat power is granular; it is composed of minuscule "grains" of combat. 
Viewed at the micro level, combat power would exhibit countless ebbs and 
flows, ups and downs. We say "countless," but the number of grains is finite 
nonetheless. The bits of combat power come from the great many individual 
element-action-element couplings that combine to give the appearance of 
continuously flowing activity. Each granule contributes its share to combat 
power, and in this sense, the contributions can be thought of as akin to the 
quanta of quantum mechanics. Combat power is granular in time and in the 
three dimensions of space, even though it appears in the macro view as 
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continuous. Yet, while remaining faithful to the micro granularity, the theory 
must address the aggregation of grains of combat power into the amorphous- 
appearing nature of combat dealt with by combatants in battle. 
An instantaneous quantity. Combat power acts as a rate. It is the capability to 
achieve results at any instant of time, and thus it is seen as the time rate of 
change of the states of elements (own force, enemy force, and environment). At 
the lowest level, it is the capability to achieve results at a particular granular 
element of space at one instant of time At the overall level, it is the aggregate 
capability over many elements of space at one instant. The cumulative impact of 
combat power over time is produced as combat output. 
Property of aggregation-disaggregation. Another characteristic of combat power 
is that elemental combat power contributions can be aggregated into clusters of 
combat power, and these in turn into larger clusters. Conversely, combat can be 
dissected into smaller groupings of combat power and on down to elemental 
contributions. This property derives from the corresponding property of 
elements and actions. 
Combat power exists only during combat. Combat power exists only in the face 
of an opposing force while combat is in progress. Before combat commences and 
after it terminates, the capability to achieve combat results exists as combat 
potential, not as combat power. 
Combat power exhibits self-similarity within the hierarchical structure of 
combat. Combat power works at the lowest echelons of combat in the same way 
it works at the highest echelons. This is determined by the fractal-like 
hierarchical character of combat structure. In principle, the combat power of a 
tank brigade is exerted in the same manner as the elemental combat power 
exerted by a single tank. 
7.2.2   Combat Output 
Since combat power causes a rate of change of state, its effect acting over time is 
cumulative changes of state, which we call combat output. Combat output is the 
cumulative results (measured as the new states of elements) of combat power acting over 
time on the combat situation. Combat output is simply the time integral of combat 
power. It is equivalent to combat work accomplished against an enemy and in 
furtherance of a mission. It differs from the physics definition of work in that 
much of combat work is cognitive in nature rather than physical. As with combat 
power, combat output is not necessarily fully useful to either side. It can be 
favorable or unfavorable depending on how well it advances the mission. The 
combat power results being integrated as output are those actually occurring 
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because of the combat power applied by both sides (as distinguished from 
results perceived by each side to be occurring). 
7.2.3   Definitions of Terms Related to Combat Power 
The following definitions stem from the nature of combat power and combat 
output, and from the axioms set forth earlier. 
Combat result is the changed state that occurs in a single or aggregated element from 
an elemental or aggregated combat activity. The new state is the changed condition 
of the single or aggregated element being acted on as reflected by its attributes, 
including its spatial conditions. One possible combat result is destruction of an 
element, in which the state change is from existence to nonexistence (the state 
change for a truck that has been destroyed but whose parts are salvaged is 
nonexistence as a truck element plus conversion of the truck into separate truck 
parts elements). 
Combat situation is the totality of the states of both sides and of the environment at 
any point of time during combat. 'Totality" means the aggregation of the states of 
all elements. The combat situation is the reality of what exists in the combat 
arena, not what is perceived to be the situation by each side. The combat power 
mixture of the two sides produces a rate of change of the combat situation at any 
instant of time. Combat output produces accumulated change of the situation 
over time. 
Designed combat potential is the pre-combat latent designed capacity of a force to 
achieve useful results in combat when organized, trained, equipped, supported, 
motivated, and led according to the force design against a design threat. Designed 
combat potential represents a nominal state of combat capacity unencumbered 
by shortfalls in combat readiness and undegraded by enemy action. It is a 
unilateral characteristic of a force rather than one that is influenced by the 
actions of a particular enemy in a particular combat environment. 
Available combat potential is the latent capacity of a force to achieve useful results in 
combat with its existing organization, training, equipment, support, motivation, and 
leadership. This represents a combat capacity taking into account real-life 
shortfalls, but as yet undegraded by a particular combat environment or by 
enemy action. Immediately before combat commences, available combat 
potential is what each side has to draw on for conversion to combat power. 
During combat, potential not yet converted to combat power remains as 
available potential. Because of degradations from enemy actions and the 
environment, available combat potential is rarely, if ever, transformed fully into 
combat power. 
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Combat energy. Although the term "combat energy" has not been given a 
particular definition, energy in the broadest sense of the word is what is 
expended to produce combat power and combat output. Specifically, energy is 
expended by each side in performing combat functions to create combat power 
by means of the processes formed in the three-sided interactive mix. The human 
energy expended is both physical and cognitive. The material energy is in the 
form of expenditure of fuel, ordnance, and other consumables, and overcoming 
impediments of the combat environment. 
7.2.4   A Mathematical Analogy for Combat Power 
Granting questions about the validity of using mathematical expressions to 
characterize a subject as complex and as subject to the human element as combat, 
it may nevertheless be useful to try to express the essence of combat power in 
mathematical analogy. This may help in understanding the subject, and, if 
nothing else, the attempt may test the concept by trying to state it in 
mathematical terms. Beyond that, some ideas may begin to take shape for 
further exploration. 
We begin by setting down some terms. 
Let P represent combat power. The notation -" signifies that combat 
power acts in the manner of a directed vector. In keeping with the 
definition of the term, P is combat power at any instant of time. Its 
effect is observed as the time rate of change of the states of 
elements. 
N represent the number of combat elements, which include humans 
and material things. 
a represent the combat value of attributes embodied in the elements. 
Ü represent the time rate of actions being taken by combat elements 
to achieve results. The notation — signifies that the actions are 
directed with the intention of furthering the mission and in this 
sense act as if vectored. 
Then (aN) represents state at a specific time (the combination of elements and 
their attributes). 
Let subscript B stand for Blue force, and 
subscript R stand for Red force. 
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Then, as a first step, in simplest terms we can express the generalized concept of 
combat power (in part) as: 
Ifc=f[(aN)B,uB]  and   P^=f[(oN)R/uR]. (1) 
In these equations, f stands for "a function of." We do not know the nature of 
that function, except that it involves elements, attributes and actions and is 
conceptually the same for both sides. The simplest form the function f might take 
is the product of aN and u, but the function is almost certainly more complex 
than this. 
But Equation Set (1) cannot represent the complete notion of combat power, 
since, by our definition, the combat power of each side is modified by the 
opposing force's combat power, and so an expression must be included to reflect 
this. The enemy combat power can impact only elements (not actions), and in 
impacting elements, it will change the attributes of those elements, thus 
changing the state of the elements. Therefore we postulate the instantaneous 
changes of state in the following expressions: 
d(aN)B      / -   - v       ,    d(oN)R       , . 
—^ = g(-PR,PB)  and   -A_^- = g(-^/PR). (2) 
In Equation Set (2), g again stands for "a function of." And again, we do not 
know the nature of this function except that it is conceptually the same for Blue 
and Red forces and is different from that represented by f. We also make the 
assumption that Red combat power, PR, has a negative effect (as indicated by the 
minus sign) on the change of state of Blue forces, while % has a positive effect, 
and the converse is true for the change of state of Red forces. 
Equation Sets (1) and (2) are cross-coupled (or conjugate) equations, exempli- 
fying the interaction of the combat power of the two sides. The state term in the 
equations (aN), acting through the time rate of its actions, u, produces combat 
power, but the state term is continuously modified by the combat power of the 
enemy. To refine this notion more carefully, we mean that at the micro level, 
every individual element with its attributes that acts against an object element 
produces a quantum of combat power that is seen as the rate of change of the 
object element's attributes (hence its state), but that quantum is affected by the 
(virtually) simultaneous actions of enemy elements that also impact that 
particular object element. 
In ground combat the effects that act to reduce the term N (these are solely the 
result of the destruction process) are generally less than the effects that adversely 
affect attributes (a). Thus processes that affect a but do not change N, such as 
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suppression, demoralization, deception, and disruption, generally have a more 
important influence in reducing enemy combat power than does destruction. 
We do not know how the elemental bits of combat power (as affected by 
elemental bits of enemy combat power) can be rigorously combined into 
aggregated combat power. We assert that the summation process is not linear; 
that is, aggregated combat power is not the arithmetic sum of elemental bits of 
combat power. Granting the lack of a methodology for aggregating, we 
nevertheless suggest that conjugate Equation Sets (1) and (2) can be considered 
as a mathematical analogy for the concept of combat power at both elemental 
and aggregated levels of force. 
7.3     DEVELOPMENT OF COMBAT POTENTIAL 
Axiom 3 states that combat potential, the latent capacity to achieve results in 
combat, is embodied in military forces. Prior to combat, forces are organized, 
prepared and indoctrinated, sometimes hastily and sometimes over many years, 
with the potential to carry out combat when called upon. The development of 
combat potential begins when raw manpower is recruited, material is turned 
into weapons, and doctrine and tactics are developed. It continues with training, 
preparing, and developing readiness until the latent capacity is activated and 
discharged during combat. While combat is under way, forces outside the 
combat area not engaged in combat retain their combat capacity as combat 
potential, and the capacity of some of the forces within the combat arena may 
also be retained as potential. Once combat has terminated, residual capacity 
reverts to combat potential. 
7.3.1   Distinction between Combat Potential and Combat Power 
The dividing line between combat potential and combat power is determined by 
the question of influence. If an element, regardless of location, exerts any 
influence on the combat situation, it is contributing to combat power. If not, it 
remains combat potential. For example, a strategic intelligence acquisition 
system available outside the combat area has combat potential, but if it feeds in 
tactical intelligence about the combat situation, then it contributes to combat 
power. If a unit within the combat area is held in reserve, it nevertheless 
contributes to combat power, since its availability influences the force 
commander and his subordinates in their decisions (and may also influence the 
opponent if he is aware of the reserve unit). Similarly, reserve stocks of 
ammunition and fuel available to each side have an influence because, if stocks 
are ample, commanders know that their combat actions will not have to be 
limited; or, if stocks are low, they know the force will have to curb combat action 
to hoard supplies. An infantryman who participates in heavy combat action but 
77 
Dynamics: The Concept of Combat Power 
never fires his rifle contributes to combat power because his presence affects 
those around him. In all these examples, however, most of the capacity of the 
reserve unit, the unused portion of reserve stocks, and the infantryman's 
capability remain as combat potential. 
The extent to which any particular unit may be counted as potential rather than 
combat power is not significant in itself; the influence on the situation is the 
significant point. The difference between combat potential and combat power is 
analogous to the difference between potential energy and kinetic energy in 
physics. In physics, work can be accomplished by converting potential energy to 
kinetic energy; in combat, work (combat output) can be accomplished by 
converting combat potential to combat power. Combat potential is latent 
capacity, while combat power is active, realized capability. 
7.3.2   From Designed Combat Potential to Available Combat Potential 
Designed combat potential is a nominal potential based on how a force is 
designed and the environments and threats it is designed to be used against. The 
force's potential for use in combat situations different from the intended 
environment and threat will vary, usually on the down side. Its potential for 
achieving results in combat can be estimated by considering the numbers of 
force elements and the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the 
elements based on both hard and approximated data (subjective to some extent) 
and various methods of computing force effectiveness against a specific or 
generic threat. Weapon effectiveness is usually based on laboratory tests, field 
tests, simulations, maneuvers, and past combat experience using the weapons. 
The effectiveness of individuals and units is based on similar data sources. Yet 
even with voluminous data, determining the combat potential of a force is 
difficult; there is no widely accepted method for summing the combined 
capability of all force elements. Extrapolation from experience remains the most 
reliable input to such estimates. Designed combat potential thus represents an 
estimated nominal capability that does not take into account particular force 
readiness degradations, nor degradations from the actions an enemy might take 
or an unfavorable combat environment might impose. 
Available combat potential, on the other hand, incorporates all the real-life 
degradations to which a force may be subject. These can include poor leadership, 
inadequate training, low morale, fatigue, equipment in poor repair, inoperative 
communication links, shortfalls in manning and equipping, deficiencies in tactics 
and doctrine, and countless other exigencies. It is with its available combat 
potential that any force starts into battle. Before combat a commander has 
opportunities to improve his potential, but when combat commences, his 
available potential is what he has to draw on. Available combat potential is his 
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to unilaterally mold, but once combat has begun, the combat power he is able to 
activate from that potential will depend not only on his choices but also those of 
his opponent. 
7.4     ACTIVATION OF COMBAT POWER FROM COMBAT POTENTIAL 
As stated in axiom 4, commanders activate combat potential to develop combat 
power in furtherance of their mission. Activation of combat power begins during 
the preparatory steps at the outset of combat and intensifies during its course, 
with residual capability reverting to combat potential when combat terminates. 
7.4.1   How Combat Power Is Activated 
During the preparatory phase, combat energy is developed unilaterally by each 
side through the combat functions needed to initiate the mission. Preparatory 
actions include issuing initial orders, positioning forces and supplies, and 
observing the opponent. At this stage, the development of combat power from 
combat potential is largely unencumbered by enemy action. Thereafter, during 
the active phase when combat functions lead to interaction with the enemy, the 
combat power that a force generates is degraded from its potential by virtue of 
the enemy's actions in opposition and by any disadvantageous aspects of the 
combat environment. Figure 15 illustrates the degradation of combat capacity 
from designed potential to available potential to the capability to achieve results 
during the course of actual combat. 
Activation of combat power is initiated solely through cognitive actions. The 
force commander on each side takes various command actions, primarily using 
the processes of command-control, motivation, and communication, to vector 
and control his force to accomplish his mission. Subordinate commanders extend 
the command function and the same processes throughout the force. 
Noncommand personnel respond to commands with countless cognitive 
decisions of their own to get their parts of the operation going, and these 
noncommand decisions further extend the vectoring and controlling. Thus the 
activation of combat power results from innumerable cognitive actions by all 
individuals in combat. The process of command-control operates through all 
individuals, though it is manifested as a top-down process initiated by a single 
combat commander. This extended process of command-control obviously is 
subject to inefficiencies (seen as friction, to be discussed later) as it stretches 
farther from the combat commander. 
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Designed Combat 






Reductions in capacity to achieve results due to less 
than full activation of combat power, degradations by 
enemy action, and degradation by the combat 
environment 
Figure 15. From Combat Potential to Realized Combat Output 
In addition to this array of direct cognitive actions, there are many cognitive 
actions that fall under a preprogrammed class of automatic response to 
situations. These stem from training, indoctrination, culture, and ordinary good 
sense of what needs to be done. In a well-trained unit, a commander may state 
an order in only a few words. The unit takes over and knows the many things 
that must be done. At every decision node, innumerable actions are taken 
because of the vast built-in comprehension of what is wanted. The implicit 
content of the control system far outweighs the explicit content. The cognitive 
states of individual combatants have had inculcated in them the knowledge, 
information, understanding and motivation that vectors their decision actions 
properly, for the most part. A unit that makes such automatic responses correctly 
is described as well trained and as having cohesiveness and force integrity. 
7.4.2   Negative and Positive Influences on Combat Power 
Creating combat power from potential is subject to the faults mentioned 
previously that can arise in the extended control mechanism. A multitude of 
other factors can also have negative effects. The combat environment can be a 
major degrading factor. Severely adverse weather and terrain, for example, can 
greatly reduce the effective power activated from potential. Likewise, constraints 
imposed by higher commanders or by local conditions (such as interference from 
noncombatants in the area) can curtail the activation of power. Uncertainty about 
the situation can lead to faulty judgments. Chance events can have an impact. 
On the positive side, given a particular level of combat potential, the activation 
of power can be enhanced in many ways. When a force is properly organized for 
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a particular combination of mission, situation, and environment, a kind of 
combat power synergy results. High morale, force integrity and cohesiveness are 
enhancing factors. Commanders, starting with the force commander but also 
including the rest of the command chain, have a paramount effect, for good or 
for bad. 
Some of the most critical positive and negative influences are discussed below. 
The influences pertain both to the activation and the subsequent application of 
combat power. 
7.4.3   Friction in Combat 
A major degrading influence on combat power is what has been described as 
"combat friction." It appears to be ubiquitous, but its cause is only vaguely 
explained. 
Defining combat friction. When applied to warfare, the term friction can have a 
variety of meanings. Among these is use to denote what might be considered the 
"grand friction" of war: friction that arises in the conduct of campaigns, in 
theater-level actions, and in national and coalition war activities. Clausewitz has 
used friction in this broad sense. We are concerned in this document only with 
the narrower significance of friction in combat. 
Combat power often appears to be reduced due to causes that cannot clearly be 
laid to enemy action nor to own-force deficiencies. The cause of this reduction 
can be called combat friction. It is desirable, however, to limit as finely as 
possible what is included under the rubric "friction," avoiding the temptation to 
lump all manner of elusive factors that cannot easily be explained or quantified 
within a catch-all bucket called friction. Nevertheless, because understanding of 
the phenomenon is as yet nebulous, a degree of arbitrariness is necessary as to 
what is counted as friction and what is not. Friction is defined and described 
here conceptually rather than explicitly. 
We define combat friction as unproductive energy expended on any wasteful result 
that occurs when an agent element carries out an action impacting an object element. In 
the aggregate, combat friction is the summation of wasteful results occurring from many 
elemental actions. Every element-action-element activity has associated with it not 
only an intended useful result, but.possibly also an unintended, nonuseful, 
friction result, and these in combination lead to combat friction within a force. 
A theoretical basis for combat friction. In accordance with the definition above, 
friction in combat arises from the countless interactions that occur among combat 
elements. The results are similar to encounters between physical objects: when 
one physical object strikes another, there is a wasted loss of energy, or more 
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precisely, the conversion of a portion of useful energy into nonuseful energy. 
The kinds of energy waste in combat are more complex than those in the world 
of physics, however, since human as well as material elements are involved. 
Interaction between any two combat elements of the same force can result in 
friction. Every pairing is a potential source. This notion of friction is more easily 
seen in regard to pairs of single elements (such as two individuals or a truck and 
the mud it is driving through), but by extension, we can consider the friction 
between aggregated-element pairs (such as two platoons or the operations staff 
and the logistics staff of a headquarters). Friction may, of course, also result from 
an element taking an action that interacts with many other elements. 
Friction only occurs as a byproduct of activity. It is the action that takes place in 
the element-action-element pairing that results in friction. Elements on the 
battlefield not taking any actions at a given time are not causing friction at that 
time. Whenever and wherever they act, there may be friction. 
Combat friction is internal to a force, not the direct result of enemy action. We 
say this because friction is associated with the elements that are taking actions. 
When an element of one force takes an action that impacts an enemy element, 
that enemy element will, in response, often take actions that are wasteful, thus 
producing friction internal to the enemy force. One aim in combat is to magnify 
the opposition's friction, and even when this is not a specific intent, activities 
effectively directed against the enemy will inevitably lead to increased friction 
within the enemy force. 
Sources of friction. The sources and results of friction are extremely varied. 
They are best described through illustrations: 
One individual gets in another's way as both try to fire on the enemy. 
Similarly, one battalion impedes another during a maneuver. Refugees 
fleeing the combat area interfere with fire missions. In all three cases the 
impeding results of the movements are friction. 
An order is written in an ambiguous manner. The result of the lack of 
clarity is friction. 
An order is garbled in transmission. The act of garbling has created 
friction. If the recipient of the garbled message takes action to find out 
what the correct order is, the effort lost in doing so is additional friction. If 
the recipient acts on the garbled order as he interprets it, he may or may 
not be causing more friction; to the extent that his actions lead to wasted 
results, he is causing further friction. 
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A clear order is received but incorrectly interpreted. The result of the 
cognitive action during which misinterpretation occurred is friction. The 
results of follow-on actions based on the misinterpretation will add more 
friction. 
A muddy battlefield delays the maneuver of a force. The retarding action 
of the mud causes friction (in the physics sense as well as combat friction). 
Friction can occur from many kinds of interactions between elements of a 
military force and the physical environment. 
A unit has been fighting with virtually no rest for three days. The reduced 
unit effectiveness due to fatigue is friction. The unit experiences 
aggregated friction losses of many kinds as elements of the unit take 
wasteful actions (the elements are primarily personnel taking faulty 
cognitive actions, but worn equipment can also lead to wasted results). 
Two units fire at the same target. One of the two engages successfully. 
The wasted fire by the other unit is friction. 
A unit advancing in an otherwise well-executed attack does not perform 
well because visibility is limited by smoke and dust. The reduced 
effectiveness due to obscuration is friction. 
A force in the midst of combat receives a change of mission. The many 
changes in orders, deployments, and other activities will cause friction 
losses of many kinds. 
An artillery unit executes suppressive fire against a force. The suppressive 
fire is not itself a source of friction within the force receiving the fire, but 
actions taken by the receiving force will entail friction losses to the extent 
that the force, being suppressed, takes wasteful rather then effective 
actions. This illustrates how actions by the enemy are not direct sources of 
friction within a force, but lead indirectly to friction. 
In all these examples, the actions described have led to a partial loss of combat 
power because of nonuseful results. This is combat friction. 
To generalize the many sources of combat friction, we can say that friction arises 
from inefficient and disorganized activity, redundant activity, damping effects 
of the combat environment and other constraints, wear and tear and fatigue in 
individuals and materiel, and (perhaps most important) faults in the functions of 
command, control and communication. We can also say that most of the causes 
of combat friction are amenable to reduction. 
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Quantifying Friction. From the concept of friction as the wasted results of 
countless elemental activities in combat, it follows that the more activity, the 
more friction. Moreover, it is clear there is a proliferation of friction because the 
wasteful action of one element can result in friction in the follow-on actions of 
several affected elements. This observation parallels that seen earlier in the 
structure of combat, where we saw a compounded cascading of combat activity 
as the number of element pairs increased with increase in force size. We are led 
to the conclusion that combat friction increases in a non-linear manner as force 
size increases. In other words, the number of instances of friction arising in a 
division-size force in combat is disproportionately greater than in a brigade-size 
force. 
There seems to be no way at present to quantify the many kinds of combat 
friction, but it is a good thing to try. The effect of particular sources of friction 
will undoubtedly vary widely from case to case. Nevertheless, it appears that 
many sources of friction can be identified in general terms, and means to 
ameliorate adverse effects can be addressed. It will be worth investigating 
whether the gross effect of friction—the total loss of combat power from all 
sources of friction—could be quantified in some manner for forces of, say, 
battalion and larger size where the various friction effects may average out. If 
gross friction can be quantified in some degree, then we can begin to calculate 
average or expected values. 
Any reduction of friction losses is to the good. Even though quantifying friction 
may be an elusive goal, study of the sources and ordering them by degree of 
seriousness appears worthwhile. Identifying which sources are conducive to 
reduction can provide a basis for minimizing friction losses. 
The prior discussion of combat friction points to a theoretical basis for 
compounded losses in combat power due to friction as force size becomes larger. 
The amount of loss may well be substantial, as suggested by Trevor Dupuy in 
Understanding War. The following discussion summarizes a hypothetical 
qualitative tool for envisioning the extent by which friction losses aggregate. 
If every element in a force were causing friction by impacting all other elements 
of the force, then the upper limit of friction losses would be proportional 
(approximately) to the square of the number of elements in the force. But, since 
each element cannot impact all other elements, nor can every impact be expected 
to result in significant friction, we can say that the friction losses should be 
proportional to the number of elements actually causing friction raised to a 
power between 1 and 2 (because not every element causing friction will interact 
with every other element). In equation form, the friction losses would be: 
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*N = 2(lmf (3) 
where «fcjsj is the loss in combat power due to friction in a force of N elements. 
§    is the average loss of combat power due to friction in each element- 
action-element pairing where friction occurs. 
nf   is the number of elements causing friction at any instant of time, a 
number probably substantially less than N. 
x    is an exponent between 1 and 2. 
With our present limited understanding of combat friction, this equation can do 
no more than indicate the exponential compounding of friction as force size 
becomes larger. If it were possible to estimate average friction losses per combat 
interaction, or to determine that most friction losses come from only certain 
kinds of interactions, then a quantitative approach might become more tractable. 
Figure 16 shows how combat power loss due to friction changes as force size 
increases. The magnitude of combat power friction loss in the figure has no 
quantitative significance except to demonstrate the compounded increase as 







Force Size (N) 
Figure 16. Combat Power Loss Due to Friction 
Conclusions. It is clear that combat friction, as defined herein, is a widespread 
phenomenon on the battlefield. Considering the variegated sources and likely 
frequency of friction, the following are advanced as general conclusions: 
• The source of combat friction lies in the wasteful results from the 
activity of individual force elements. The more activity in a force, the 
more friction. 
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• The effect of combat friction on combat is substantial, is widespread, 
and is adverse to the side incurring the friction. 
• The amount of friction, and hence the degree of adverse effect, 
increases in a compounded manner as force size increases. 
7.4.4   Enhancement of Combat Power Through Combined Arms Synergism 
Military forces are organized in a multilayer hierarchy of units, each unit 
composed of two or more smaller units. In this way, forces (and hence combat 
power), are aggregated into larger and larger sizes. A crucial point is the manner 
in which combat power aggregates as force size increases. As the hierarchy of 
forces is built up from individual elements, can the combat power of the 
aggregate force be taken as the sum of the combat powers of the elements of the 
force, or is there some other basis for summing combat power? In a linear 
theory, it is conceptually possible to add the separate parts to get the whole. But 
combat in no sense conforms to a linear theory; it is a dynamical, nonlinear 
phenomenon, with a multiplicity of cross-connected factors within and between 
the two opponents. Summing the separate parts does not give the whole, nor 
does summing the combat power contribution of the separate parts lead to the 
combat power of the whole. We have already noted the compounding of friction 
losses as forces become larger. 
Synergism from mutual support and reinforcement. To approach the problem of 
aggregation, we first consider a hypothetical force composed entirely of like 
elements. The only such forces today would be small units, such as a platoon of 
identical tanks or a flight of identical aircraft. In ancient warfare, one can picture 
larger forces of like elements—perhaps hundreds of warriors all trained alike 
and armed with identical spears, daggers, and shields. In a battle where each 
warrior fought independently of the others (in a melee, for example), the combat 
power of the aggregate force might well be the sum of the combat powers of all 
the individual warriors (disregarding friction). 
If we combine the actions of individual warriors tactically in a phalanx that 
operates in a concerted manner, the combat power of the aggregated force then 
appears (from historical evidence) to be greater than the sum of its parts, since it 
can defeat a same-size force not organized as a phalanx. The explanation lies in 
the mutual protection and reinforcement (physical and psychological) that each 
warrior now receives from nearby warriors when operating in unison as a 
phalanx. Combat power synergy has resulted from a tactical improvement. 
Clearly, where there is mutual reinforcement and protection in a force, the 
aggregate combat power of the force is greater than the sum of the combat 
power of the elements of the force. 
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If, however, this homogeneous mutually supporting force comes up against a 
force of equal size that not only employs mutual support but also has a greater 
variety of weapons (some of the warriors, let us say, armed with longbows and 
arrows instead of spears and daggers), the homogeneous force can now be at a 
disadvantage if it is vulnerable to any of the new weapons. Any single weapon 
system, even though powerful when standing alone, may be defeated if it cannot 
defend against all opposing weapons (in the example case, stand-off use of the 
bow and arrow). The point applies as well to a force using a single tactic against 
an equal-size force using a variety of tactics. By further extension, the point also 
holds even where a disparity exists in the capabilities of similar weapons. These 
cases exemplify, in simple form, the concept of combined arms. The term is used 
here in the most general sense of combination both within a single military 
service and across service lines. 
Depending on how vulnerable it is, the side deficient in weapon or tactical 
variety can be outweighed in combat power by an opponent inferior in force 
size. There comes a point, however, where the sheer magnitude of the weapon- 
deficient and tactics-deficient force develops enough combat power to over- 
whelm a smaller force that is richer in weaponry and tactics. 
Synergistic effect of combined arms. Over the centuries new weapons and 
tactics have been added to armed forces in the attempt to impose new 
vulnerabilities on the opposition and to compensate for own-force vulnerabilities 
created by the opposition. Modern forces must cope with a great variety of 
weapons and tactics, some meant solely for attack, some for defense, some for 
deception, some as counters to enemy weapons and tactics, and some as counters 
to counters. Fundamental to military forces has always been the necessity to 
defend as well as attack. For this reason, it is not possible to maximize combat 
power by arming a force only with highly potent offense weapons. A case in 
point is overdependence by the Israelis on offense aircraft and armor at the start 
of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. A force could be designed for maximum potential 
by loading it with only the most powerful offense weapons and tactics, but it 
will fail in combat against a force armed with weapons and tactics which it 
cannot counter. 
Throughout this process of proliferating weapons and tactics, the key to success 
has always been combination into complementary mutually supporting systems. 
This is the concept of combined arms. Weapons and units are used in supportive 
combinations such that the capabilities of each are maximized while the 
weaknesses are minimized. Each weapon and tactic has a role, and it is the 
combination of all working together that enhances the capability of the force as a 
whole. If any weapon or tactic is missing or deficient, force capability is 
weakened. In accordance with the conclusion stated above, the built-in mutual 
support results in a combined arms synergism that increases combat power. 
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In modern military forces, the combined arms concept is applied at all force 
levels. Forces are constituted as combined arms teams within larger combined 
arms teams within still larger teams from the smallest unit to theater forces. The 
principle of mutual support is applied universally: weapon systems protect other 
kinds of weapon systems and are protected in turn; there is support between like 
units and unlike units; support between ground, air and naval units; support 
between higher and lower echelons; support to the front and the rear; support 
laterally and vertically; and so on. To the degree that the principle of mutual 
support is followed, the combined arms synergism is felt throughout the 
aggregate force. Through synergy, the combat power of a force exceeds that of 
the separate elements of the force. James G. Miller, in Living Systems, arrives at a 
comparable conclusion regarding the parts of living organisms versus the whole. 
As noted, however, a combined arms force has necessarily sacrificed offense 
combat potential that could exist were it not necessary to divert some capabilities 
to the defense. The existence of an enemy has forced the diversion of a fraction 
of combat energy away from the offense. The combined arms synergism thus 
starts from a reduced level of usable offense combat power. The synergy of 
combined arms should therefore be viewed not so much as an additive or 
multiplicative effect on combat potential and combat power, but rather as a 
partial restorative from the negative effect of vulnerability to the enemy. It is 
more accurately a quasi-synergism. 
Properly used, the combined arms concept provides the commander with 
flexible means to cope with a multitude of combat tasks against a variety of 
opposing forces. It compensates for the deficiencies and vulnerabilities of any 
one force system by using the advantages of others. 
Although the combined arms concept is of long historical standing, the modern 
version imposes great complexity on force design. Moreover, with expanding 
variety of weapons and tactics has come greater specialization in weapons and 
units. At the highest echelons, for example, different engineer units are available 
for bridge building, airfield construction, port construction, mine laying, and 
other tasks. Yet within the fractal-like hierarchical structure of military forces, 
we can find equivalent (though rudimentary) engineering functions down to the 
lowest echelons, where individuals may perform in a simple manner what 
specialized battalions do with great complexity at the higher echelons. 
The key to obtaining a high level of combat potential is finding the best balance 
in both offense and defense weapons and associated tactics and doctrine to deal 
with a variety of anticipated situations and possible enemies. Since combat 
situations vary widely, proper balance within the constraints of designed 
potential and  available potential will  depend  on flexibility to  adapt the 
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combined arms balance to each situation. There is no universal optimum for 
combined arms balance. 
The concept of combined arms balance has innumerable parallels in nonmilitary 
activities. Balanced combinations of offense and defense capabilities are essential 
in sports, for example. Perhaps the best example of balance is the biology of 
animals, where the capability of the body functioning as a whole is obviously 
greater than the sum of the capabilities of body organs, which in turn is greater 
than the sum of the capabilities of cells. The biological reason also parallels that 
of combined arms: organs and cells are specialized to provide coordinated 
mutual support, with considerable ability to shift support as needs demand. 
In aggregating combat power, we can summarize the discussion above in the 
following conclusions: 
• Combat potential and combat power are aggregated in a nonlinear 
manner through the hierarchical and lateral combination of force 
elements into larger units. 
• A balance of combined arms results in a synergistic effect on combat 
power that is felt at all echelons. The cause of the synergistic effect is 
mutual reinforcement and support and its extent depends on the 
degree of reinforcement and support. 
• Combined arms balance is essential to military forces. The proper 
balance depends on the particular combat situation. Flexibility in force 
design facilitates achieving the proper balance in a variety of situations. 
• The combat power of a force cannot be maximized by using only 
systems that are by themselves powerful at the sacrifice of balance in 
complementary offense and defense systems. 
7.4.5   Force Integrity and Cohesion in Combat 
It has long been recognized that a combat unit needs coordinated, integrated 
teamwork to develop a high order of combat power. It is also recognized that 
even a moderate loosening of force integrity can lead to a large loss of 
effectiveness. The term cohesion has recently been used to describe the binding 
effect that holds a unit together despite the stresses of combat. Force integrity 
and cohesion as used herein are essentially synonymous except that force 
integrity can apply to forces of any size, while cohesion is a characteristic 
primarily of smaller units and is seen only vestigially in large units. 
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Unit cohesion is a key ingredient in achieving the synergistic, mutually- 
supporting effects of balanced combined arms. Cohesion holds force elements 
together. It acts as a binding strength, cementing units and individuals. The 
opposite of cohesion can be called disjunction, which acts to loosen connectivity 
within a unit, encouraging a tendency to come apart and lose force integrity. The 
terms are defined as follows: 
Cohesion is the condition of a combat unit whereby its elements are united in a 
common purpose and goal that is understood by all and its elements are in place, 
functionally connected, and operative. This means that the unit is functioning as a 
unified system with connecting linkages not only available, but with their 
proper functioning understood and effectively carried out, a consequence not 
only of force design but of training and indoctrination. In other words, the unit 
is functioning cooperatively as the team it is intended to be—it cleaves together 
as a unitary whole. From the definition, it can be seen that cohesion signifies 
unity both structurally and as to purpose. 
Disjunction is the condition of a unit whereby it has in some degree lost unity of 
purpose or goal, force elements, functional connectivity, or any combination of these. It is 
the opposite of cohesion. Disjunction involves the loss of any—or all—of the 
characteristics essential to cohesion. A unit can incur disjunction because of, for 
example, a loss of unity of purpose without any loss of its elements or linkages. 
Conversely, a unit may retain commonality of purpose but suffer disjunction 
through loss of force elements. 
Before combat, a unit may be subjected to disjunction for reasons not connected 
with combat, but we are here concerned only with disjunction in combat. 
Cohesion and disjunction are attributes of units, not of individuals. The term 
unit here refers in a generic sense to all manner of military organizations from 
small teams and crews to more formally organized larger units. Through lateral 
and hierarchical linkages, cohesion in a unit can induce cohesion in other units. 
In like fashion, unit disjunction can spread disjunctive effects to other units. 
Cohesion does not fully exhibit the property of aggregation, however, because 
its effects become dissipated as unit size becomes larger. It is a significant 
characteristic of smaller size units only. 
Determinants of cohesion. One ingredient for the existence of cohesion can be 
designated a structural determinant, since it requires that a unit have the 
essential elements of its structure intact, properly linked together, and operative, 
with proper functioning understood by unit personnel and with the common 
purpose comprehended. This determinant entails force structure, matching 
doctrine and training, readiness, and mission understanding. It works from the 
top down, imposing unity of direction and organization from higher echelons. 
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The other ingredient can be designated a behavioral determinant, since it 
concerns how individuals and units behave in combat in response to the mission 
and the common purpose. The behavioral component of cohesion works 
principally through person-to-person bonding in small units. Bonding develops 
laterally within crews, teams, sections, company-size units, and ship's 
companies; and it develops vertically between commanders and those under 
them with whom they deal personally. The bonding results in cohesion. 
Although some degree of person-to-person bonding may occur in larger units 
and between a high echelon charismatic leader and his forces, cohesion is seen 
mainly in groups where face-to-face contact is frequent. This is why cohesion 
does not aggregate as force size becomes larger. The effect on combat power of 
the behavioral aspect of cohesion (and disjunction) occurs primarily in the lower 
echelons of forces, in contrast to the top-down working of the structural aspect of 
cohesion. 
There are many causes that induce behavioral cohesion. Some are external to the 
unit, but most evolve from the close intimacy of personal contact within a unit, 
especially contact under the shared danger of active combat. Included are 
mutual hardship, dependence upon those close by for safety, peer influence, 
personal pride, affection received and given to buddies, the necessity to 
shoulder one's load in the face of a life-threatening situation, and similar 
influences. These influences predominate in units at lower echelons, particularly 
those exposed to enemy actions. The stress of combat heightens the bonding, so 
long as there is perception that all remains in order. Causes external to the unit 
include commonalities of many kinds: traditional military behavior, mutually 
shared values, cultural and ethnic homogeneity, religious beliefs, national 
aspirations, language. Additional external influences lie in common awareness 
of and commitment to the broad war aims set by the highest authorities. Facing 
personal danger, the aims of individuals in combat can differ greatly from those 
of higher echelons, but ingrained values go a long way toward keeping small- 
unit behavior congruent with higher level wishes. Even more important is the 
role of all those in the command chain, who act as the agents of higher authority 
in conforming unit behavior to overall purpose and values. 
All military units enter combat with some degree of cohesion and all will be 
subjected in some degree to disjunctive influences as combat proceeds. 
Disjunction occurs when a unit has suffered structural damage or degeneration 
of behavioral unity. 
Structural disjunction. The great variety of combat capabilities, counter-capabili- 
ties, and counter-counter-capabilities that technology has brought to warfare 
necessitates complicated combined arms structures and doctrines, and with them 
ever more complex mutual support linkages. The problem of complexity is 
magnified by increased dispersion of forces in combat, which, despite increased 
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communication capabilities, magnifies the difficulty of maintaining personal 
linkages and bonding. 
Whenever there is loss, suppression, or malperformance of elements of the 
structure, there is concurrent loss, suppression or malperformance of the support 
links from those elements to other elements. Structural disjunction compounds 
loss of combat power through simultaneous damage to force elements and to 
support linkages. It follows that the more complex the combined arms design, 
the more susceptible it is to structural disjunction. Forces are designed with 
built-in redundancies and are cross-trained to mitigate this susceptibility, but the 
basic problem remains. The compounding effect of structural disjunction leads 
to the following conclusion: 
• The loss of combat power in a unit subjected to structural disjunction is 
compounded because of the loss both of elements of the unit and the 
linkages from those elements to other elements. 
The compounding negative effect can be illustrated by an example in which a 
unit is composed of five elements, each of which contributes an equal share to 
unit combat power and each of which depends on every other element to be 
fully effective. The five-element unit with four support linkages for each element 
is shown in Figure 17a. Now suppose there is a loss in combat of one of the 
elements, as shown in Figure 17b. Since loss of combat power results from the 
loss of support linkages as well as from the loss of the element, the total loss of 
power is the compounded result of the loss of one-fifth of the elements and two- 
fifths of the linkages. 
Linkage _ 
Lost >7T^ Element 
i        /1\   N. Lost 
a b 
Figure 17. The Compounding of Losses from Structural Disjunction 
92 
Dynamics: The Concept of Combat Power 
The question of how much structural disjunction a unit can absorb and remain 
militarily effective has been given considerable study. The question becomes 
something like a sorites paradox: does the loss of one man make a unit no longer 
effective and thus cause it to break in battle? Two men? Twenty men? Eighty 
men? And so on until at some critical point the unit is judged to pass from 
functional to nonfunctional, that is from a unit to a non-unit. The usual 
parameter examined has been casualty losses in battle, and the break point has 
often been expressed as a percentage of casualties sustained. Sometimes materiel 
losses and other complexities, such as loss of leaders, have also been considered. 
If structural integrity were the only factor affecting unit capability, the existence 
of definable unit break points could well be a fundamental aspect of a theory of 
combat. But behavioral cohesion (and, in the more general case, behavioral 
integrity) is an important factor in unit effectiveness, and so a break point 
derived solely from historical casualty and materiel losses can only be an 
average that has built-in (but masked) behavioral factors. We are left with the 
answer to the sorites paradox: the unit in which Beau Geste (in the well-known 
story by Percival Wren) was the sole survivor remained functioning, while units 
on other battlefields fled after only a small fraction had become casualties. As 
the samurai Miyamoto Musashi stated in The Book of Five Rings, 'The way of the 
warrior is resolute acceptance of death," so that a unit composed of warriors 
may not break until the last man has died. 
Behavioral disjunction. Explanation of behavioral disjunction is more elusive. 
While structural cohesion and disjunction can be envisioned as working in a 
more or less mechanistic way, behavioral cohesion and disjunction work in 
psychological ways. They can result from top-down influences or from person- 
to-person influences at the lowest combat echelons. 
Groups in combat carry out (to greater or lesser degree) directed group-oriented 
activity rather than random individual-oriented activity. With proper 
leadership, the group-oriented activity is polarized and vectored (to greater or 
lesser degree) by the combat mission, which in turn is polarized and vectored by 
the broader purposes of the campaign and the entire war. This is instilled top- 
down. Like polarized atoms in a magnetic field, individuals are oriented toward 
one consistent, unified goal, which contributes to cohesion. When polarization is 
widespread, the cohesive effect is widespread and units perform their group- 
oriented activities as intended by higher authority. But when polarizing is weak, 
vacillating, misconstrued, or implausible, cohesion is weak and misoriented. 
Disjunction can result whenever the polarizing signals from above are faulty, 
and fault can be injected at any command level. When it happens at a high level, 
the disjunction seen at the lower echelons tends to spread widely, although the 
effects can be ameliorated by good leadership at lower command levels. 
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Disjunction at the individual level occurs when the personal motivations of 
individuals begin to override the common goal of the combat mission, and by 
extension, of the broader war effort. Here the command structure again is critical 
as the conduit for goals and values. Since behavioral cohesion stems from 
person-to-person relationships, there tends to be an infectious reinforcement of 
either the positive effects of cohesion or the negative effects of disjunction. There 
is therefore a compounding of the positive or the negative effects upon combat 
power. The compounded infectious reinforcement is especially pronounced in 
regard to morale and fighting spirit. New personnel arriving in a unit 
characterized by high morale and belief in the mission will be infected with the 
unif s favorable attitude. In the other direction, loss of confidence in the value of 
pursuing the mission or in a leader can spread infectiously like panic in a crowd. 
Some factors contributing to cohesion are not readily subject to disjunctive 
infection, such as ingrained cultural traits and longheld traditions, and these 
tend to act as a brake on the more transient infectious factors. 
Importance of cohesion. Cohesion enhances the aggregation of combat power, 
while disjunction degrades it, and does so in a compounded manner. Historical 
examples support the conclusion that the behavioral component of cohesion is 
more significant than the structural component. There are many instances where 
a unit in combat with strong structural cohesion was unable—because of 
behavioral deficiencies—to bring more than a limited level of combat power to 
bear. In contrast, there are many instances where a unit has suffered extreme 
structural disjunction, yet has maintained a high level of combat power because 
(it would seem) the unit retained behavioral cohesion. There are also instances 
where a force that suffered behavioral disjunction was rallied by forceful 
leadership. On the other hand, there appears to be few cases where a 
demoralized unit was restored during combat solely by reconstituting its 
structural elements. 
The following conclusions summarize the role of cohesion in aggregating combat 
power: 
• Cohesion and disjunction have a structural component and a 
behavioral component. With both components, effective linkages 
among force elements are critical to cohesion. 
• The behavioral component tends to dominate over that of the structural 
component. 
• Cohesion acts in a strong positive way to enhance the combat power of 
a force. 
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• Disjunction has a compounded negative effect on combat power which 
can lead to abrupt, cascading loss of effectiveness. The effect can occur 
with regard to either the structural or the behavioral component. 
7.4.6   Human Behavior in Combat 
The discussion of force cohesion and integrity highlights one critical aspect of 
human behavior in combat. The following addresses other aspects that affect the 
dynamics of combat. 
Variability and predictability of behavior in combat. Axiom 6 states that 
uncertainty is inherent in combat. One of the most pervasive sources of 
uncertainty is how individuals and groups will act under the stress of combat. 
Behavioral variability affects all forms of human interaction. Yet, granting 
behavioral variance in general, there is, paradoxically, considerable predict- 
ability of human behavior in combat, both as to individuals and more so as to 
groups. Part of this predictability can be ascribed to innate similarities among 
humans and part to similarity in cultural influences. Additionally, predictability 
can be attributed to similarities in training, disciplining, and indoctrinating 
combatants, and the greater the uniformity in these pre-combat activities, the 
greater the predictability. Moreover, during combat predictability is enhanced 
by the cognitive inputs that affect all in common, such as the mission, orders, 
and other information disseminated to all. 
The causes of human variability in combat obviously include genetic and 
physical differences, along with educational and psychological differences 
arising from cultural and social environments. 
There is, however, one paramount distinction that influences individuals in 
combat differently from individuals acting in most other human endeavors: it is 
the realization of imminent personal danger. Fear is one dominant result, yet 
even in combat many factors tend to override what in other human activities 
often becomes a paralyzing effect. The bonds formed with others in the unit are 
an important factor in overcoming fear, as are command and peer influences and 
belief in the purposes of the war. Nevertheless, despite these conforming 
influences, in combat one human's response to fear can differ greatly from 
another's. 
Because of the multiplicity of top-down unifying effects, variability between 
groups in combat is less than variability between individuals, and hence group 
behavior is more predictable than individual behavior. In part this is because the 
individual genetic, physical, and psychosocial differences are averaged out in 
groups. In addition, variability appears to be inversely related to span of control: 
a single soldier controls himself (a unit of one) and may act with great heroism 
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or may fail utterly. A platoon commander, on the other hand, controls a number 
of individuals and acts to integrate them within the plans of higher echelons. As 
units become larger, behavioral variability between them appears to become 
less. The averaging out of individual behavior becomes more pronounced and a 
sort of "law of large numbers" dominates. As units become larger, they progress 
to more predictable states. 
We are led to the following conclusions: 
• As unit size becomes larger, unit behavioral variability in combat 
becomes less, and consequently predictability of unit behavior becomes 
greater, the reasons being the averaging out of behavioral differences 
and the greater integrating effect of higher level commanders. 
• The more the commonality and coherence of a force's pre-combat 
training and indoctrination, the more predictable will be the behavior 
of the force in combat. 
Self-regeneration of units in combat. A unit in combat is in a constant struggle to 
stay alive and functioning. It must continuously cope with degenerative factors 
arising from the enemy, the combat environment, and the wear and tear of 
combat activity. As with all biological entities, a combat unit continuously draws 
upon dynamic feedback to sustain itself and adjust to survive; it learns as it goes. 
It must contend with conflicting goals: to fulfill its assigned task and to stay 
alive. Military units exhibit the same strong survival instinct of all living 
organisms, but they do so under the paradoxical circumstance of putting 
themselves at mortal risk. 
Units in combat appear to exhibit an unusually strong ability to recoup from 
severe stress and regenerate themselves. This may arise in part from the 
perception that the unit is in mortal danger if it fails to regenerate and continue 
fighting. In addition, cohesiveness, to the extent it is present, clearly aids 
regeneration. Peer influence and altruistic dedication to the mission 
undoubtedly contribute, and also the anathema of being branded a coward. Yet, 
considering that a beleaguered unit usually has the option of surrendering and 
thereby precluding the need to regenerate and continue fighting, there appears 
to be an extraordinary innate capacity to choose otherwise and reconstitute 
functions essential to remaining viable, despite the danger. A leader steps up to 
replace the commander who has been killed, new linkages are jury-rigged to 
replace linkages destroyed, and the unit continues with ad hoc capability. The 
increase in entropy in a combat unit (in the form of chaotic, disorganized, 
disordered conditions) is opposed by the tendency within the unit to self- 
organize, reconstitute itself, and reestablish internal order. Self-regeneration of 
units in combat appears to be a strongly ingrained characteristic. 
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Recent work on complexity theory advances the thesis that self-organization of a 
complex adaptive system occurs at the boundary between well-ordered and 
chaotic behavior. Too much order stultifies growth and self-organization; too 
little results in instability and anarchy. Complexity theory offers some hope for a 
quantitative explanation of why effective fighting forces are neither too rigidly 
controlled nor too undisciplined. An example of self-organizing in military 
forces was the latitude given by Admiral Nelson to his captains at Trafalgar. By 
freeing his captains from the rigid strictures of contemporary doctrine, Nelson 
allowed them the initiative to self-organize under the stress and chaos of battle, 
that is, to fight cooperatively in mutual support with a minimum of direction 
from the top. A unit in combat is a learning machine with a strong incentive for 
fast learning. 
As with cohesion, it is the behavioral characteristics of a combat unit more than 
the structural that will govern its conduct in battle. Combat is inherently about 
the dynamic behavior of people as individuals and as groups working with 
machines in a complex, interlocking system under great stress and for high 
stakes. It is the norm that stable situations will become chaotic, and it is innate in 
combat systems that—working at the boundary between order and disorder— 
they will continuously strive to regenerate themselves. 
The property of self-regeneration and self-organizing can be summarized in the 
following conclusion: 
• A cohesive unit in combat acts continuously to oppose actions causing 
its disorganization and debilitation by applying self-organizing, 
regenerative energy to reconstitute its combat capability. 
7.4.7   Aggregating Combat Power 
Once activated from potential, combat power is aggregated at the macro level 
and continually distributed, redistributed and vectored to accomplish the 
mission. Aggregated and distributed combat power are realities, as any 
commander knows, yet while conceptually obvious, the present state of 
knowledge offers no way of mathematically combining elemental combat power 
into larger agglomerations. Of the many attempts at quantitative summing thus 
far developed, most use firepower as the factor to be aggregated, ignoring such 
factors as advantages in leadership, information, maneuver, and morale that 
contribute importantly to combat power. Even those attempts that aggregate 
firepower usually focus only on the destructive effects to the neglect of other 
significant effects, such as suppression and demoralization. 
Despite the lack of an accepted quantitative tool for dealing with aggregation of 
combat power, certain principles offer partial underpinning for a theoretical 
97 
Dynamics: The Concept of Combat Power 
approach. We have touched on combat friction, combined arms synergy, force 
integrity and cohesion, and human behavior. These and other factors affect how 
combat power is aggregated. 
Although there is no mathematical model for aggregating combat power, we 
know from observation that aggregation does occur. The next chapter addresses 
the dynamics of applying combat power, in both elemental and aggregated 
forms, to accomplish the mission. 
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DYNAMICS: APPLICATION OF COMBAT POWER 
8.1     GENERAL 
Once activated from combat potential, combat power is applied with two 
complementary aims to accomplish the mission. One is application to own-force 
elements to move them to fulfill the mission. This is accomplished through the 
internally directed processes. The other is application against the enemy to 
remove his opposition, which is accomplished through externally directed 
processes. In this chapter we examine the dynamics of applying combat power 
to these complementary ends. 
8.2     COMBAT PROCESSES 
8.2.1   The Role of Combat Functions and Processes 
8.2.1.1 Primary combat processes. The structure of combat incorporates a set of 
primary combat processes which, taken together, are defined as encompassing 
all activity of combat. To reiterate, a primary combat process is combat activity 
of any kind that produces a common generic result. It is through the processes 
that combat power produces results aimed at achieving a mission. The results 
are those that actually occur, not those intended to occur by one side or the 
other. The primary processes were judiciously selected as suitable for describing 
combat; there is not a theoretical basis for choosing a particular set. 
Any single action will normally produce more than one category of result and 
therefore involve more than one primary combat process. Here, however, we 
intend that each process be mutually exclusive of all other processes so that there 
is no commingling among them nor any gradation from one process to another. 
All destruction results, for example (and hence all destruction processes), are 
thus distinct and separate from all suppression results, all disruption results, all 
communication results, and so on, and consequently from all those processes. As 
an illustration, well-delivered air bombardment will normally result in some 
destruction, some suppression, some disruption, and often some degree of 
demoralization. By making each of these result categories distinct, we can, in 
principle, tabulate each category separately, although an observer would see 
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them mingled. Considering the processes to be mutually exclusive enables us to 
provide a more orderly description of what occurs in combat. 
Although internally directed processes are just as important as externally 
directed ones, it is only through external processes that the enemy can be 
directly affected. The internal processes provide the enabling basis for external 
processes, in addition to providing their own essential contributions to mission 
completion. 
In his book, Living Systems, James G. Miller describes nineteen basic processes as 
common to all living systems from cells to supranational entities (such as the 
United Nations and the European Community). Although he uses a different 
nomenclature, all of his nineteen processes can be related to one or more of the 
thirteen primary combat processes. For combat (involving, with the two 
opposing sides, a double subset of Miller's living systems), the thirteen processes 
are adequate to encompass all actions. 
A single element taking an action against a single element will produce one or 
more results that fall under one or more of the primary combat processes. More 
often, an action will impact more than one object element and produce multiple 
results among each of the object elements. In the larger view, the elemental 
activities contributing to each process are aggregated to produce aggregated 
results under that process. At both the individual and the overall levels, all or 
most processes of combat will be in play by each side at any instant of time. 
Combat results intended will always be favorable but actual results, and hence 
processes, can often, for many reasons, be unfavorable. The externally directed 
processes will generally be favorable (though only for the moment, because 
subsequent situations may render an initial gain disadvantageous in the longer 
run). Internal processes that work through cognitive elements—motivation, 
command-control, communication, and information acquisition—are especially 
susceptible to producing unintended adverse results. 
8-2-1.2 The costs of processes. Every process has costs. These can be the 
obvious costs of expending resources—fuel consumption, ammunition expen- 
diture, materiel wear and tear, human fatigue—but they can also be more subtle, 
such as the information given to the enemy by virtue of process execution, the 
time needed to execute the process, and friction losses incurred. These are costs 
borne by the party initiating the process. In addition, there are, of course, own- 
force costs in losses of men, materiel, and time attributable to the external 
processes carried out by the enemy. The efficiency of any process might be 
determined by weighing the costs against the results achieved; however, the 
mixing of process results and the indeterminate nature of costs would render 
any such calculation merely an abstract judgment. 
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8.2.1.3 Primary combat functions. Distinct from the primary combat processes 
are the primary combat functions. Like combat processes, the set of primary 
combat functions (listed in Chapter 6) is arbitrarily defined to be all-inclusive: 
every action undertaken in combat will, by definition, fall under one or another 
of these primary functions. Combat processes create the actual results achieved 
in the two-sided give and take of combat, whereas functions are the actions 
taken by each side to achieve intended results. 
To illustrate, a commander will use the Army functions of maneuver and fire 
(along with other combat functions) with the intention of achieving results to 
further his mission. His opponent will do likewise. The fire and maneuver 
functions undertaken by each side will combine to create results that become the 
new actual situation. The new situation will certainly not be what both 
commanders intended, and usually will not be exactly what either intended. 
Regardless, both sides share the new situation, and depending on their 
perception of the situation, will initiate further actions. With both sides 
separately performing their functions, each side will have been carrying out 
processes that produce destruction, suppression, demoralization, protection, 
movement, communication, and so on, the actual results from the processes 
differing in some degree from what each side had sought. The combat 
environment will also have an effect on the shared results. 
Thus processes concern actual results while functions concern intended results. 
Secondly, processes are output oriented in that they relate to effects, while 
functions are input oriented in that they relate to causes. Finally, processes 
concern the actions taken by all three parties to combat while functions are 
actions undertaken by each opponent separately. Combat functions are applied 
as energy vectored to fulfill the mission; combat processes are the consequences 
of the combined energy applied by both sides, as further modified by the 
environment. 
A discussion of how the various combat functions are utilized and combined for 
best effect is not called for here. The voluminous literature on doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, and materiel is a far better source for describing how to wage 
combat. This theory of combat is in no sense a "how to" book. 
8.2.2   Descriptions of the Primary Processes 
To understand how combat processes work in the dynamics of combat, it is first 
necessary to explain each process and how it contributes to combat power, 
keeping in mind the differences between processes and functions and that each 
process is defined to be separate and distinct from all others. 
101 
Dynamics: Application of Combat Power 
Table 6 repeats the list of primary combat processes discussed earlier. 
Table 6. Primary Combat Processes 
Externally Directed Processes Internally Directed Processes 
(which impact only enemy forces) (which impact only friendly forces) 
Demoralization Command-Control 
Destruction Motivation 





8.2.2.1   Externally directed processes 
Demoralization process. The process of demoralization leads to breaking or 
reducing the will of the enemy force to continue its opposition. It operates solely 
on cognitive, not physical elements. The results range from doubt by individuals 
about continuing the fight to abject loss of will within the entire force. The most 
singular impact occurs when the commander of the enemy force is demoralized, 
but demoralization can occur from the bottom up even though the commander 
and his principal subordinates have retained a strong will to fight. To some 
degree, the process affects many combatants in every combat situation. When the 
process affects the command structure or becomes widespread among the rank 
and file, combat power can be catastrophically reduced. 
With loss of will, the purpose and values of waging combat tend to be discarded 
in favor of the primal impulse to survive, hopelessness, and desire for 
psychological palliation. The vectoring effect of mission is diminished and in the 
extreme, no longer acts to focus combat activity. A force may disengage from 
combat for reasons other than demoralization, such as excessive fatigue or the 
need to preserve the force for a subsequent mission, but when the cause is loss of 
will, the demoralization process is at work. If demoralization has not progressed 
too far, the effects can be arrested and even reversed by forceful leadership. 
The principal instruments for carrying out the process are fire and maneuver. 
Surprise, whether by fire or maneuver, can be an especially powerful demoral- 
izer. The shock effect from a sudden, forceful penetration, an envelopment, or 
massive firepower, while often of short duration, leads not only to severe 
disruption but often to catastrophic demoralization. But demoralization can also 
result through gradual attrition of will from extended fighting and losses. Other 
combat functions besides fire and maneuver also contribute to the process, 
notably psychological and deception operations. 
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Destruction process. The destruction process works on all physical elements, both 
animate and inanimate, but not on intangible cognitive elements. The process 
also includes disablement and damage (partial destruction), even though 
subsequent repairs may be made during the course of combat. Similarly, 
wounding of personnel is included. The cumulative effect of the destruction 
process over time is attrition. 
In modern combat, destruction is carried out almost entirely through the 
function of fire. Firepower of every kind is included, from small arms to bombs 
to chemical and nuclear weapons. Knives, bayonets, hand grenades, mines, 
incendiary materials, and many other weapons and devices are also used in the 
destruction process. At times, the combat environment may be the cause of 
destruction, as when ships are lost in a storm or tanks in a river crossing. 
The destruction process contributes to combat power by physically reducing 
enemy elements—human or material—thereby directly decreasing the enemy's 
available means, and hence his ability to apply combat power. The destruction 
process is the most clearly discernible and measurable of all processes, so much 
so that it is often the only process examined in analyzing combat. Sometimes a 
combat mission will be stated as "destroy the enemy," but this is rarely meant 
literally; the true intent is more often to nullify the enemy capacity to fight 
through a combination of destruction and demoralization that will lead to 
catastrophic loss of force integrity. 
Suppression process. The suppression process operates only on cognitive elements 
(humans), unlike the destruction process, which operates only on physical 
elements (both human and material). The effect on cognitive elements from 
suppression differs from that of demoralization in that suppression does not 
involve a loss of will to fight. It is primarily the threat of death or injury, leading 
to fear, that is at work in suppression. Even in the absence of fear of bodily 
harm, suppression can occur out of concern for preserving the materiel of a unit. 
The result involved in the suppression process is the curtailment of enemy 
combat activity that follows from the perception by individuals of danger to 
them or to other persons or materiel. That is why the process affects only 
cognitive elements. 
The curtailment of activity is transitory and encompasses a great variety of 
degradations of combat power: infantrymen may keep their heads down to 
avoid being hit, thereby firing less frequently or less effectively; artillery 
batteries may cease firing and relocate if enemy counterbattery fire becomes too 
intense or is expected; an aircraft crew may take evasive action to avoid air 
defense fires, thereby reducing its attack effectiveness; a ground unit may cease 
a maneuver and take cover if enemy aircraft appear; a radar may be turned off 
or operated intermittently to avoid detection and engagement by the enemy. 
103 
Dynamics: Application of Combat Power 
Yielding to suppression is a rational act. A fearless combatant might not be 
suppressed, but he could be killed as a consequence; a seasoned, trained 
combatant may temporarily be suppressed but live to fight on. 
Whereas the destruction process leads to physical damage and loss of elements, 
suppression causes neither damage nor losses; instead, it diminishes the amount 
and efficiency of the actions of enemy elements and thus decreases the 
opponent's combat power. The degree of suppression is the degree by which 
combat activity is rendered less effective. Suppression is less discernible and 
measurable than destruction, but is more prevalent on the battlefield and 
probably has a greater cumulative effect in most combat situations. 
Whenever the destruction process occurs, the suppression process will usually 
also occur: if an individual is killed, others observing this will take cover and be 
suppressed. The converse is not true—the suppression process never has the 
result of destroying or damaging. Another distinction is that suppression may 
occur from firepower or threat of firepower, while destruction necessitates the 
physical delivery of firepower (or some other physical action). 
Neutralization process. The neutralization process contributes to combat power 
through negating or denying the enemy's capability to bring all or part of its 
combat power to bear. Whereas destruction and suppression act to diminish the 
combat power of portions of the enemy force, neutralization totally negates a 
significant fraction of the enemy force, or sometimes the entire force for a period 
of time. The process frequently depends on successful use of the maneuver 
function to isolate the neutralized force so that its power cannot be usefully 
applied. Other ways to carry out the neutralization process include: 
• Deceiving the enemy so thoroughly that portions of its force cannot 
usefully be employed (an example from World War II is the German 
divisions held in the Calais area for several days after D-Day in 
Normandy). 
• Denying information to the enemy to such an extent that in its blinded 
state major force elements cannot operate effectively (such as many 
Iraqi troops during the Desert Storm ground attack). 
• Cowing the enemy into inaction because he perceives his forces to be at 
an insurmountable disadvantage. 
In all these cases, manipulating information acquired by the enemy is a key 
aspect, and the processes of destruction, suppression, disruption, and deception 
may have preceded and contributed to neutralization. The neutralization process 
resembles demoralization, but differs in that the cause is something other than 
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loss of will. A force that retains the will to fight but cannot do so because it has 
been isolated is neutralized but not necessarily demoralized. Surrendering is 
sometimes a consequence of neutralization by isolation. 
Disruption process. This process includes activities that interdict the flow of 
enemy materiel and manpower, and also activities that disturb and delay enemy 
processes of command-control, information acquisition, protection, and sustain- 
ment. Since disruption usually has a transitory effect, duration of delay, along 
with the magnitude of the force disrupted, is a measure of enemy combat power 
reduction. If a bridge or rail line in the combat area is destroyed, delaying 
enemy forces or supplies that could affect the combat, then the process of 
disruption has been carried out together with the process of destruction. If the 
bridge or rail line is not destroyed, but forces have been delayed by an act of 
sabotage involving misinformation about the supposed destruction, disruption 
would have occurred in conjunction with deception but not destruction. 
Electronic warfare and other information warfare actions provide means to 
disrupt enemy control, communication, fire direction, and information gathering 
activities through interference, jamming, and usurpation of communication links 
and control systems. Electronic warfare also contributes to the internally directed 
processes of information acquisition and protection. The distinction is that the 
disruption process utilizes electronic and other information warfare actions 
offensively for severing and interrupting enemy activities, whereas internally 
directed processes use electronic warfare to protect and enable internal actions. 
The disruption process differs from that of deception in that it does not involve a 
result of deceiving. Clearly, however, deceptive information warfare actions 
frequently will entail both deception and disruption processes. 
Deception process. The deception process reduces enemy combat power by 
misleading the enemy's information acquisition process, and through this 
conduit, his command and control functions. It operates. entirely through 
cognitive entities, striking at the enemy's central directing system. Techniques 
include directed misinformation, excessive information, ambiguous information, 
imitative communication deception, manipulative communication deception, 
decoys, fake materiel, ruses, demonstrations, feints, and the like. Many of these 
techniques are classed as information warfare. 
8.2.2.2   Internally directed processes 
Motivation process. The motivation process is the converse of the demoralization 
process. It works solely through individual cognitive elements of the friendly 
force. Where demoralization has occurred, motivation is the restorative, and 
where demoralization has not yet occurred, motivation is the guard against its 
occurrence. Motivation instills a force with the will to fulfill its mission in the 
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face of deadly threat from the enemy. More than that, it instills will to overcome 
normal societal mores and inflict death, destruction and demoralization on the 
enemy. All internal and external processes support the process of motivation 
insofar as they are perceived as succeeding, that is, leading to favorable 
outcomes. 
The degree of motivation (or conversely of demoralization) is a crucial attribute 
of every cognitive element—every individual. Just as there are no aggregated 
cognitive elements, motivation works only through individuals. The motivation 
effect on units occurs through commonality of the motivation effects on 
individuals. This point also applies to all other processes that operate on 
cognitive elements. 
The primary means for motivating during combat is the command function, 
supported by the functions of control and communication. Motivation is a key 
responsibility of all in the command chain. This top-down influence is 
buttressed by the bottom-up peer bonding that leads to motivation through 
cohesion. Just as essential are the ingrained motivations that individuals carry 
into battle. These stem from political indoctrination, training and discipline, 
military traditions and customs, national history and culture, family and home, 
and the broader purposes and values attached to the war effort. 
Command-control process. The command-control process, working entirely 
through cognitive elements, directly and strongly affects all combat activities 
and thus all processes. The process encompasses not only the crucial decision- 
making and directing that emanate from the command function, but also the 
forms of control that every human in combat exercises on his own, as well as the 
preprogramming that humans have entered into weapons systems. Guidance 
commands to a missile from a console operator are included, as are the built-in 
commands of a homing missile. The decisions a truck driver makes in going 
from point A to point B are included. The inclusiveness is such that no action 
occurs in combat without a prior command-control process except natural 
phenomena and acts of chance. The process involves the organizing and 
weighing of acquired information—own-force information, intelligence informa- 
tion, prior knowledge and experience—and the development from this of 
decisions, directives, orders, estimates, plans, and all other forms of control. 
Information acquisition process. This process has three components: acquisition of 
information about enemy forces, own forces, and the combat environment. 
Primary acquisition means are the human senses and technical sensors (radar, 
laser, sonar, electronic intercepts, magnetic detectors, infrared detectors, seismic 
devices, and many other systems). Secondary acquisition means are verbal and 
written reports and data in many forms that are acquired after information has 
initially been communicated from senses and sensors. Acquisition also encom- 
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passes information and data gathered during combat from sources such as field 
manuals, standing operating procedures, and computer files. Information 
acquired prior to combat such as a precombat estimate of the situation or 
analysis of own-force strength, contributes to combat potential and is not 
involved in this combat process. 
With regard to own forces, the process includes information acquired from 
higher echelons and adjacent or nearby forces in addition to that from elements 
within the force. Information acquired about the environment includes data on 
weather, road conditions, cross-country trafficability, rivers and harbors, urban 
areas, and the civil populace. Although the act of acquiring intelligence 
information is aimed at the enemy, its purpose is for use internally within the 
friendly force and therefore the process is classed as internally directed. 
Acquisition of intelligence will often result in a direct impact on the enemy, but 
that impact occurs through one or another of the externally directed processes. 
As an example, the principal process for a unit on a mission of reconnaissance by 
fire is the internal process of acquisition of information (about the enemy), but 
external processes of destruction, suppression, and possibly deception and 
disruption will usually accompany the acquisition process. 
Once acquired and transmitted, intelligence information is weighed together 
with own-force information in decision-making by commanders. This mental 
working of acquired information is part of the command-control process, not the 
information acquisition process. 
Communication process. The communication process is a transmission activity 
(moving information from one point to another), in contrast to the information 
acquisition process, which is solely a procuring and receiving activity. A staff 
officer who obtains information from any source (say a computer file or a map) 
is engaging in information acquisition. If then, having put this information into a 
memorandum (part of his command-control process), he transmits the memo- 
randum to another staff officer, he is engaging in the communication process; 
and when the second officer receives the memorandum, he is engaging in the 
acquisition process. The communication process entails any and all means of 
transmitting information, from oral to written to telecommunications and even 
smoke signals, hand signals and body language. 
One of the final steps of the command-control process is the mental formulation 
of an order or a plan of action. When a commander writes out the order or plan, 
this is still part of his cognition in the command-control process. When he hands 
the written order to someone else or states it orally, he is using the 
communication process—information is moving from him to others. The same 
would apply if he was transmitting a plan, his concerns, or merely his 
ruminations. 
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Movement process. The movement process pertains to physical movements of all 
kinds in three-dimensional space. An infantryman crawling toward an enemy 
bunker is as much involved in the movement process as is a convoy of ships at 
sea or a squadron of aircraft flying toward a target. Trucks hauling supplies to 
reserve units far behind the front line are included. 
A combat maneuver is a special case of a function performed by using the 
movement process (and usually other processes as well). A maneuver is an 
action intended to influence the enemy through a crucial positional advantage. 
The maneuver is not itself the result intended. Thus maneuver is an important 
function, but not a process. The 1986 version of U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, 
Operations, states: 
Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or 
retain positional advantage. It is ... the means of concentrating forces at 
the critical point to achieve the surprise, psychological shock, physical 
momentum, and moral dominance which enable smaller forces to defeat 
larger ones. ... Tactical maneuver... is the means of gaining and 
sustaining the initiative, exploiting success, preserving freedom of action, 
and reducing ... vulnerability .... 
A maneuver may put several processes to work: external processes of demorali- 
zation, neutralization, suppression, and deception; and internal processes of 
movement, protection, command-control, and motivation. Firepower, using a 
combination of the processes of destruction, suppression, and neutralization, can 
be employed as a form of maneuver by fire. 
Protection process. This process encompasses a broad set of activities that have 
the common result of protecting the force from the enemy's external processes 
and from his internal process of intelligence information acquisition. The most 
direct protection activity is fortifying against enemy firepower. Sea, air and land 
forces all employ armor protection and use screening measures, camouflage, 
dispersion, cover, and concealment to avoid enemy firepower. Electronic 
jamming that denies enemy interception of friendly force communications is 
another protective measure (but jamming of the enemy's internal communi- 
cations falls under the disruption process). Electronic and physical counter- 
measure activities of many kinds contribute to the process. A broad range of 
protective measures is available to deny information to the enemy and is of 
increasing importance because of the critical value of information in modern 
combat. Protective measures against adverse environmental factors, such as 
storms, flooding, extreme temperature conditions, and nuclear or chemical 
contamination are included. 
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Other processes indirectly help in protecting a force. Destruction, suppression, 
neutralization and the other externally directed processes protect own forces 
indirectly by diminishing enemy combat power. Because the protection process 
directly wards off enemy actions, its contribution is to prevent the decrease in 
combat power that otherwise would occur from the enemy actions. 
Sustainment process. This process supports all other processes. It involves 
sustaining all fighting, support, information acquisition, and command-control 
elements. The process embraces the broadest interpretation of what is included 
in the terms "logistics" and "support." It includes both manpower and material 
forms of support, such as personnel replacement, materiel resupply, medical 
care, morale, food supply, hygiene, transportation, ammunition replenishment, 
repair, maintenance, equipment retrieval, and field engineering. 
Sustainment pertains to all echelons and locations of activity. A front-line soldier 
hauling ammunition or refilling canteens for the squad is engaged in the 
sustainment process. When he completes his task and begins shooting, he is back 
to the destruction or suppression process. A truck driver delivering rations in the 
rear of the combat area is performing sustainment (as well as movement). A 
surgeon working in a mobile field hospital is sustaining. An engineer battalion 
improving a road is sustaining. 
8.2.3   Aggregation of Processes 
Processes enable combat dynamics to be examined in light of the actual results 
that occur in the amalgam of both sides using combat power, each seeking its 
own desired end. Using process in the sense of any and all sorts of activities that 
lead to a single generic set of like results enables the aggregation of elemental 
activities into a manageable set of result categories. Thus all sorts of separate 
actions that a force may take that cause destruction (and damage)—use of 
maneuver, firepower, electromagnetic operations, disruption operations, 
blockade, whatever—can be aggregated into destruction results at any instant of 
time or over a period of time. Similarly all the actions that lead to destruction in 
one sector of fighting can be aggregated at any instant or over a period of time 
into destruction results in that sector; or one can aggregate just the results of 
artillery destruction in the sector. Likewise, these same actions can be examined 
to aggregate suppression, neutralization, deception, or other process results. 
Processes also are amenable to disaggregation: the total results of destruction or 
suppression in a given sector over a given time interval can be broken down into 
the contributions from certain weapons or in certain subsectors. The same 
properties of aggregation and disaggregation apply to the internally directed 
processes (although it is difficult to envision how to aggregate motivation, 
command-control, and communication). 
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8.2.4   Relationships Among Combat Processes 
External and internal processes serve the mission in different ways. There is no 
priority of one category over the other, nor of any one process over any other. 
All processes are used in concert with the aim of mission fulfillment. 
Any single process represents a category of combat results. All categories of 
results occur simultaneously within the combat arena, but at any one time and in 
any one place, certain processes will dominate because of the particular combat 
activity that one side has initiated at that time and place and the counteractivity 
that the other side responds with. The consequences of the two sets of input 
activity are the processes with their associated results. 
8.2.4.1 Process relationships. Each process bears a relationship to the other 
processes, and these relationships differ for each process. Figure 18 depicts, in 
simplified fashion, the general nature of the relationships. The description of the 
processes presented above provides additional insights. The figure should not be 
considered a flow chart of combat activity; it merely shows the principal ties of 
one process to another. There are additional cross ties not shown. 
The upper part of Figure 18 shows the processes of the Blue force; the lower part 
shows those of the Red force. Each side is, of course, drawing from the same 
assortment of processes (as well as the same functions) to further its ends. As 
noted in Chapter 5, there is structural symmetry in the processes (and functions) 
between opposing forces, but obviously there is never symmetry in the dynamic 
application of functions and consequent processes by the two sides. Structural 
symmetry does not mean symmetry of combat capability. The process 
relationships shown in Figure 18 remain identical through all hierarchical 
echelons from individuals to complete forces. 
Information acquisition from a higher echelon outside the combat arena serves 
as a starting point in the figure. The information acquisition process impacts 
other processes only through the command-control process. The first step in the 
command-control process is to translate acquired information into meaning as 
deduced by the recipient of the information. From this step, the command- 
control process proceeds through many cognitive activities internal to the person 
which lead to the process of communicating with individuals and units and to 
motivating others. The motivating and communicating processes in turn lead to 
the processes of moving, sustaining, protecting the force, and acquiring further 
information. In due course, they lead to the external processes of demoralizing, 
destroying, suppressing, neutralizing, disrupting, and deceiving enemy force 
elements, thereby degrading the state of the Red force. All Blue internal 
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Figure 18. Combat Process Relationships 
111 
Dynamics: Application of Combat Power 
processes impact the Blue force, changing its state, while the Red force external 
processes are also impacting the Blue force, causing other changes in its state. 
Elements of the Blue force detect the changes in the Blue force state, and 
perceptions of these changes are communicated back into the loop once again 
through the information acquisition process. The same applies to Blue detection 
of changes in the Red force state and the feedback of perceptions of these 
changes. 
The processes work in a continuous flow, but the flow need not cycle through all 
the relationships shown in Figure 18. A commander working the command- 
control process may interrupt his thinking to check a map, using the information 
acquisition process, then return to the command-control process. The external 
processes tend to occur in episodic peaks, whereas the cognitive-oriented 
internal processes are active almost continuously. 
82.4.2 The cognitive processes. The process of command-control is ubiquitous 
and, together with motivation, is paramount in combat. Excepting chance events 
and actions caused solely by the combat environment, no combat activity of any 
kind, and therefore no combat process, occurs except as a result of an initiating 
command-control process. Furthermore, no activity (and hence no process) can 
support the mission effectively without the prior process of motivation. These 
points apply to everyone in combat—low ranking individuals as well as all in 
the chain of command. Command-control and motivation directly influence only 
friendly force elements. Neither a commander nor any other individual directly 
controls or motivates the enemy, but through these same processes, a 
commander and his force will indirectly seek to demoralize, destroy, suppress, 
neutralize, disrupt, and deceive the enemy. Facilitating the command-control 
process in its use of the external processes are all the other internally directed 
processes. 
The command-control process, while paramount, nevertheless depends on 
information acquisition to make good decisions and on communicating to get the 
word to the troops. In addition, the motivation process works with the 
command-control process as a sort of a qualitative enhancer. These four 
internally directed processes—information acquisition, command-control, moti- 
vation, and communication—work principally through cognitive actions. They 
are the agents of the corresponding functions of command-control and informa- 
tion acquisition. 
8.2.4.3 Other internal processes. The sustainment and movement processes 
contribute to all other internal processes. The protection process may either be 
enhanced or reduced as a consequence of movement, but the protection process 
does not conversely contribute to movement. Protection acts solely to mitigate 
the impact of the enemy's external processes and intelligence gathering. 
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8.2.4.4 External processes. With regard to the external processes, destruction 
will almost always have suppression and disruption associated with it, and 
sometimes neutralization, but suppression, disruption, and neutralization often 
occur without destruction. The deception process works through the opponent's 
information acquisition to reduce the efficacy of the enemy's command-control 
functions, whereas the demoralization process acts in a broader sense to infect 
the will of many or all human elements. Suppression impacts only human 
elements, while destruction, disruption, and neutralization affect both human 
and material elements. 
It is common wisdom that for every combat action there is a counteraction. This 
is valid for combat processes as well, but the counter to any single process 
usually involves several processes. The countering of combat functions works in 
the same way: the counter to any single combat function will normally entail the 
exercise of more than one function by the opponent. 
8.2.5   Summary of Combat Processes 
By way of recapitulation, the following are key points regarding the role of 
combat processes in the theory of combat: 
Combat processes are defined in terms of results actually achieved in the 
three-sided flux of combat. In this regard they differ from combat 
functions, which are oriented to results intended. Results achieved are the 
true new states of both sides and of the combat environment, as 
distinguished from the perceived states. 
The set of primary combat processes is chosen to incorporate every kind 
of result that occurs in combat and is defined to be inclusive of all results 
that occur. Each process is mutually exclusive of all other processes. 
Although the list of processes could be extended ad infinitum, the set 
selected provides a convenient categorization that facilitates the descrip- 
tion of combat. 
Only externally directed processes impact the enemy directly and act to 
eliminate enemy opposition. Internally directed processes are essential to 
support external processes and to contribute to mission achievement; they 
impact only own-force elements, and in this way affect the enemy 
indirectly. Those internally directed processes that involve cognitive 
actions—command-control, motivation, information acquisition, and 
communication—can have either favorable or unfavorable effects on 
combat power. 
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No activity by either side, and therefore no process, takes place without 
the occurrence of a prior command-control process. Thus the command- 
control process initiates all other processes. It is, in turn, dependent on the 
information acquisition process. 
Combat processes have the properties of aggregation and disaggregation. 
8.3     UNCERTAINTY AND CHANCE 
8.3.1   Defining Uncertainty and Chance 
8.3.1.1 Uncertainty. Axiom 6 states that uncertainty is inherent in combat. We 
define uncertainty as a state of doubt about the combat situation, including its 
outcome. Uncertainty in combat is pervasive. It enters combat by its effect on the 
cognitive states of all combatants, and hangs like a fog affecting everyone, 
especially those in the chain of command. Commanders and their men have no 
choice but to learn to live with uncertainty, and chance. Commanders do their 
best to reduce uncertainty, yet only a foolish commander expects to eliminate it; 
and all commanders try to maximize uncertainty on the part of the enemy to 
obtain a relative informational advantage. 
8.3.1.2 Chance. We define chance event as an event that occurs without discern- 
ible human intention or cause. With this definition we take a narrow view of what 
can pass as chance. An event that could have been anticipated and avoided is not 
a chance event, even though its occurrence was only a remote possibility. In the 
old maxim that starts "For want of a nail, the shoe was lost" and ends "for want 
of a battle, the kingdom was lost," the loss of the horseshoe is not strictly a 
chance event because with any message so critical to the kingdom, duplicate 
messages ought to have been sent by two riders. A sentry falling asleep, thereby 
allowing the enemy to take his unit by surprise, is not a chance event, nor is the 
death during battle of a commander with a known heart condition. An 
earthquake is a chance event but a predictable heavy snow storm is not. These 
examples put a fine point on what should be viewed as chance in combat. The 
wise commander anticipates and prepares for unusual events that others might 
class as chance, while an inexperienced commander will blame all sorts of 
surprises on chance or bad luck. Chance plays no favorites, and it can create 
opportunity as well as ill fortune. 
Nevertheless, small non-chance events in combat can lead to large effects. The 
failure to detonate explosives to demolish the Remagen Bridge in World War II 
(not a chance event) expedited the Allied Rhine crossing. Chaos theoreticians 
found there are countless minuscule points in a chain of events where a small 
perturbation can magnify to ultimately produce very large changes. Combat is 
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likewise filled with many such seemingly small unforeseen happenings, each 
with the potential for causing drastic changes in the situation down the road. 
More recently, chaos theoreticians have discovered that they can sometimes 
manipulate the perturbations and stabilize the system back into predictability. 
Those who command in combat have likewise learned to react to and often 
control unforeseen happenings in order to minimize their effects and sometimes 
to channel them to favorable advantage. 
8.3.2   Determinism and Predictability 
Did the loss of a nail on the shoe of the horse carrying the rider unalterably 
determine that the battle would be lost? Clearly not, for any number of possible 
actions could have intervened to alter the chain of events. There is no evidence to 
indicate that combat is deterministic, no evidence that indicates the present state 
of a single element or the present aggregated state of an aggregated element 
absolutely determines any future state. An assertion that combat is deterministic 
would, by extension, seem to claim that the initial conditions at the outset of 
combat inevitably establish the outcome, and by further extension, that the 
universe is set on a sequence of predetermined events and outcomes. If combat 
were wholly deterministic, it should be totally predictable. But as chaos theory 
shows, nonlinear dynamic systems that seem to meet the characteristics of 
determinism are not deterministic because they can be utterly unpredictable. 
Combat, which involves two-sided, interactive, nonlinear dynamics, and which 
furthermore is not isolated from external influences, and further still, is more 
biological in character than physical, cannot be classed as predictable. 
Yet, from a broad perspective, much of what can be observed of combat appears 
to be a priori deterministic for most practical purposes and much appears to be 
predictable within rough but useful ranges of accuracy. Just as the finite amount 
of encoded information contained in a fern spore predictably results in a 
nonrandom, fractal-like fern leaf, so the finite number of elements and actions in 
combat act in nonrandom fashion to produce (reasonably) predictable fractal- 
like patterns in combat. They do so because they involve the consistent encoded 
forms of military training, discipline, indoctrination, and traditions that control 
much of human behavior in combat. Also, because of the large numbers of 
combatants, weapons employed, and munitions and supplies expended, 
expected or average values from innumerable stochastic or quasi-stochastic 
events begin to override the details of individual events. CEPs (circular errors 
probable) make sense in large numbers, if not in the drop of a single bomb. 
Another factor contributing to seeming determinism and rough predictability is 
the intuition that good commanders bring to combat, which tends to lead to self- 
fulfilling outcomes; they prefer combat conditions where the outcome is likely. 
Competent commanders become expert in dealing with the fuzzy facts and 
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situations that abound in combat and in translating fuzzy information into non- 
fuzzy orders. 
Having recognized the frequent appearance of predictability in the aggregate 
view (for most practical purposes), we must acknowledge that this pertains only 
where expectations seem strongly to favor a correct prediction. Commanders 
seek situations where they expect to succeed. They assess risks and avoid, when 
they can, situations where success is marginal or unlikely. Predictability is low 
in cases of small marginal advantage and can go off the scale where chance or an 
unforeseen event intervenes significantly. 
In summary, we assert that combat is fundamentally nondeterministic and 
unpredictable, but that, for many reasons, much of combat can be viewed in the 
broad perspective as seemingly being determinable from preceding events and 
hence being predictable within tolerable limits of accuracy. In other words, there 
often can be a high order of probability as to outcomes. This view must not be 
treated too universally: we mean only that there is, in apparently clear cases, 
rough predictability of overall results, provided that significant unforeseen 
events do not occur. There is not predictability in detail and not predictability in 
general. 
8.3.3    Effects of Uncertainty and Negative Information 
Uncertainty. Pervasive uncertainty affects every combatant from start to finish. 
Combat proceeds on the basis of perceptions of reality rather than reality, and 
these perceptions are skewed by many factors: incomplete information, 
inaccurate and erroneous information, apprehension, fear, disinformation, 
deception, the biases and predilections of individuals (particularly those in the 
command chain), and other conditions afflicting cognitive elements. All of these 
factors result in what can be called the cognitive entropy of combat: the measure 
of uncertainty, confusion and disorder perceived by each combatant. 
Let us postulate a situation that we know cannot exist: a situation in which, at a 
moment in time, every combatant has complete knowledge about everything in 
the combat arena—about every person, every material element, the location and 
every attribute of all these elements, and every action being taken at that 
moment. Uncertainty would still exist, for there are "uncertainty principles" that 
say you fundamentally cannot know, within certain limits, all dimensions of 
some things. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics says 
we cannot simultaneously know both the exact velocity and the exact position of 
an object. The linear time-invariant uncertainty principle of information theory 
says that there is a basic uncertainty in what we can know about both the 
frequencies and  the  time duration of a signal. However, these and  other 
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uncertainty principles become significant only when we are concerned with 
measurements requiring great precision. Therefore, to put this point in 
perspective, in combat, scientific uncertainty principles become lost in the noise, 
even at the most elemental level. While the uncertainties exist, they are so 
overridden by the grossness of combat activities that they become 
inconsequential. 
A more significant reason why complete knowledge would not eliminate 
uncertainty is that, given the nondeterministic character of combat, what 
happens next and what will happen later on cannot be known exactly. Even if 
every person on one side could know exactly what he will do the next moment, 
none of them knows what any person on the other side will do, nor even what 
the person standing next to him will do. Even if complete knowledge of the 
present down even to molecules or atoms were possible in combat, uncertainty 
would remain as to future states. 
But to return to a realistic plane, uncertainty as to the present situation is seen 
everywhere. There is uncertainty as to many of the present-state attributes 
(location, morale, capability, posture, force integrity, and so on) of both the 
friendly force and the enemy force; uncertainty as to the validity of information; 
as to whether orders have been carried out; as to the combat environment; as to 
what losses have been sustained—in short, uncertainty as to much of the current 
state of forces on both sides and of the environment. The longer the train of 
sequential events since the last bit of information, the greater the uncertainty and 
the more the information is mistrusted. 
Compounding the problem of uncertainty is what can be called negative 
information. It too is pervasive in combat. It includes information that does not 
result in uncertainty in the sense of doubt about the situation, but it can have an 
even greater influence. Negative information includes disinformation and 
deception intentionally planted by the enemy, as well as own-force misconcep- 
tions, misapprehensions, and other inadvertent own-force disinformation. 
Further, it includes ignorance, particularly by those in the command chain. A 
commander (or any combatant) may have no doubt in his mind about the 
situation, yet be completely ignorant of the true circumstance. He would be 
better off knowing nothing and realizing he knows nothing. The effect of 
negative information is to warp the perception of what otherwise should have 
been factual information. 
8.3.4   Cognitive Entropy 
The degree of uncertainty about the present combat situation can be thought of 
as a measure of the cognitive entropy of combat. We are not speaking here of 
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thermodynamic entropy, but entropy in the sense of information theory. 
Thermodynamic entropy could not apply because combat is not an isolated, 
closed system and it involves biological systems that are self-regenerating and 
self-controlling, and hence cognitive entropy can be reduced by factors both 
internal and external to the combat arena. The informational uncertainty 
involved in cognitive entropy pertains to more than just the physical situation, 
for it includes uncertainty as to the mission and orders and, on a more abstract 
plane, as to combat purpose and values. This conceptual sort of entropy is 
extremely hard to pin down. It might be called fuzzy entropy, since we are 
dealing with fuzzy sets of information. Although the actual situation is not 
fuzzy, what enters the minds of combatants is clouded by uncertainty. 
Conceptually, we can define this fuzzy cognitive entropy as the ratio of what is 
not known about the combat situation to complete knowledge of the situation, 
the unknown relative to the knowable. In this sense, it is a measure of the 
confusion, disorder, and uncertainty experienced by combatants. Everyone in 
combat is at all times trying to minimize his own cognitive entropy and that of 
his fellows. At the outset of combat, the collective entropy (the sum lack of 
information by all combatants) of each side is usually low for friendly forces but 
may be high or low about enemy forces. As combat proceeds, entropy normally 
increases (the so-called fog of battle), but will wax and wane as correct 
information is acquired or fades and as it is correctly or falsely interpreted and 
understood. In the worst case, when individuals have lost all interest in the 
mission and know only what they can see with their own eyes, cognitive entropy 
is at a maximum. At the conclusion of combat, cognitive entropy in regard to 
friendly forces decreases and in regard to enemy forces generally increases. 
From this discussion, two points seem to emerge. First, cognitive entropy has 
useful meaning only when considered separately for each side. The total entropy 
in the combat arena, being the ratio of what is not known by both sides to the 
complete combat situation, tells us little about the dynamics of combat, whereas 
the entropy experienced by each side separately clearly has a significant bearing 
on force capability. Second, cognitive entropy in combat probably exists only in 
the mind of each individual, just as there are no aggregated cognitive elements, 
only cognitive individuals. Nevertheless, cognitive entropy, as it affects each 
side, can be conceptually thought of as the combination (but not the arithmetic 
sum) of the cognitive entropies of all individuals of that side. 
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8.4     DISTRIBUTION AND VECTORING OF COMBAT POWER 
8.4.1   Command-Control: Process and Functions 
8.4.1.1 The gray world of command and control. Given the pervasiveness of 
uncertainty in combat, all who engage in command and control functions— 
which includes every active combatant—operate in a world where most 
available information is uncertain and ambiguous. Added to this is the 
occasional unforeseen event that ramifies to unexpected significance and the rare 
chance event that upsets plans. From this fuzzy world where facts are gray or 
missing, decisions must be made and communicated in clear, black and white 
terms. For those not in the command chain most decisions are made largely by 
rote in accordance with what the individual has been trained to do. Those in the 
command chain, however, face weighing choices that are often tortuously 
difficult, but when made, need to be communicated positively and decisively. 
As General Maxwell D. Taylor citing from the Bible said, "If the trumpet give an 
uncertain voice, who shall prepare himself for war?" 
Thus command necessitates converting conditions of uncertainty into unambi- 
guous orders and actions. This entails sorting through uncertainties and 
possibilities of chance and unforeseen events, and then filling in the unknowns 
based on experience and probabilities. From this cognitive exercise, the 
commander communicates his decision. The command function has the intent of 
making a right decision and enunciating it firmly and clearly. The command- 
control process leads to a decision that may be good or bad and that may be 
disseminated clearly and forcefully or not. 
8.4.1.2 Experience and probability in command and control. Wise command- 
ers, realizing they cannot know everything about the combat situation, do. not 
delay action while seeking ever more information, but sense when they know 
enough to act. Commanders operate much like the brain, which, observing a 
developing pattern, interprets the partial pattern based on experience, and when 
sufficient pieces of the pattern have been received, anticipates the full picture, 
weighs options and decides. The commander will make a judgment about the 
probability of what the developing pattern represents and about the likelihood 
the pattern will not change. Included among the probabilities will be the 
commander's view of what his opponent will likely do based on knowledge of 
that opponent's past actions. Many other probabilities will be weighed and 
ranked to produce an overall probability. This calculus of partial patterns and 
weighted probabilities is at the heart of decision-making, not just in combat, but 
in all manner of human decisions. The commander finesses unpredictability in 
detail  by  working  on  probability  in  the  larger  picture.  And  successful 
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Commanders convey decisions in terms that reflect neither improbability nor 
unpredictability. 
Experience obviously is a paramount factor in command and control. Everyone 
in combat carries in his mind the accumulated residue of his experiences in life. 
But it is experience more directly related to military life and to combat that 
dominates command and control. Here the specific purpose-value system of 
combat overlies and must contend with the deeper purpose-value system of 
culture. Continuous information feedback to all combatants is weighed against 
these specific and broad purpose-value systems, leading to cyclic decision- 
making. All in the chain of command, and less directly all others, are guided by 
decision rules that derive from the behavioral incentives and penalties of higher 
military and governmental echelons. 
8.4.1.3 The esprit component of command and control. Axiom 5 states that 
domination is the ultimate means of achieving an objective. It is certainly not the 
sole means, for only destruction will defeat a force that fights to the last. 
Domination is a defeat of the human spirit. In combat this means one force 
imposing its will on the other force, with the commanders on each side, aided by 
their subordinate commanders, being the principal imposers and principal 
recipients of domination. There are instances of a demoralized force becoming 
dominated by the opponent regardless of its commander's strong will to resist, 
and other instances where a force remained undominated even when its 
commander had been reduced to abject helplessness. 
Domination works on the cognitive elements of the enemy. The means to achieve 
domination comprise all the external processes, with demoralization as the 
primary tool, and destruction and deception likely to weigh more heavily than 
the others. The shock effect of surprise magnifies the impact. Resistance to 
domination puts all the internal processes in play, but especially motivation and 
command-control. The esprit component of command and control has been 
expressed by Wayne Hughes in Combat Science in these words: 
Domination works on the mind and spirit. ... The winner instinct, not the 
killer instinct, is the attribute that explains the spiritual basis of combat 
success. Combat is the most intensely physical of all human activity, but 
after religion it is also the most intensely spiritual in its lasting effects. The 
health of one spreads to enhance all, and a sickness in one debilitates the 
others. 
8-4.1.4 The episodic nature of combat. Combat rarely proceeds at a uniform 
pace, nor in a gradual build-up to a single climax followed by a winding down. 
There usually are peaks of heightened activity followed by periods of relative 
quiet. As the common saying has it, "war is moments of stark terror between 
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long periods of utter boredom." The episodic nature of combat is seen in all its 
aspects: there are times when information gathering is the primary focus, times 
when positioning forces is the main object, times when maneuvering is key, 
times when firepower is dominant, and times when recuperation is called for. 
The decision-making system, from commander down to private, all trying to 
cope with uncertainties and unknowns, requires time to ponder, and thus 
generates its decisions sporadically rather than continuously. 
8.4.2   Distribution of Combat Power in Time and Space 
Although combat power comprises innumerable quantum-like elemental 
contributions, it is not seen that way by commanders nor other combatants. To 
further his mission, a commander views combat power as being brought to bear 
by aggregations of forces and actions that he must control in time and space. 
Even though unity of effort and concentration of forces are watchwords of 
command, never in the real world would a commander treat combat power as if 
it were a single lump sum. Instead, he distributes and redistributes it by 
allocating forces and directing their actions here and there in a continually 
shifting pattern. 
Once a commander has turned available combat potential into combat power, 
the two most crucial responsibilities for him and his subordinate commanders 
are (1) propitious distribution of combat power in time and space and 
(2) vectoring that combat power to achieve the mission. Commanders normally 
will also ensure sufficient residual potential to fight again, unless the force must 
be sacrificed for some higher goal. In carrying out these responsibilities, the 
commander and every combatant will be expending energy—usually prodigious 
amounts of it and often to the point of exhaustion. 
Distribution of combat power takes place in the dimensions of space and time. 
Spatially, the vertical dimension extends from ocean depths to outer space and it 
may include subterranean space. The horizontal dimensions can extend 
anywhere within the combat area. At the micro level, combat power distribution 
is in finite granular bits, power being made up of the many separate individual 
processes occurring on the battlefield. On the macro scale, distribution has the 
appearance of bundles in time and space. 
8.4.2.1 Spatial distribution. Figure 19 presents a fine-grain snapshot of Blue 
force combat activity within a small slice of the combat area during a short 
period of time. A complete picture would include Red force combat activity as 
well. The dots represent individual elements. The solid arrows represent 
physical actions taken by the elements, which impact other elements, either Blue 
or Red, and the dotted arrows represent cognitive actions. Thus each dot-arrow- 
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dot corresponds to one individual element-action-element activity with a 
consequent result. Most of these activities involve multiple impacts and multiple 
results. The small circular arrows indicate impact on the element itself (such as a 
change of state due to a movement or to ammunition expended). 
-*o 
Area occupied primarily 
by Blue Force 
Area occupied primarily 
/ by Red Force 
o Red Force Elements 
Blue Force Elements 
Blue Force physical actions 
Blue Force cognitive actions 
Figure 19. Fine-Grain Snapshot of Blue Force Combat 
Activity in a Slice of the Combat Area 
Since combat power is defined in terms of results achieved (leading to changes 
of state), the point in space and the instant in time that a result occurs is the 
location where and time when an element of combat power is created. The word 
"point" should not be taken here to have the mathematical meaning of infinitely 
small, but rather to mean a finite yet very small volume; similarly, "instant" does 
not mean an infinitesimal segment of time, merely a very short segment. Hence 
in Figure 19 a micro bit of Blue force combat power created at each of the 
impacted dots (as noted above, Red force activity has not been displayed). 
Internally directed processes create supportive combat power only within space 
occupied by elements of that force, since by definition these processes only 
impact friendly force elements, while similarly, externally directed processes 
create aggressive combat power against the enemy only within space occupied 
by enemy elements. 
At the individual level, every element that affects the combat situation, whether 
through physical action or through cognitive influence and whether affecting 
enemy or friendly force elements, contributes to combat power. The elemental 
bit of combat power is formed in the processes in which one or more agent 
elements impact an object element, including interaction with any enemy 
element that may impact the same object element. A maneuvering tank and its 
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crew that is firing at an enemy armored personnel carrier while receiving return 
fire is normally engaging in several external processes and could simultaneously 
be engaging in all internal processes except sustainment, all contributing to 
combat power, some against the enemy personnel carrier and some within the 
friendly force tank. Where the process result occurs is the where combat power 
is exerted. 
The object elements, where elemental combat power is being created through 
changes of element attributes, can be any own-force elements (including the 
agent elements themselves), elements of the enemy force, and the combat 
environment. Furthermore, the object elements are not necessarily those 
intended to be the objects of an action, and often are objects against which the 
action was quite unintended. In instances of friendly fire casualties, for example, 
the objects are own-force elements fired on in error—an instance where combat 
power has a negative consequence. Civilian noncombatants and civilian infra- 
structure can become objects of collateral civil damage either intentionally or 
incidentally. In area fire or aerial carpet bombardment, the objects are not 
discretely targeted elements, but are any and all elements affected by the area 
fire or bombardment in addition to those for which damage was intended. 
Each of the elemental combat power contributions is part of the overall 
distribution of combat power on the battlefield at that moment. In principle, for 
every spatial point in the combat arena, it would be possible to combine all the 
elemental power contributions at that one point at one instant. A mapping of all 
these elemental power combinations over the combat area would, for each 
adversary, represent a picture of the total spatial distribution for that side at that 
instant. 
Figure 20 illustrates such a mapping over a portion of the combat area. The 
figure represents overall distribution of Blue force combat power at one instant 
of time. As a simplification, the figure does not include Red force combat power. 
A complete portrayal would show power of the two sides superimposed but 
distinct from each other. For each side the combat power at every point results 
from the interactive combination of both sides' activities that impact elements at 
that point at that instant, plus any effect that the combat environment has. 
Although a demarcation line is shown between the areas occupied by Blue and 
Red forces, there often is no firm separation of forces. Some Blue forces can be 
operating (and creating combat power) within the area where Red forces 
predominate. 
Since external processes will at times create more of the total combat power than 
will internal processes, Figure 20 shows a greater portion of Blue's combat 
power within the Red force area. This will not always be the case. During 
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The height of the 
contours represents 
combat power. 
Area occupied primarily 
by Blue Force 
Area occupied primarily 
by Red Force 
DEPTH 
Figure 20. Spatial Distribution of Blue Force Combat Power 
over a Portion of the Combat Area at an Instant of Time 
preparation for an attack, for example, most combat power will be distributed 
within the friendly force area. 
A diagram similar to Figure 20 could be made for the spatial distribution of 
combat potential for the Blue force. A major difference would be that combat 
potential would be distributed only within the area occupied by the Blue force, 
since potential, by definition, does not involve actions against the enemy. Once 
combat is in full swing, most of available combat potential will normally have 
been converted to combat power. 
The conceptually simple presentation of spatial distribution presented above is 
unfortunately belied by the complexity of real-life combat. There is not as yet 
any way to mathematically combine the combat power contributions of a mixed 
bag of processes, nor even to quantify completely the contributions of a single 
process. Hence it is not possible to produce a mapping like Figure 20 for a real 
combat situation, even though we can envision it. Yet commanders in combat, 
drawing on experience and training, intuitively accomplish the task of summing 
combat power and visualizing it in time and space. Superiority of one force over 
another is the result of skillful distribution of elements and actions that are 
decisive in space and time. Experienced command leadership and a high degree 
of combat readiness are essential for this to happen. 
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8.4.2.2 Distribution in time. The distribution of combat power in time is 
illustrated in Figures 21 and 22. Figure 21 shows distribution at the micro level 
for a relatively short time interval (ta to t2) at a single point in space occupied by 
one Blue force object element. Each of the bars represents the combat power 
contribution from a single element-action-element activity with associated result 
during the interval. Combat power contributions from both Blue and Red forces 
are shown. Since the point is occupied by a Blue force element, the Red combat 
power contributions are from Red external processes and the Blue contributions 










Figure 21. Micro-Level Distribution of Combat Power over Time 
at a Point Occupied by a Blue Force Object Element 
Figure 22 extends the picture to show time distribution of combat power 
aggregated over an area within Blue force territory, the time interval here being 
from the initiation of combat (to) to its termination (tt). The combat power 
aggregated in the figure could be that from all processes or it could be from just 
one combat process, such as destruction or suppression. The size of the area is 
small compared to the total area of combat, but is substantially larger than the 
single point of Figure 21, and so this representation approaches the overall view 
that combatants have of combat. Since the area is within Blue force territory, Red 
combat power from its external processes is sometimes great and sometimes 
negligible, whereas Blue combat power from its internal processes is spread 
more uniformly. Figure 22 is an aggregated smoothing out of the finite number 
of individual combat power contributions occurring in the area. 
8.4.2.3 The vector aspect of combat power. Figures 20, 21 and 22 display 
combat power as if it were a scalar quantity without regard to its vector-like 
characteristic, yet the vectoring of combat is a powerful means of channeling 
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Figure 22. Overall Distribution of Combat Power over Time in 
an Area Occupied by Blue Force Elements 
effort. The vectoring, however, while always intended to be favorable, is not 
always so in actuality, and so this negative aspect of distributing combat power 
must be examined. 
The vector aspect of combat power is illustrated in Figures 23 and 24. Figure 23 
presents vectored distribution of combat power within a portion of the combat 
area from the commencement of combat (t0) to its end (tt). The ordinate 
represents combat power that has been vectored to achieve desired results. 
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Figure 23. The Vector Aspect of Combat Power 
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favorable to mission accomplishment, it is plotted above the index line as a 
favorable vector. Where it has led to changes unfavorable to mission 
accomplishment, it is plotted as an unfavorable vector. As a simple example, 
when one side is advancing to take a hill, its combat power vector at that 
moment is favorable, but if the enemy forces a retreat, the vector has turned 
unfavorable. Many other factors besides advancing or retreating can, of course, 
affect the combat power vector, such as casualties being sustained compared to 
those inflicted on the enemy, orders being disseminated rapidly or not, and 
improving or diminishing fighting spirit. Since combat power is seen as rates of 
changes, its vector will be in terms of rates of advance or retreat, rates of 
casualties, rates of change of morale, and so forth. 
In Figure 23, both Blue and Red experience periods of unfavorable state changes, 
the consequence of the combat power vector having been adverse. For each side 
in combat, favorableness or unfavorableness is generally inversely related to that 
of the other side, but there is not a one-for-one inverse correspondence either in 
space or time because the missions of the two sides are not necessarily in one- 
for-one direct opposition. In addition, there can be other reasons than enemy 
action for combat power being unfavorably vectored, such as errors, 
inefficiencies, and bad decisions on the part of the friendly force. In most such 
cases attributable to the friendly force, the fault does not lead to the vector being 
totally reversed, but rather to it being skewed away from full support of the 
mission. In the example cited above, a faulty judgment about the terrain might 
result in a slowing of the advance and thus a less favorable vectoring, but not a 
retreat. 
8.4.2.4 The vector aspect of combat output. Combat output, the cumulative 
effect of combat power over time, is equivalent to combat work accomplished. 
As such, combat output is reflected in the cumulative results, favorable and 
unfavorable, which equate to the cumulative states of a force. Since output 
derives from combat power, it likewise has a vector-like characteristic, leading to 
the state of the force at times being favorable or unfavorable to mission 
accomplishment as combat progresses. The measures of combat output are 
largely in scalar quantitative terms such as cumulative amount of ground gained 
or lost, casualties inflicted on the enemy versus casualties sustained, and enemy 
aircraft shot down and ships damaged versus own-force losses. But combat 
output is also measured in factors less conducive to quantification, such as 
accumulation of intelligence information versus lack of it, retention of 
communication links versus loss of them, and increase in fighting spirit versus 
demoralization. As to both the more and the less quantifiable measures, the 
vector aspect for each adversary enters insofar as the cumulative measures are 
favorable or not to mission achievement. Ground may have been taken toward 
the mission objective, but if the cumulative costs in casualties, loss of unit 
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Figure 24. The Vector Aspect of Combat Output 
integrity, and lower morale were excessive, ultimate mission fulfillment may 
have been set back, and combat output vectoring will have been unfavorable. 
Figure 24 shows the changes in vectored combat output over a part of the 
combat area that follow from the combat power example of Figure 23. In Figure 
23, the curves represent the time rate of change of state for each of the two sides. 
The combat output curves in Figure 24 are the integrals of the combat power 
curves in Figure 23—the cumulative states, favorable or unfavorable of each 
side. For Blue in the example, combat output is favorable to mission accom- 
plishment throughout the duration of combat, although it becomes less favorable 
during the period when Blue combat power becomes unfavorable. For Red, 
there are periods when net combat output is unfavorable, and Red ends the 
combat action in such a state. As shown, neither Blue nor Red fully reaches the 
end-states each sought, but Red's shortfall is greater than Blue's. 
8.4.3   Dynamics of Distributing Combat Power 
The propitious distribution of combat power in time and space is a sine qua non 
for success in combat. Distribution in time and in space is carried out as a single 
integrated activity, but to facilitate presentation, each will be discussed 
separately. 
8.4.3.1 Propitiousness as a measure of merit. For both time and space distribu- 
tion, we use the notion of propitiousness instead of optimality as the measure of 
merit. Propitiousness involves a range of time and space over which results 
obtained are, as of that moment in the course of combat, observably favorable. 
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This is not retrenchment from rigor, but rather a recognition that at any time 
during the course of combat there cannot be an a priori optimum distribution of 
combat power, since such an optimum presumes foreknowledge of the future 
effects of enemy and friendly actions being taken, as well as of the ultimate 
outcome of combat. Combat cannot be presented as equations in closed form in 
which answers are predetermined when the input variables are known. 
Time propitiousness is illustrated in the three cases shown in Figure 25. For each 
case, the time of actual execution lags behind the time of execution selected by 
the commander, a common occurrence in combat. In Case 1, the action is not 
time-critical, so the range of propitiousness is broad, and fortuitously, time of 
execution turns out better than the selected time. In Case 2, timing is sensitive 
and the time of execution falls outside the range of propitiousness. Case 3 shows 
an instance where time of completion is so critical as to constitute a firm cut-off; 
execution is so late there is no favorable result at all. 
Extending the notion of propitiousness to distribution in both time and space 
becomes more difficult to visualize. Propitiousness in essence is captured in the 
dictum attributed to General Nathan Bedford Forrest of "getting there first with 
the most men." But sometimes getting there first even with less is propitious, 
and at other times getting there with the most even tardily is propitious. About 
the only ground rule that can be stated is that whatever falls within a range of 
advantageousness at the moment in light of the course of combat to that point is 
propitious. 
Combat comprises innumerable such single-action degrees of time-space propi- 
tiousness or unpropitiousness. The result of every individual action can in 
principle be characterized by the propitiousness (or lack thereof) as to when and 
where the action occurred, and the aggregated time-space distribution of many 
actions can be viewed as propitious in the aggregate or not. The propitiousness 
of a single action can never depend on the merit of the action in isolation, but 
must depend on its contribution to the stream of actions there and elsewhere. In 
the eyes of participants, distribution in time and space (as with all aspects of 
combat) is viewed in the aggregate and will be seen more as art than science. 
The principles of war and operational manuals make clear the utmost 
importance of spatial and time distribution of the combined elements and 
actions of a force acting in concert. 
8.4.3.2 Information feedback loops and action-reaction cycles. Since combat 
involves two-sided force-on-force activity, there is a constant cycle of action and 
reaction and information feedback by both sides, some of it feedback regarding 
the friendly force and some about the enemy. Within his plan of actions, a 
commander will incorporate planned reactions to anticipated enemy initiatives 
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Figure 25. Time Propitiousness 
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and counteractions, and both his initiative actions and his reactions will be 
modified as battle progresses. The outcome of combat will be critically affected 
by the timeliness of responses by the two sides in the action-reaction cycles. To 
make timely and propitious decisions, commanders depend on timely and high 
quality input information, and, of course, the efficacy of their decision-making 
also depends on how well they process that information. 
Figure 26 depicts two information loops, one being the own-force loop that starts 
with own-force information acquisition, transmits information via intermediate 
nodes to commanders where decisions are made regarding further information 
acquisition, and then completes the loop back to own-force information 
acquisition. The other loop involves intelligence information, which is sent to the 
same commanders for decisions about further intelligence information 
gathering, and then back to intelligence acquisition. In both loops, communi- 
cation links all nodes. The two loops operate in parallel and meet at the 
commander node, where both kinds of information are weighed to produce the 
outgoing directives for further acquisition and for other own-force actions (these 
latter actions are not part of the information loops; they are part of the action- 
reaction cycle). Although the decision node in Figure 26 shows commanders, the 
loops pertain not only to those in the command chain but to all individuals, since 
all contribute in some degree to decision-making. 
The time it takes for information to cycle through the information loops is 
critical. Likewise, time responsiveness in the action-reaction cycles is critical. The 
side that can acquire, cycle, and process information faster and that can react 
faster to processed information has a great advantage. Figure 27 is a depiction 
that combines the information acquisition loops and the action-reaction cycle in 
the form of a horizontal double figure eight, one for the Blue force and one for 
the Red force. For each force, the length of time, starting from the commander 
node at the center of the figure eight, out along the information acquisition loop, 
back to the commander, then out along the action-reaction cycle, and finally back 
to the commander again, represents total time responsiveness for information 
gathering, information feedback, information processing, force reaction, and 
feedback of information about force reaction. The total time responsiveness is 
conceptually the sum of the two cycles (the total path along the figure eight). In 
the Blue force versus Red force comparison illustrated in Figure 27, Blue is 
shown as having the longer information acquisition cycle time and the shorter 
reaction cycle time. 
Within the commander node at the center of the figure eight, information (as 
perceived) is continually being received, integrated, stored, and processed 
periodically into orders in reaction to the situation. Information about the 
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reactions is then returned to the commander, where it is again integrated, stored, 
and processed for further decisions about information acquisition and force 
action. 
For actual combat, the concept of time responsiveness illustrated in Figure 27 is 
not possible to reproduce quantitatively, since the flow of information is 
continuous at and between all nodes, with continual mixing of information at 
every node. In addition, information is subject to storage for varying periods of 
time and is retrieved and processed sporadically. All of this makes for blended 
information melded from many discrete initial acquisitions in the manner of a 
stream accumulating flow from many rivulets. Overlapping and mixing 
obscures calculation of discrete time lags. Nevertheless, in principle, an element 
of information could be traced through the system, and the transit time 
measured. Regardless of the doubtful practicality of accomplishing this, it is 
crucial to minimize time lags. 
Time to acquire and feed back information Time to react and feed back information 
 Blue force cycle time 
Red force cycle time 
Figure 27. Combined Information and Force Reaction Time Cycles 
What counts, of course, is not merely less time lag in absolute terms, but less lag 
than the opponent. The combat power advantage of one side over the other will 
be some function of the time lag differential. The effect is analogous to the 
advantage of one aircraft carrier over another by virtue of its quicker intelligence 
acquisition and its shorter turn-around time for refueling and rearming aircraft. 
As mentioned previously, there is also a qualitative factor that affects the 
information loops. Information flowing through these loops is not the reality of 
the situation, but the perception of reality as conditioned by gaps and other 
faults in information gathering (about both the friendly force and the enemy) 
and in communicating. These shortcomings are inherent in both information 
loops, but are especially critical in the intelligence loop. The qualitative aspects 
of information flow are as important as time lags. 
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8.4.3.3 Achieving propitious distribution of combat power. There are no 
standard formulas to guide commanders in distributing combat power. No two 
missions are the same, no two situations are exactly alike, and the number of 
factors to be taken into account is immense. General guidelines are found in the 
principles and maxims of war. More specific guidelines exist in doctrinal and 
tactical manuals, training courses, military history, and most important, the hard 
lessons of combat experience. To these can be added the universally accepted 
dictums to focus combat power so as to exploit enemy weaknesses, use surprise 
and shock effect, concentrate force against the enemy's decisive sources of 
strength and balance (his center of gravity), take account of culminating points 
during operations, and observe other time-honored precepts. Implicit in all these 
guidelines is the advantage accruing to the side that has the more rapid and 
more effective responsiveness. 
8.5     THE FLOW OF COMBAT 
8.5.1 Trends and Projections 
The high value placed on combat outcome compels continuing assessment of 
where the action is leading. At all times in battle, commanders and all others 
observe events and interpret them as trends—own-force losses versus enemy 
losses, strong points gained or given up, units holding or disintegrating, 
progress toward mission achievement versus shortfalls. Each combatant projects 
the observed trends as adverse or favorable to him, his unit, and his cause and is 
influenced in his actions by the projections. When combat appears to flow 
smoothly, the projections generally appear to have a comfortable degree of 
certainty. When combat appears to be chaotic, the future seems less certain and 
the actions that should be taken less clear. 
8.5.2 Actual Versus Perceived Trends 
With trends we must once again distinguish the real from the perceived. A 
multiplicity of actual trends is at play at any moment in combat. Sometimes the 
trends are strong, widespread, and reinforcing. At other times the trends are 
weak, localized, and disparate. In either case, actual trends derive from the flow 
of actual events. They exist in reality. 
Perceived trends, on the other hand, are derived from information acquired 
about events, and are subject to all the numerous faults of the acquisition process 
plus the overlay of subjective interpretation during the multilayered command 
and control functions. Perception may miss an actual trend until it has gotten out 
of hand, or conversely, may grossly exaggerate a trend of little real importance. 
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In any case, events are passed through the filter of perception and it is trends as 
perceived that continually form the basis for each combatant's projection of the 
future. Perceptions by individuals are not reached independently; they are 
influenced by the perceptions of peers and superiors, particularly commanders. 
Thus, while the perception of trends is an important influence on each 
individual, these perceptions take on a group coloration in much the same way 
that cohesion and disjunction infectiously modify group behavior. 
Much investigation has been carried out on the effects of trends upon the 
outcome of combat. A major focus of this has been investigation of mathematical 
models that represent trends, much of the work concentrating on attrition 
equations and their many variants, such as versions of Lanchester equations. 
Often, the models indicate a trend that continues inevitably in the same direction 
to some point taken as defeat or exhaustion or unit break point. In other cases, 
solutions may terminate in one or more equilibrium points that act somewhat 
like the attractors of chaos theory. All these mathematical representations of 
combat are recognized as gross simplifications of reality. 
Nevertheless, the question may be asked whether there are real trends in combat 
that, once begun, continue inexorably in the same direction. Consideration of a 
wide variety of trends (for example, in ground gained or lost, motivation or 
demoralization, cohesion or disjunction, rate of casualties, losses of materiel) 
leads to the conclusion that the only real trends that might be classed as 
inevitable and irreversible are those dictated by the process of destruction. Other 
trends appear to be subject to reversal, given the right conditions. Indeed, this is 
the basis of culminating points in land combat doctrine. One reason lies in the 
action-reaction cycles, where perceptions of adverse trends continuously lead to 
attempts to alter the trends, with at least occasional success. A more significant 
reason probably lies deeper, involving human behavior and the power of 
combat units to self-regenerate and self-reorganize. 
Destruction can be considered as not subject to reversibility because once an 
object is destroyed, it ceases to exist and cannot be resurrected. The point, 
however, is only partly valid, and somewhat trivial, because some losses can be 
replaced during combat and some damaged materiel and wounded combatants 
can be restored to battle. 
Although trends of real events do not appear to proceed inevitably, perceived 
trends nevertheless have a pronounced effect on the outcome of combat. In 
accordance with Axiom 5, the perception by one side that it is achieving 
domination or by the other side that it is becoming dominated has a powerful 
cognitive effect that is often self-reinforcing. 
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8.5.3    Projections of Perceived Trends 
It is the projection of perceived trends more than the trends themselves that 
governs decisions about future actions. This applies at all decision nodes from 
individuals to the combat commander. A commander who projects that a pattern 
of events will lead to future trouble will seek to turn the unfavorable pattern to a 
favorable one, or if unable to do so, may try to disengage from combat. An 
individual soldier may seek to improve his projected future, or in the extreme, 
may become disheartened and lose his will to fight. Disparate projections from 
mixed trends can dissipate combat power in friction. 
Because commanders are aware of time lags and faults in information 
acquisition and the command and control functions, projected trends based on 
perceived events are susceptible to exaggeration and overcompensation in 
decision-making. The decision mechanism acts sometimes like a servo system in 
which imperfect responsiveness results in sometimes overcontrolling, sometimes 
undercontrolling, and sometimes oscillating between two positions. Poor time 
responsiveness amplifies the overcontrolling and undercontrolling. 
Figure 28 illustrates the effect. The figure plots the actual and the perceived ratio 
of combat power of the two sides. Combat begins at time tn with an attack by 
Blue and has proceeded to time t2 in the upper figure (28a). The actual relative 
combat power initially favors Blue, but begins to be less advantageous to Blue at 
tj. By time t2, Red has noted the trend reversal and is projecting a trend that will 
ultimately turn in his favor. Meanwhile, Blue has not perceived the trend 
reversal and continues to project a trend increasingly favorable to him. Figure 
28b shows events from time t2 to t5. At time t3, Red, acting on his trend 
projection, initiates a forceful action to capitalize on the changing situation. 
Blue's perception (and hence his projection) continues to lag until time t4, when 
his perception finally catches up with the now drastically altered situation. Blue 
finds himself in the position of the cartoon character who has run past the edge 
of the cliff and, legs still churning, belatedly looks down, then falls. By time t5, 
Blue is again overreacting by projecting a catastrophically unfavorable trend, 
thereby fulfilling his own excessive projection. Blue's fault lies in too-slow time 
responsiveness in acquiring and processing information. Red's faster responsive- 
ness gives him a substantial advantage. 
Figure 28 also illustrates the importance in trend projection of recognizing a 
culminating point in combat. A culminating point occurs when the combat 
power of an attacking force no longer significantly exceeds that of the defending 
force. At a culminating point, the attacker should shift to the defensive. In the 
example, the culminating point occurs somewhere between t2 and t3. At time t2, 
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events are such that Red has perceived that a culminating point may be 
approaching and is acting accordingly. Blue, not anticipating the culminating 
point, is not only not in no position to delay or negate the culminating point but, 
worse, continues to take actions that eventually lead to his catastrophic failure. 
As noted in the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, commanders must 
understand that in battle, men and units are more likely to fail catastrophically 
than gradually. Figure 28 depicts the catastrophic failure from delayed percep- 
tion and consequent erroneous projection by Blue of an adverse trend, as 
distinguished from the timely and correct perception and projection by Red of a 
trend favorable to him. Military doctrine universally emphasizes the paramount 
importance of perceiving and exploiting trends toward failure by the enemy and 
mitigating trends toward own-force failure. Failing to exploit or to mitigate a 
trend when it is in a commander's power to do so is an egregious error. 
8.5.4   The Episodic Flow of Combat 
The flow of combat is normally episodic. The constantly shifting distribution of 
combat power leads to Crescendos of violent action often followed by lulls. There 
is no repeatable pattern to this characteristic. Sometimes there is only a single 
crescendo, sometimes many spaced over time, sometimes two or more at once. A 
crescendo may arise from a sudden surprise engagement, or from a gradual 
build-up of action. A maneuver may cause a peak in the action, or sometimes 
firepower; more often it is both. The action-reaction cycles tend to give a cyclic 
character to the peaking and ebbing of combat power, a sort of pulsing of 
activity. Action-reaction cycles at the macro level are, of course, composed of 
myriads of micro action-reaction cycles, and it is the vectored reinforcing of 
these that gives rise to this pulsing of activity. But here again, there is no 
repeatable pattern, no consistency from one combat situation to another. 
In some ways the episodic flow of combat can be compared to the flow of a 
turbulent stream, with its mix of smoothly flowing water and occasional rapids 
and whirlpools. The comparison is apt because describing turbulence in liquid 
flow remains an unsolved problem in physics; there is as yet no adequate 
theoretical basis to take account of whorls and eddies, or even how turbulent 
flow begins. Similarly, in combat we are limited in how far we can go in 
presenting a theoretical basis for combat dynamics. One of the tools applied in 
an attempt to cope with turbulence in liquid flow is the concept of state space 
(also called phase space), a conceptual space where each dimension corresponds 
to one variable of the system. But in combat, there is no discernible periodicity in 
the way the variables behave, and there are so many variables as to render an 
approach using state space meaningless. In the extreme, the number of variables 
138 
Dynamics: Application of Combat Power 
equals the number of individuals engaged in combat (plus the combat environ- 
ment variables), and the state space spreads out in uncountable dimensions. 
To recognize that combat is turbulent, in the sense of being generally episodic 
with intense combat power pulses and lulls, is not to say that at present we can 
scientifically do much about this characteristic. Yet commanders can and do cope 
with the turbulent flow of combat. Where the scientist sees random, unpredict- 
able, formlessness in the turbulence of a river, the commander sees useful 
patterns in the flow of human actions during combat. And others under the 
commander likewise see patterns that enable the force as a whole to cope with 
turbulence and chaos and make sense out of combat. A unit in combat thus 
draws order from a sea of chaos. As the eminent scientist Erwin Schrödinger put 
it, a living organism has the "astonishing gift of concentrating a stream of order 
on itself and thus escaping the decay into chaos." 
8.6     A BEGINNING 
Combat, perhaps the most complex of all human endeavors, is certainly one of 
the most trying. The nature of combat, with its uncertainties and its peaks and 
lulls, with combat power constantly being changed in a three-sided mix, and 
with its human behavioral unknowables, follows no repeatable pattern that 
allows for predictability in detail. Despite this, trained commanders and forces 
find ways to successfully apply combat power and achieve missions. Where 
many throw up their hands at the complexity and turbulence of combat, the ones 
called on to wage battles make a creditable showing of it. In the same vein, 
where some disparage as hopeless an attempt to explain the intricacies of combat 
with any useful validity, we in this document have at least tried. If nothing else, 
this is a beginning. 
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COMBAT THEORY AND ITS CONTINUING EVOLUTION 
9.1     GENERAL 
In the foregoing chapters of this document, we have presented a military combat 
theory. We have defined the role of combat within the spectrum of conflict and 
then developed a comprehensive description of combat in the form of a 
metamodel. The development relates combat to broader sociological variables. It 
ties combat to mission. It addresses the components of combat as elements, 
attributes, actions and activities and from there to the functions and processes of 
combat. It describes the dynamic nature of combat structure and the complexity 
of component interactions within the structure. The results of these interactions 
are described in well-defined operational terms such as combat power, friction, 
surprise and uncertainty. 
Nineteen years ago at this writing, in the meeting at Leesburg, VA, the need was 
stressed for stronger scientific underpinnings to ongoing work in warfare 
modeling and simulation. This meeting and the chain of events that followed 
have resulted in the present concise theory. While the Leesburg conference 
focused on modeling at the theater level, the meeting's proceedings and 
summary volumes called for theory development more appropriate to a broader 
context of war in general, and modeling in particular. 
Careful, disciplined investigation of the problem over the intervening years has 
led us to define combat as the kernel of all manner and means of war. In detail 
and in depth, the description of combat in the concise theory goes well beyond 
existing modeling. Thus, the theory exposes modeling problems related to the 
analysis of real warfare that are even more difficult to deal with than anyone 
suspected at the time of the Leesburg meeting and which remain with us to this 
day. 
There may be other ways of portraying combat in all of its complexity. Regard- 
less of the form taken by such alternative views of combat, it is important that 
they accommodate all observable aspects of its phenomena. Therefore, they 
should demonstrate some measure of feature-by-feature conformance with the 
steps identified in the methodology of this document. 
Clearly, significant tasks lie ahead if we are eventually to claim useful, "proven" 
theoretical constructs in keeping with the aspirations of the Leesburg conference 
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and TMCI charter. These tasks can be characterized by their orientation toward 
theory application, validation, or theory extension, recognizing that these factors 
are somewhat interdependent. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to 
discussion of the role each plays in the refinement and evolution of the combat 
theory. 
9.2     UTILITY AND APPLICATION OF COMBAT THEORY 
The purpose of a theory of any complex phenomenon is to gain the most 
complete and clearest understanding of its processes, while striving to collect 
and present the information in a structured way. The understanding of a 
phenomenon as complicated as military combat leads to an ability to identify 
and measure the results of interactions among its internal workings. Theory 
maintains a broad, all-encompassing (and hence higher) position on the 
hierarchical ladder of knowledge, and it is the existence of theory that guides the 
scientific development of models. There are variables and processes identified in 
combat theory that defy modeling efforts. The very existence of theory, 
extending beyond the narrower scope of modeling, provides a clearer picture of 
how well the problem is understood. 
No such comprehensive understanding of combat has existed. From very early 
days, military theorists such as Sun Tzu, von Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mahan 
have contributed essays to the large body of knowledge concerning armed 
conflict. Their efforts created the foundation for combat theory. The present 
effort attempts to address a part of the problem through application of the 
scientific method that has the rigor and consistency to afford a more 
comprehensive view of the entire process. Most particularly, it sheds light on the 
simultaneity of all combat activities, and the role of combat within the total 
conflict spectrum. 
Combat theory should be of prime importance to several classes of military and 
civilian users. These would include military practitioners (operational com- 
manders, staffs, planners); training professionals (basic and advanced training, 
unit training, exercises, special schools); and military thinkers (developers of 
tactics and doctrine, designers of operational tests, faculties and staffs at military 
academies, universities and war colleges, military research institutes, develop- 
mental activities). Other users should include the civilian defense analysis com- 
munity (academic institutions, contract researchers, not-for-profit think-tanks, 
historians, military buffs); and the modeling community (military modelers, 
civilian modelers, entertainment modelers and game developers). 
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Several military tasks can be well served by applications of combat theory: 
• Basic education of personnel in military science 
• Development of mathematical models and simulations of combat 
• Historical reconstruction and analysis of combat and war 
• Formulation of operational concepts and strategy 
• Doctrine development 
• Development of military weapons and support systems 
• Development of force concepts, structures, and organization of forces 
• Design of military exercises and combat experiments 
• Battle management and warfare analysis in real time 
Reliable theory offers advantages that extend well beyond the focus on parti- 
cular aspects of combat and the ability to quantify. Theory that provides 
extensive mapping of all of combat's parts into its whole affords an overview for 
military commanders, planners, students and historians alike of combafs 
unusual structural and dynamic complexity. 
When interest centers on processes that are more cognitive, such as command- 
control, motivation, and information acquisition, the utility of sound theory 
increases. Such processes are difficult to study and model explicitly, even though 
they pervade combat. Knowledge of how and where they enter the picture can 
be very useful even when their full effects are not understood. Theory that 
establishes patterns of influence and dependence among the combat processes 
would give military thinkers a deeper understanding. As a result, it plays a 
subliminal but important role in matters of tactics and doctrine, force 
structuring, and designing field exercises and tests. When attention shifts to 
actual military operations, combat theory becomes a source of foundational 
knowledge. In these latter instances, ties between theory and the real world are 
largely non-explicit and subtle. Nevertheless, the deeper understanding of 
combat provided by theory can contribute to military thought and practice. 
What is of greatest significance for the Leesburg meeting is that its primary 
recommendation has finally been addressed. A theory of combat has been 
developed for testing, modification, and improvement through widespread 
application to military problems, general validation using a variety of schemes, 
and further extension through research into broader areas of conflict such as 
campaigns and wars. 
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9.3     VALIDATION OF COMBAT THEORY 
In testing combat theory, we must compare key aspects of the theory against 
evidence from the real world. Our theory comes almost entirely from a distillate 
of human experience over much of recorded history. However, since World War 
II, the subject has taken on a more scientific cast that reflects attempts to apply 
mathematical and computational techniques to the study of combat. 
The present theory undertakes the task of describing all facets of combat in their 
interactive intricacy. Models address the degree of this interactivity over some 
restricted region of the theory domain. They generally strive to attain a higher 
level of information but over some narrower band of interest. While our theory 
is descriptive, a shift to modeling introduces possibilities of predictive investiga- 
tion. Yet the validation requirements for models with prescriptive and predictive 
power are far more formidable than those for the descriptive theory we have 
presented here. 
Existing data to use in theory validation is abundant but is hardly ever in a form 
that is immediately and directly useful. Generally, we must ferret out the 
information we need in a process that is both protracted and difficult. There are 
experiments and exercises that can be performed in direct response to a need for 
specific data and information, but relatively little of this form of activity has 
been undertaken to date in keeping with the general lack of attention to anything 
like combat theory and its validation. 
Because combat theory comes from combat experience, validation consists of 
comparing theory against instances of combat drawn from military literature, 
history, and experiment. Evidence likely to be useful for theory validation 
includes: 
• Natural experiments recorded in 
- Military histories 
- Memoirs of military notables 
- Essays and treatises in military theory and science 
• Purpose-built experiments such as 
- Combat exercises and experiments 
- Investigations of human behavior under stress 
- On-going warfare experimentation 
- Models and simulations of combat 
We find that the natural experiments offer the most prevalent and voluminous 
material, generally in narrative form as books, journals, articles, and professional 
papers. These provide data for what might be termed "soft validation," a process 
that aims to corroborate the universality of our theory's structural boundaries. 
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Included under such efforts are the following postulated characteristics of theory 
to be checked: 
• Universality over time from antiquity into the future 
• Invariance with combat domain (land, sea, air, and space) 
• Invariance with combat scale and intensity over the conflict spectrum 
• Structural congruity throughout the hierarchy of forces 
• Structural symmetry for opposing forces 
Additional aspects of theory that may be amenable to soft validation are: 
• Individual and unit behavior in combat 
• Combat friction, combined arms synergy, force integrity, and cohesion 
• Episodic nature of combat 
• Influence of external context variables on combat 
Soft validation might proceed from an extensive sampling of accounts of 
historical military actions that involve land, sea, air or combined arms combat. 
The sampling should also extend over time from antiquity to the present and 
should vary in combat scope from limited to large scale activity. Working with a 
rich enough set of historical evidence will permit partial corroboration or 
modification of the theory aspects listed above. To do so will first require that 
we attempt to trace function and process flows defined by theory through the 
historical accounts of combat. The entire structure of combat postulated in the 
theory should be carefully analyzed for satisfactory piece-by-piece fit with 
historical accounts that have been selected. 
When steps in theory development are so basic or abstract as to fall outside the 
purview of historical narrative, as with the axioms of Chapter 2, we can make 
use of "nonfalsification" principles in seeking a form of soft validation. This 
means that instead of seeking evidence of a match between theory and reality, 
we content ourselves with an apparent absence of any evidence that such a 
match does not exist. This is an even softer approach to validation, but at times it 
may be the only option. 
As we take our theory through combat structure (Chapter 6) and into structural 
dynamics and combat power (Chapters 7 and 8), we close in on the need for 
hard validation to couple theory to reality. Hard validation will demand models, 
exercises and experiments. As we push more deeply into the dynamic inter- 
activity of combat variables, qualitative descriptions of the phenomena are no 
longer adequate. Instead, we are driven to measuring degrees of interaction in 
some way. This enables us to confirm meaningful theoretical relationships as, for 
example, between combat power and its sources. Samples of such relationships 
are hypothesized in Chapter 8 in figures and plots (see Figures 23 - 25) that 
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should be exposed to testing. However, hard validation exercises cannot be 
based on historical material or essays. Instead, special experiments must be 
designed and the use of mathematical and computational models explored. Data 
gathering must be tailored to validation needs in specific yet complex areas of 
combat theory. 
Hard validation will be difficult, and a long, complex, multifaceted effort. It 
appears that the best chance for success is afforded by iterative, adaptive, self- 
correcting interplay among the key factors as stated in combat theories, historical 
data, military thought, models and experiments, whether exercised sequentially 
or in parallel. There is a paradox, however. We must use models to help us 
validate theory, but we must have theory to help us construct proper models. An 
iterative procedure cycling between better theory and better validation tech- 
niques may well provide the interplay for theory evolution. An ultimate aim 
would be to take theory from its descriptive state through to prescription and 
prediction while at the same time providing for improvements in modeling. 
When we consider the combat dynamics of the theory we must start thinking in 
quantitative terms (hence modeling) in order to couple theory with the evidence 
of real world behavior. 
The attainment of such coupling evades our grasp because of the inability to 
model all the combat processes that are involved. Military and operations 
analysts must carefully study the form of recent investigations undertaken in the 
physical, biological and social sciences that come under umbrella terms such as 
chaos theory, catastrophe theory, complex adaptive systems, fuzzy logic, neural 
nets and artificial intelligence. These new arrivals augment earlier investigations, 
such as those from game theory. At the outset, the adaptation of some of these 
for the study of military affairs may be as analogies or metaphors. Yet one 
would hope that when applied to analogous problems, these new scientific tools 
will provide us with useful descriptions of military phenomena. There is no real 
convergence of opinion as to the military applicability of these new techniques, 
even among the small body of experts in the field. It is quite possible that some 
or all of the new tools now being investigated may someday provide important 
advances to the theory of combat. At least these tools may aid in understanding 
combat through new relationships. For instance, the conclusion of complexity 
theory that progress and growth are most likely to occur at the boundary 
between a tightly ordered system and a chaotic, disordered system seems an 
insight full of meaning for military organization, doctrine and tactics. 
Combat exercises and experiments as sources of validation data are generally 
activities conducted in a mock-warfare environment expressly to train troops, to 
develop tactics and doctrine, or to learn more about the technical and 
operational characteristics of combat systems hardware. Precious few experi- 
ments have ever been conducted for the purpose of validating models or 
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theories. If validation needs are to be met, they must be piggy-backed onto 
exercises and experiments designed for other purposes. Since exercises are 
relatively elaborate undertakings, they would be considered very costly and 
cumbersome were they to be used only for theory and model validation or 
accreditation. Since they involve range facilities with special measuring 
equipment and employ a variety of personnel, sensors, weapons and other 
military hardware representing both friendly and enemy forces, it is not 
surprising that experiment reproducibility and control of combat variables 
would be considered poor for validation. Yet there are recent trends toward the 
selective conduct of experiments that are designed for, and can be run in parallel 
with, certain model constructs and abstractions. Such efforts could contribute to 
validation. 
A special class of experimental activity is laboratory and combat experiments 
designed to measure human performance under battle stress. This form of 
experimentation is a recent development that will play forces up to division and 
corps size, as well as joint task forces. It is too early to predict the degree of 
assistance these efforts will provide in testing combat theory. That they are being 
planned, however, is an indication of the importance attached to behavioral 
research in furthering a basic understanding of warfare. 
On-going warfare as "the laboratory" is not a new idea. The scientific study of 
war began during World War II and eventually provided impetus to the 
establishment of operations research as a formal discipline. The early emphasis 
was on evaluation of system concepts and tactical hypotheses. Subsequent wars 
(including Desert Storm) have seen more elaborate and extensive analytical 
testing during the conduct of military operations. Yet actual warfare presents 
only fleeting opportunity for scientific observations and collection of data. 
Combat events are not under the control of the experimenters. Nonetheless, war 
provides an environment that cannot be surpassed for realism of battle data. 
In summarizing the problems of theory validation, it is clear that uncovering 
data for hard validation will be more difficult than for soft validation. This 
condition is partially offset by the time-consuming process of sifting through 
mountains of soft data to find the right kind in the right form. Hard validation 
will become increasingly important as we become more concerned with meas- 
urement of cause and effect relationships. An adaptive procedure iteratively 
testing theory against varied sources of soft historical and hard experimental 
data appears to offer the most promising approach to theory validation. With 
little doubt, the road to validation will be long and difficult. 
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9.4     THEORY EVOLUTION 
We believe that the concise theory of combat presented in this document satisfies 
the most urgent requirements. Beyond providing a comprehensive picture of 
combat, the present theory affords the means to examine both operations and 
analytical techniques as to their adequacy. 
We recognize that there appears to be heavy emphasis on land warfare in the 
discussion and examples presented in this document. This is predicated on the 
belief that the complexity of land warfare exceeds that of other warfare domains 
and therefore warrants closer attention. While applicability of the theory to these 
other domains should not be in doubt, it nevertheless is fitting to look more 
closely into sea and air combat and to confirm their conformance to the theory as 
presented. 
What has been presented in this document is only a beginning. Much remains to 
be done to broaden the present work by extending its scope throughout the 
conflict spectrum and furthering its depth of penetration into cause and effect 
relationships. Meanwhile work continues at the Military Conflict Institute on 
other forms of military conflict and we anticipate additional discussion from 
Institute members and from the public at large in response to this document. The 
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